Insights

Deutsch Kerrigan Article /

Setting Precedent: Louisiana Supreme Court's Landmark Decision on General Damages in Mesothelioma Cases

November 3, 2023

Amber B. Garcia

share this page

Setting Precedent: Louisiana Supreme Court's Landmark Decision on General Damages in Mesothelioma Cases

In November 2020, a jury in Orleans Parish awarded a nearly $10.3 million dollar verdict to Henry Pete, a plaintiff who alleged exposure to asbestos caused his mesothelioma.  The trial judge signed a judgment confirming to the jury’s verdict.  One of the defendants appealed the judge denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and included three assignments of error, including the excessiveness of the general damage award.  The Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed.  The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the issue of quantum.  On October 20, 2023, the Louisiana Supreme Court handed down its opinion.

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the issue of quantum. Specifically, the Court decided whether the court of appeal properly found no abuse of discretion in the jury’s award of approximately $10 million in general damages to Plaintiff, Henry Pete, who developed mesothelioma as a result of his exposure to asbestos.

In short, the Louisiana Supreme Court reduced the general damage award from $9,800,000 to $5,000,000.  Together with the past medical expenses, the Court rendered judgment in the sum of $5,551,020.70.

The Louisiana Supreme Court held that an appellate court must consider relevant prior general damage awards as guidance in determining whether a trier of fact’s award is an abuse of discretion.  Applying this principle to the Henry Pete case, the Louisiana Supreme Court found that the jury abused its discretion in awarding $9.8 million in general damages, finding that the evidence presented at trial does not support an award that far exceeds the highest reasonable awards in cases involving similar injuries.  The Court went on to find $5 million is the highest amount that could reasonably be awarded.

As a reminder, the jury awarded $10,351,020.70 as follows:

  • Past and future physician pain and suffering: $2,000,000
  • Past and future mental pain and suffering: $2,300,000
  • Past and future physical disability: $3,000,000
  • Past and future loss of enjoyment of life: $2,500,000
  • Past medical expenses: $551,020.70

Defendant, Ports America appealed, and the court of appeal affirmed.  The court of appeal did not find that the jury abused its discretion in its award to Henry Peter and declined to disturb the jury’s award.

The Louisiana Supreme Court recognized that a jury has great discretion in awarding general damages but also recognized that the discretion is not unfettered.  The Court went on to note that the abuse of discretion standard for appellate review lacks parameters, and the Court was compelled to find an approach that includes an element of objectivity.

The Court held that appellate courts must now look at past general damage awards for similar injuries in determining whether the trier of fact abused its much discretion.  The Court reiterated that this was not the only parameter to be considered in evaluating whether a general damage award is an abuse of discretion, but to determine whether a trier of fact abused its discretion in its award for general damages, an appellate court is to consider the particular facts and circumstances of a case, in conjunction with a review of prior awards.  This applies to claims of excessiveness as well as insufficiency in an award.

While we don’t think this case will set a cap of $5,000,000 on mesothelioma cases, it certainly makes clear that we must consider past awards.  This will certainly impact how Plaintiffs now must value asbestos cases in Louisiana.  The slippery slope, of course, is that we can see appellate courts reducing judgments as well as increasing judgments.

Firm Highlights

  • Insight

    No Mercy for Employers in Louisiana Supreme Court’s Recent Magill Decision

    In its recent per curiam opinion, Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska[1], the Louisiana Supreme Court has foreclosed a routine defense strategy to shield employers from direct negligence claims. The high court has extended their 2022 decision in Martin v. Thomas[2], and now allows plaintiffs to pursue direct negligence claims against an employer despite the employer’s stipulation that its employee was in the course-and-scope of employment and caused the accident. Essentially, employers who fail to implement better employment practices will permit plaintiffs to ramp up potential exposure with evidence, if such exists, that heretofore they were routinely barred from introducing at trial. The Supreme Court’s Magill holding should encourage employers to update where needed their policies and procedures pertaining to hiring, training, supervising, and entrusting duties and property to employees, not only for the safety of their employees and customers in this state, but also eliminate employer’s exposure to direct negligence claims. Prior to Martin, a litigation strategy had taken shape where employers stipulated to 1) an employee being in course-and-scope of employment at the time of the accident, 2) that the employee was at fault for the accident being caused, or 3) both. By stipulating these facts, employers were largely able to exclude evidence of any direct negligence on part of the employer and/or narrow the scope of trial to only a contest of the plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court in Martin held that despite an employer admitting their employee was in course and scope when the accident occurred, plaintiffs could pursue direct negligence claims against the employer—as the issue of liability had not been admitted. Accordingly, employers found success by admitting both course and scope and liability—as seen in the Western District of Louisiana’s holding in Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona[3]. In Ferguson, the defendants stipulated that their employee was acting in course-and-scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. Due to the employer’s stipulation of fault, Judge Wicks of the Western District of Louisiana held that Martin did not apply and that plaintiffs could not pursue direct negligence claims. In Magill, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided scarce reasoning for their decision. The high court simply affirmed the District Court’s expansion of the holding in Martin and that the employer’s reliance on the Western District’s Ferguson holding was a misapplication of Louisiana law. The Supreme Court also cited the decision in Tardo v. Farrell.[4] where the Fifth Circuit held that even if an employer and employee stipulate to course and scope and fault, those admissions do not eliminate direct-negligence claims because those claims remain separate issues for the trier of fact. The Fifth Circuit notably stated, “the societal decisions as to who actually pays does not change the manner of assessing fault to all parties as required by law.” This statement raises concern, as plaintiffs may now attempt to challenge employer stipulations that historically narrowed trials. The Supreme Court did not explain its reliance on Tardo, so future litigation will likely clarify the decision’s full impact. Under Magill, plaintiffs are permitted to pursue direct negligence claims against the employer despite the employer admitting that their employee was acting in course and scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. The full effect of the Supreme Court’s decision remains to be seen. In praxis, Magill will permit plaintiffs to put on evidence of direct negligence by an employer in front of a jury who cannot assign fault—as fault has already been stipulated to by the defendants. Employers now face the practical risk that plaintiffs will encourage juries to increase damages as a form of punishment against an employer that admits fault but contests the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries. Employers should use this moment to rigorously review and strengthen policies and procedures related to hiring and training in order to limit exposure when plaintiffs assert direct-negligence claims.  [1] Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska, 2025-00892 (La. 11/12/25) [2] Martin v. Thomas, 21-01490 (La. 6/29/22), 346 So.3d 238 [3] Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, 17-1570, 2023 WL 173413 (W.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) [4] Tardo v. Ferrell, 25-123 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/25), 2025 WL 1516837 (unpublished).
  • Experience

    Burnell Joseph v. Atalco Gramercy, LLC et al., No. 3:23-cv-505, United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

    Bob Kerrigan and Jose Ruiz successfully secured summary judgment dismissal for their client, Velan, Inc., in a complex intentional tort and products liability act involving catastrophic injury. The plaintiff, a precipitation batch tank operator working at the Atalco alumina refinery in Gramercy, Louisiana, suffered severe and debilitating chemical burn injuries to his face, eyes, and body when he was sprayed with caustic liquor while working underneath a tank at the refinery. He claimed that the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank was leaking, which allowed the tank to become filled with liquor after it had been previously verified as empty. He filed suit against Velan, Inc., the manufacturer of the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank, alleging that the valve was unreasonable dangerous in accordance with the Louisiana Products Liability Act. He also filed an intentional tort claim against his employer, Atalco Gramercy, LLC, alleging that Atalco knew the valve was leaking and continued to force employees to work underneath the tank. He claimed that under these conditions, an incident such as his was substantially certain to occur. Following the close of discovery, Velan moved for summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims was appropriate because: (1) the plaintiff’s injuries were a result of Atalco’s misuse of the valve; (2) the plaintiff lacked the expert testimony needed to prove his theory of liability under the Louisiana Product’s Liability Act; (3) the Velan valve at issue was not unreasonably dangerous as defined by the Louisiana Products Liability Act; and (4) the plaintiff was unable to prove proximate causation needed to establish his case of liability against Velan. The Hon. Brian Jackson found that under the undisputed facts presented by Velan, summary judgment was appropriate and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against it, with prejudice.