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Navigating Louisiana’s New Litigation Landscape: Critical Updates for Insurance Companies

October 22, 2025

Justine M. Ware

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Navigating Louisiana’s New Litigation Landscape: Critical Updates for Insurance Companies

In the last two years, Louisiana has implemented several significant reforms impacting the  litigation landscape for insurance companies. A clear understanding of these changes is essential for insurers that underwrite, broker, or adjust claims within the state.

  1.    Direct Action Statute

Historically, Louisiana law allowed plaintiffs to sue a tortfeasor’s liability insurer directly and name the insurer in the lawsuit caption. As of August 2024, this is no longer the law. Under the new Direct Action Statute, a plaintiff may bring a direct action against a tortfeasor’s insurer only if:

  1.    the insured has filed for bankruptcy;
  2.    the insured is insolvent;
  3.    the insured cannot be served with the petition after 180 days;
  4.    the tort claim arises between spouses or between a parent and child;
  5.    the insurer is a UM carrier;
  6.    the insured is deceased; or
  7.    the insurer is defending under a reservation of rights or denies coverage.

La. Rev. Stat. § 22:1269. Insurers should pay close attention to the seventh circumstance on this list. Many insurers issue a reservation of rights letter as a matter of course. They may wish to reconsider that practice if they wish to avoid being sued directly.

  1.    Prescription

Prior to July 1, 2024, a plaintiff had one year from the date of a tortious act against their person or immovable property to file a lawsuit. Louisiana has revised this deadline to allow two full years for plaintiffs to file their lawsuits.

The new deadline allows more time for pre-suit investigations and claim evaluations which should, hopefully, decrease the occurrence of frivolous filings as there will no longer be a rush to file. However, this increased time period creates a potential pitfall by increasing the risk of evidence deterioration such as loss of video footage, the repair of damaged vehicles, or destruction of records with one year retention policies. Insurers should take great care to preserve any evidence from the moment they are made aware of a claim and take proactive steps such as issuing preservation letters early.

  1.    Comparative Fault

A very significant change has occurred to Louisiana’s comparative fault laws. Louisiana has long been a pure comparative fault state, meaning a plaintiff can only recover from a defendant its percentage of fault. For example, if a defendant was found only 10% liable, the plaintiff could only recover 10% of the judgment amount from that defendant.

The new law states that if a plaintiff is found to be 51% at fault for the accident they sued upon, they are barred from recovering any damages. This is a major change in tort law, which some may view as extreme. Likewise, if a plaintiff is found at fault, but less than 51%,  recovery is reduced by their percentage of fault.

  1.    No Pay No Play

Previously in Louisiana, if a plaintiff did not have the minimum automobile liability insurance coverage she could not recover the first $15,000 in bodily injury or first $25,000 in property damage. 

Under the new law, uninsured plaintiffs are now prohibited from recovering the first $100,000, in bodily injury or property damage. This represents a major shift in Louisiana’s approach to uninsured motorists.

  1.    Collateral Source Rule

The change to the collateral source rule is significant for the consideration of how medical bills will be addressed before juries. The old law only allowed juries to be shown the full amount billed by medical providers. This allowed a potential windfall as commonly, the amount billed is not the actual amount paid by health insurance or the patient.

Under the new collateral source rule, if a plaintiff’s medical bills were paid by a health insurer or Medicare, the jury must be informed of both the amount billed and the amount actually paid. Any award of money to the plaintiff must be limited to the amount actually paid plus anything outstanding.

For other past medical bill paid by Medicaid or an uninsured patient, recovery includes both the amount paid and the outstanding amount including amounts secured by lien, privilege, or guarantee.

  1.    Medical Causation Presumption

Previously in Louisiana, plaintiffs benefited from what is colloquially referred to as The Housley Presumption. The Housley Presumption allowed a plaintiff to provide the jury with instructions to presume that simply because the plaintiff had no prior history of illness, injury, or condition, that the accident sued upon caused their medical condition. This presumption has been problematic for defendants as it negates common sense in situations where a plaintiff may have a degenerative condition, unrelated condition, or a condition that was pre-existing but never treated by a physician.

This presumption no longer exists as of May 2025. The result of the dissolution of this presumption means plaintiffs must now present affirmative medical evidence to prove their injuries were caused by an accident even when they have no prior medical history.

  1.    Settlement Funding / Bad Faith

A requirement that has always been present has been moved to a different statute, but bears reviewing. All settlements with insurance companies must be paid within 30 days of the agreement. That agreement does not need to be written or formal. La. Rev. Stat. §  22:1892(I).

In practice, there is some flexibility to this rigid deadline. For example, the parties can enter into an initial written settlement agreement that includes payment terms which suspend the 30-day funding requirement.

Together, these changes significantly alter how insurance disputes will be litigated and resolved in Louisiana. Insurers and claims professionals should adapt their processes, reinforce evidence preservation efforts, and educate internal teams on the new requirements to reduce exposure and maintain compliance in this evolving legal environment.


Firm Highlights

  • Insight

    No Mercy for Employers in Louisiana Supreme Court’s Recent Magill Decision

    In its recent per curiam opinion, Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska[1], the Louisiana Supreme Court has foreclosed a routine defense strategy to shield employers from direct negligence claims. The high court has extended their 2022 decision in Martin v. Thomas[2], and now allows plaintiffs to pursue direct negligence claims against an employer despite the employer’s stipulation that its employee was in the course-and-scope of employment and caused the accident. Essentially, employers who fail to implement better employment practices will permit plaintiffs to ramp up potential exposure with evidence, if such exists, that heretofore they were routinely barred from introducing at trial. The Supreme Court’s Magill holding should encourage employers to update where needed their policies and procedures pertaining to hiring, training, supervising, and entrusting duties and property to employees, not only for the safety of their employees and customers in this state, but also eliminate employer’s exposure to direct negligence claims. Prior to Martin, a litigation strategy had taken shape where employers stipulated to 1) an employee being in course-and-scope of employment at the time of the accident, 2) that the employee was at fault for the accident being caused, or 3) both. By stipulating these facts, employers were largely able to exclude evidence of any direct negligence on part of the employer and/or narrow the scope of trial to only a contest of the plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court in Martin held that despite an employer admitting their employee was in course and scope when the accident occurred, plaintiffs could pursue direct negligence claims against the employer—as the issue of liability had not been admitted. Accordingly, employers found success by admitting both course and scope and liability—as seen in the Western District of Louisiana’s holding in Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona[3]. In Ferguson, the defendants stipulated that their employee was acting in course-and-scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. Due to the employer’s stipulation of fault, Judge Wicks of the Western District of Louisiana held that Martin did not apply and that plaintiffs could not pursue direct negligence claims. In Magill, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided scarce reasoning for their decision. The high court simply affirmed the District Court’s expansion of the holding in Martin and that the employer’s reliance on the Western District’s Ferguson holding was a misapplication of Louisiana law. The Supreme Court also cited the decision in Tardo v. Farrell.[4] where the Fifth Circuit held that even if an employer and employee stipulate to course and scope and fault, those admissions do not eliminate direct-negligence claims because those claims remain separate issues for the trier of fact. The Fifth Circuit notably stated, “the societal decisions as to who actually pays does not change the manner of assessing fault to all parties as required by law.” This statement raises concern, as plaintiffs may now attempt to challenge employer stipulations that historically narrowed trials. The Supreme Court did not explain its reliance on Tardo, so future litigation will likely clarify the decision’s full impact. Under Magill, plaintiffs are permitted to pursue direct negligence claims against the employer despite the employer admitting that their employee was acting in course and scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. The full effect of the Supreme Court’s decision remains to be seen. In praxis, Magill will permit plaintiffs to put on evidence of direct negligence by an employer in front of a jury who cannot assign fault—as fault has already been stipulated to by the defendants. Employers now face the practical risk that plaintiffs will encourage juries to increase damages as a form of punishment against an employer that admits fault but contests the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries. Employers should use this moment to rigorously review and strengthen policies and procedures related to hiring and training in order to limit exposure when plaintiffs assert direct-negligence claims.  [1] Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska, 2025-00892 (La. 11/12/25) [2] Martin v. Thomas, 21-01490 (La. 6/29/22), 346 So.3d 238 [3] Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, 17-1570, 2023 WL 173413 (W.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) [4] Tardo v. Ferrell, 25-123 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/25), 2025 WL 1516837 (unpublished).
  • Experience

    Burnell Joseph v. Atalco Gramercy, LLC et al., No. 3:23-cv-505, United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

    Bob Kerrigan and Jose Ruiz successfully secured summary judgment dismissal for their client, Velan, Inc., in a complex intentional tort and products liability act involving catastrophic injury. The plaintiff, a precipitation batch tank operator working at the Atalco alumina refinery in Gramercy, Louisiana, suffered severe and debilitating chemical burn injuries to his face, eyes, and body when he was sprayed with caustic liquor while working underneath a tank at the refinery. He claimed that the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank was leaking, which allowed the tank to become filled with liquor after it had been previously verified as empty. He filed suit against Velan, Inc., the manufacturer of the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank, alleging that the valve was unreasonable dangerous in accordance with the Louisiana Products Liability Act. He also filed an intentional tort claim against his employer, Atalco Gramercy, LLC, alleging that Atalco knew the valve was leaking and continued to force employees to work underneath the tank. He claimed that under these conditions, an incident such as his was substantially certain to occur. Following the close of discovery, Velan moved for summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims was appropriate because: (1) the plaintiff’s injuries were a result of Atalco’s misuse of the valve; (2) the plaintiff lacked the expert testimony needed to prove his theory of liability under the Louisiana Product’s Liability Act; (3) the Velan valve at issue was not unreasonably dangerous as defined by the Louisiana Products Liability Act; and (4) the plaintiff was unable to prove proximate causation needed to establish his case of liability against Velan. The Hon. Brian Jackson found that under the undisputed facts presented by Velan, summary judgment was appropriate and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against it, with prejudice.