Portrait of Kermit L. Roux, III

Kermit L. Roux, III

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Portrait of Kermit L. Roux, III
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Kermit Tre’ Roux III represents insureds, claims adjusters, third-party administrators and underwriters in litigation and appeals. Tre’ is a trusted advisor for some of the world's leading insurance companies in the United States, Canada, Bermuda and London. He also defends hotels, restaurants, bars, grocery stores, convenience stores and transportation companies against premises liability claims, food poisoning claims, slip and fall claims, chemical exposure, and other catastrophic injury and wrongful death claims. He represents his clients in all facets of civil litigation, including single-party, multi-party and class action cases.

Maintaining a diverse practice, Tre’ also represents clients in select family law matters. Understanding that these matters can be trying on multiple levels, he works to efficiently achieve favorable and amicable results for his clients. As one of the leading domestic attorneys in the greater New Orleans area, Tre’ represents clients in matters involving divorce, contested custody, child support, spousal support, relocations, visitation, domestic abuse, community property and paternity claims.

Tre’ currently serves as the Legal Staff Officer for the Eighth U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary District, Coastal Region, where he handles all legal issues of the Division, its Flotillas, and its 1,900 men and women. He has been a Flotilla Commander for the New Orleans-based Flotilla 4-3 and a Staff Officer for the Fourth Division of the Eighth District, Coastal Region. He has received the Auxiliary Award of the Operational Merit, the Auxiliary Sustained Service Award, the Coast Guard Meritorious Team Commendation, the Coast Guard Unit Commendation, the Specialty Training Award, the Operations Program Award, the Program Examiner Award, the Auxiliary Membership Award, and most recently the Sustained Service Award for superior performance of service in excess of 3,000 cumulative hours.

    • Tulane University (J.D., 1994)
    • Southern Methodist University (B.B.A., 1991)
    • Tulane University (J.D., 1994)
    • Southern Methodist University (B.B.A., 1991)
    • Louisiana
    • U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
    • U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana
    • U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana
    • U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
    • Louisiana
    • U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
    • U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana
    • U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana
    • U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
  • Louisiana Bar Foundation, Fellow

    Louisiana State Bar Association

    American Bar Association

    New Orleans Bar Association
    Bankruptcy Section

    Louisiana Association of Defense Council

    Texas State Bar Association

    Louisiana Bar Foundation, Fellow

    Louisiana State Bar Association

    American Bar Association

    New Orleans Bar Association
    Bankruptcy Section

    Louisiana Association of Defense Council

    Texas State Bar Association

    • Inside New Orleans Readers’ Favorite Elite Lawyer, 2021

    • Recognized in The Best Lawyers in America©, 2018-present

    • Who's Who in American Law, 2000-present

    • New Orleans Magazine "Top Lawyers" List, 2012

    • Pro Bono Volunteer Recognition Award, 2009

    • AV Preeminent Martindale-Hubbell® Peer Review Rating™

    • New Orleans CityBusiness "Leadership in Law" List of the Top 50 Lawyers in New Orleans, 2012

    • Inside New Orleans Readers’ Favorite Elite Lawyer, 2021

    • Recognized in The Best Lawyers in America©, 2018-present

    • Who's Who in American Law, 2000-present

    • New Orleans Magazine "Top Lawyers" List, 2012

    • Pro Bono Volunteer Recognition Award, 2009

    • AV Preeminent Martindale-Hubbell® Peer Review Rating™

    • New Orleans CityBusiness "Leadership in Law" List of the Top 50 Lawyers in New Orleans, 2012

  • Family Law - Spousal Support

    In 2009, Mr. and Mrs. Rosenfeld agreed to child custody and child support arrangements further stipulating that Dr. Rosenfeld would pay permanent spousal support in the amount of $3,000 per month for two years beginning in August 2009 and $2,000 per month thereafter for four years. Settlement documents executed between the parties did not contain a non-modification clause. Eventually, Mrs. Rosenfeld remarried and Dr. Rosenfeld moved to terminate her spousal support awards pursuant to LSA-C.C. Art. 115.

    The trial court found that the agreement entered into by the parties did not expressly prohibit modification and therefore terminated Mrs. Rosenfeld's spousal support award. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's award noting that the jurisprudence demonstrates that a non-modification clause contained in a Consent Judgement will be enforced by Louisiana courts and prohibit modification of a spousal support agreement. In this case, however, the Consent Judgement failed to expressly prohibit modification of the award and therefore, the award was subject to modification or termination. Louisiana Civil Code Article 115 specifically provides that by operation of law, the obligation of a spouse to pay spousal support is extinguished upon remarriage of the obligee's spouse. The Fifth Circuit noted that the Judgement of the trial court was correct in the determination that Article 115 applied to the facts of this case and as a matter of law, terminated any obligation Dr. Rosenfeld had to pay spousal support to Mrs. Rosenfeld following her remarriage.

    Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 11-686, 90 So.3d, 1077 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2012)

    Family Law - Paternity

    Derrick Pociask and Kara Moseley were married at the time of Hurricane Katrina. Following the tragic storm, Pociask's employer left the city of New Orleans and offered him a position in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Prior to leaving, Pociask arranged for a contractor to perform repairs to his house with the expectation that the home would thereafter be sold and that Kara Moseley and her young son would eventually join him in Pennsylvania. Unfortunately, Moseley had an affair with the contractor and the marriage quickly disintegrated after she became pregnant with the contractor's child.

    After the birth, Pociask filed a Petition to Disavow Paternity. Because the child was born while the divorce was pending, there was a presumption that Pociask was still the father of the child after the paternity test confirmed it wasn't. Eventually, Pociask filed a Motion for Summary Judgement asserting that he was not the biological father of the minor child. Moseley countered with her own Motion for Summary Judgement alleging that Pociask could not avail himself of the exception to the time limitations set forth in the Civil Code Article 189 which addressed disavowal actions. She claimed that the parties did not live separate and apart continuously during the 300 days immediately preceding the birth of the minor child. The trial court eventually granted Pociask's Motion for Summary Judgement. In a shocking move, the First Circuit Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's ruling finding that Pociask was presumed to be the father of the child because he spent one or two nights with his wife in the 300 days prior to the birth of the child.

    The Supreme Court granted Writs and reversed the Court of Appeal's erroneous ruling finding that Pociask could avail himself of the 300-day time period exception to the running of prescription in the disavow action. In this ruling, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeal erred in not reading Louisiana Civil Code Article 189 in pari materia with La. Civil Code Articles 102 and 103 before determining whether the husband and mother had lived separate and apart continuously for the 300 days immediately preceding the birth of the child. The District Court correctly found that one overnight visit, absent any allegation of cohabitation, sexual relations, or reconciliation, did not serve to interrupt the 300 day period. Thus, the Supreme Court found that the District Court properly denied the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgement and granted Summary Judgement in favor of Pociask allowing him to disavow the paternity of the minor child.

    Pociask v. Moseley, 2013-0232, 122 So.3d, 533 (La. 2013)

    Family Law - Child Support

    This case involved the setting of child support and, in particular, the computation of Ms. Favor's husband's income. Ms. Favor argued unsuccessfully on appeal that Mr. Favor's income was twice that which was found by the trial court.

    Family Law - Custody and Visitation

    The 24th Judicial District Court entered an Injunction prohibiting both ex-spouses from exercising overnight custody or visitation with the minor children while persons of the opposite sex, not married or related by blood, were present. Fred Harper appealed. The Court of Appeal found that the trial court's failure to make a best interest of the children finding when modifying the Custody/Visitation Agreement was legal error and that the ex-wife failed to meet the burden of proving that the requested modification of Custody/Visitation Agreement was in the best interest of the children.

    Harper v. Harper, 777 So.2d 1275

    Family Law - Child Support

    In this case, the ex-wife filed a Motion to Increase Child Support after one her two children reached the age of majority. The Civil District Court increased child support for the remaining minor child retroactive from the date of judicial demand. The former husband failed to pay the retroactive component of the new support obligation and informed the university where the adult son attended classes that he would no longer pay tuition and fees. Thereafter, the ex-wife filed a Motion for Contempt and to Compel. The District Court granted the ex-husband's Exception of No Right of Action and No Cause of Action. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that a parent may not sue to enforce the other parent's child support obligation after a child reaches the age of majority.

    Rosenbloom v. Bauchat, 654 So.2d 873

    Family Law - Child Support

    Rosenbloom v. Rosenbloom was one of the first significant appellate decisions addressing the setting of child support when the combined gross monthly income exceeds the highest amount set forth on the child support table. In this case, the Court of Appeal found that the trial court erred in setting the support obligation using a fixed percentage where the parents' income exceeded the maximum income set forth in the child support guidelines. The Fourth Circuit subsequently reduced the child support obligation in view of all of the evidence submitted as to the child's expenses.

    Rosenbloom v. Rosenbloom, 654 So.2d 877

    Family Law - Property Distribution

    The trial court entered an Order partitioning life insurance policies, annuities, and individual retirement accounts (IRA's) in creating an equal distribution between the husband and wife for the value of the policies. The husband appealed. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that the proceeds of the life insurance policy, but not the life insurance policy itself, are considered sui generis and not subject to claims of community in a partition of community property. The Fifth Circuit further found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dividing the value of the policies equally even though the husband purchased the majority of the policies on his life for the wife's benefit and only one of 11 policies divided the insured's wife's life.

    Kambur v. Kambur, 652 So.2d 99

    Family Law - Spousal Support

    In 2009, Mr. and Mrs. Rosenfeld agreed to child custody and child support arrangements further stipulating that Dr. Rosenfeld would pay permanent spousal support in the amount of $3,000 per month for two years beginning in August 2009 and $2,000 per month thereafter for four years. Settlement documents executed between the parties did not contain a non-modification clause. Eventually, Mrs. Rosenfeld remarried and Dr. Rosenfeld moved to terminate her spousal support awards pursuant to LSA-C.C. Art. 115.

    The trial court found that the agreement entered into by the parties did not expressly prohibit modification and therefore terminated Mrs. Rosenfeld's spousal support award. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's award noting that the jurisprudence demonstrates that a non-modification clause contained in a Consent Judgement will be enforced by Louisiana courts and prohibit modification of a spousal support agreement. In this case, however, the Consent Judgement failed to expressly prohibit modification of the award and therefore, the award was subject to modification or termination. Louisiana Civil Code Article 115 specifically provides that by operation of law, the obligation of a spouse to pay spousal support is extinguished upon remarriage of the obligee's spouse. The Fifth Circuit noted that the Judgement of the trial court was correct in the determination that Article 115 applied to the facts of this case and as a matter of law, terminated any obligation Dr. Rosenfeld had to pay spousal support to Mrs. Rosenfeld following her remarriage.

    Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 11-686, 90 So.3d, 1077 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2012)

    Family Law - Paternity

    Derrick Pociask and Kara Moseley were married at the time of Hurricane Katrina. Following the tragic storm, Pociask's employer left the city of New Orleans and offered him a position in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Prior to leaving, Pociask arranged for a contractor to perform repairs to his house with the expectation that the home would thereafter be sold and that Kara Moseley and her young son would eventually join him in Pennsylvania. Unfortunately, Moseley had an affair with the contractor and the marriage quickly disintegrated after she became pregnant with the contractor's child.

    After the birth, Pociask filed a Petition to Disavow Paternity. Because the child was born while the divorce was pending, there was a presumption that Pociask was still the father of the child after the paternity test confirmed it wasn't. Eventually, Pociask filed a Motion for Summary Judgement asserting that he was not the biological father of the minor child. Moseley countered with her own Motion for Summary Judgement alleging that Pociask could not avail himself of the exception to the time limitations set forth in the Civil Code Article 189 which addressed disavowal actions. She claimed that the parties did not live separate and apart continuously during the 300 days immediately preceding the birth of the minor child. The trial court eventually granted Pociask's Motion for Summary Judgement. In a shocking move, the First Circuit Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's ruling finding that Pociask was presumed to be the father of the child because he spent one or two nights with his wife in the 300 days prior to the birth of the child.

    The Supreme Court granted Writs and reversed the Court of Appeal's erroneous ruling finding that Pociask could avail himself of the 300-day time period exception to the running of prescription in the disavow action. In this ruling, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeal erred in not reading Louisiana Civil Code Article 189 in pari materia with La. Civil Code Articles 102 and 103 before determining whether the husband and mother had lived separate and apart continuously for the 300 days immediately preceding the birth of the child. The District Court correctly found that one overnight visit, absent any allegation of cohabitation, sexual relations, or reconciliation, did not serve to interrupt the 300 day period. Thus, the Supreme Court found that the District Court properly denied the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgement and granted Summary Judgement in favor of Pociask allowing him to disavow the paternity of the minor child.

    Pociask v. Moseley, 2013-0232, 122 So.3d, 533 (La. 2013)

    Family Law - Child Support

    This case involved the setting of child support and, in particular, the computation of Ms. Favor's husband's income. Ms. Favor argued unsuccessfully on appeal that Mr. Favor's income was twice that which was found by the trial court.

    Family Law - Custody and Visitation

    The 24th Judicial District Court entered an Injunction prohibiting both ex-spouses from exercising overnight custody or visitation with the minor children while persons of the opposite sex, not married or related by blood, were present. Fred Harper appealed. The Court of Appeal found that the trial court's failure to make a best interest of the children finding when modifying the Custody/Visitation Agreement was legal error and that the ex-wife failed to meet the burden of proving that the requested modification of Custody/Visitation Agreement was in the best interest of the children.

    Harper v. Harper, 777 So.2d 1275

    Family Law - Child Support

    In this case, the ex-wife filed a Motion to Increase Child Support after one her two children reached the age of majority. The Civil District Court increased child support for the remaining minor child retroactive from the date of judicial demand. The former husband failed to pay the retroactive component of the new support obligation and informed the university where the adult son attended classes that he would no longer pay tuition and fees. Thereafter, the ex-wife filed a Motion for Contempt and to Compel. The District Court granted the ex-husband's Exception of No Right of Action and No Cause of Action. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that a parent may not sue to enforce the other parent's child support obligation after a child reaches the age of majority.

    Rosenbloom v. Bauchat, 654 So.2d 873

    Family Law - Child Support

    Rosenbloom v. Rosenbloom was one of the first significant appellate decisions addressing the setting of child support when the combined gross monthly income exceeds the highest amount set forth on the child support table. In this case, the Court of Appeal found that the trial court erred in setting the support obligation using a fixed percentage where the parents' income exceeded the maximum income set forth in the child support guidelines. The Fourth Circuit subsequently reduced the child support obligation in view of all of the evidence submitted as to the child's expenses.

    Rosenbloom v. Rosenbloom, 654 So.2d 877

    Family Law - Property Distribution

    The trial court entered an Order partitioning life insurance policies, annuities, and individual retirement accounts (IRA's) in creating an equal distribution between the husband and wife for the value of the policies. The husband appealed. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that the proceeds of the life insurance policy, but not the life insurance policy itself, are considered sui generis and not subject to claims of community in a partition of community property. The Fifth Circuit further found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dividing the value of the policies equally even though the husband purchased the majority of the policies on his life for the wife's benefit and only one of 11 policies divided the insured's wife's life.

    Kambur v. Kambur, 652 So.2d 99

Firm Highlights

  • Insight

    No Mercy for Employers in Louisiana Supreme Court’s Recent Magill Decision

    In its recent per curiam opinion, Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska[1], the Louisiana Supreme Court has foreclosed a routine defense strategy to shield employers from direct negligence claims. The high court has extended their 2022 decision in Martin v. Thomas[2], and now allows plaintiffs to pursue direct negligence claims against an employer despite the employer’s stipulation that its employee was in the course-and-scope of employment and caused the accident. Essentially, employers who fail to implement better employment practices will permit plaintiffs to ramp up potential exposure with evidence, if such exists, that heretofore they were routinely barred from introducing at trial. The Supreme Court’s Magill holding should encourage employers to update where needed their policies and procedures pertaining to hiring, training, supervising, and entrusting duties and property to employees, not only for the safety of their employees and customers in this state, but also eliminate employer’s exposure to direct negligence claims. Prior to Martin, a litigation strategy had taken shape where employers stipulated to 1) an employee being in course-and-scope of employment at the time of the accident, 2) that the employee was at fault for the accident being caused, or 3) both. By stipulating these facts, employers were largely able to exclude evidence of any direct negligence on part of the employer and/or narrow the scope of trial to only a contest of the plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court in Martin held that despite an employer admitting their employee was in course and scope when the accident occurred, plaintiffs could pursue direct negligence claims against the employer—as the issue of liability had not been admitted. Accordingly, employers found success by admitting both course and scope and liability—as seen in the Western District of Louisiana’s holding in Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona[3]. In Ferguson, the defendants stipulated that their employee was acting in course-and-scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. Due to the employer’s stipulation of fault, Judge Wicks of the Western District of Louisiana held that Martin did not apply and that plaintiffs could not pursue direct negligence claims. In Magill, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided scarce reasoning for their decision. The high court simply affirmed the District Court’s expansion of the holding in Martin and that the employer’s reliance on the Western District’s Ferguson holding was a misapplication of Louisiana law. The Supreme Court also cited the decision in Tardo v. Farrell.[4] where the Fifth Circuit held that even if an employer and employee stipulate to course and scope and fault, those admissions do not eliminate direct-negligence claims because those claims remain separate issues for the trier of fact. The Fifth Circuit notably stated, “the societal decisions as to who actually pays does not change the manner of assessing fault to all parties as required by law.” This statement raises concern, as plaintiffs may now attempt to challenge employer stipulations that historically narrowed trials. The Supreme Court did not explain its reliance on Tardo, so future litigation will likely clarify the decision’s full impact. Under Magill, plaintiffs are permitted to pursue direct negligence claims against the employer despite the employer admitting that their employee was acting in course and scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. The full effect of the Supreme Court’s decision remains to be seen. In praxis, Magill will permit plaintiffs to put on evidence of direct negligence by an employer in front of a jury who cannot assign fault—as fault has already been stipulated to by the defendants. Employers now face the practical risk that plaintiffs will encourage juries to increase damages as a form of punishment against an employer that admits fault but contests the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries. Employers should use this moment to rigorously review and strengthen policies and procedures related to hiring and training in order to limit exposure when plaintiffs assert direct-negligence claims.  [1] Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska, 2025-00892 (La. 11/12/25) [2] Martin v. Thomas, 21-01490 (La. 6/29/22), 346 So.3d 238 [3] Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, 17-1570, 2023 WL 173413 (W.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) [4] Tardo v. Ferrell, 25-123 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/25), 2025 WL 1516837 (unpublished).
  • Experience

    Burnell Joseph v. Atalco Gramercy, LLC et al., No. 3:23-cv-505, United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

    Bob Kerrigan and Jose Ruiz successfully secured summary judgment dismissal for their client, Velan, Inc., in a complex intentional tort and products liability act involving catastrophic injury. The plaintiff, a precipitation batch tank operator working at the Atalco alumina refinery in Gramercy, Louisiana, suffered severe and debilitating chemical burn injuries to his face, eyes, and body when he was sprayed with caustic liquor while working underneath a tank at the refinery. He claimed that the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank was leaking, which allowed the tank to become filled with liquor after it had been previously verified as empty. He filed suit against Velan, Inc., the manufacturer of the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank, alleging that the valve was unreasonable dangerous in accordance with the Louisiana Products Liability Act. He also filed an intentional tort claim against his employer, Atalco Gramercy, LLC, alleging that Atalco knew the valve was leaking and continued to force employees to work underneath the tank. He claimed that under these conditions, an incident such as his was substantially certain to occur. Following the close of discovery, Velan moved for summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims was appropriate because: (1) the plaintiff’s injuries were a result of Atalco’s misuse of the valve; (2) the plaintiff lacked the expert testimony needed to prove his theory of liability under the Louisiana Product’s Liability Act; (3) the Velan valve at issue was not unreasonably dangerous as defined by the Louisiana Products Liability Act; and (4) the plaintiff was unable to prove proximate causation needed to establish his case of liability against Velan. The Hon. Brian Jackson found that under the undisputed facts presented by Velan, summary judgment was appropriate and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against it, with prejudice.