Experience

US Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals – Maritime indemnity claims reinstated

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US Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals – Maritime indemnity claims reinstated

In a major decision concerning maritime indemnity contracts, issued on January 11, 2024, the Fifth reinstated Palfinger USA, Inc.'s indemnity claims against Shell Offshore, Inc. that arose from a 2019 lifeboat accident in which two of Shell’s workers were killed and another was injured. Deutsch Kerrigan attorneys Joseph McReynolds and Raymond Lewis represented Palfinger USA. The dispute centered on whether Palfinger's contract to inspect and repair Shell's lifeboats on a tension-leg platform in the Gulf of Mexico  was a maritime contract.

The district court had ruled that the contract was not maritime, ostensibly applying the Fifth Circuit's recent test from its 2018 en banc decision In re Larry Doiron, Inc.  In the district court’s view, the fact that the lifeboats were vessels was not sufficient to establish the maritime nature of Palfinger’s contract. The district court reasoned that the lifeboats weren't functioning as maritime vessels but were serving as safety equipment for oil and gas exploration on the platform and were not engaged “in maritime commerce.”

In reversing the district court's decision, the Fifth Circuit agreed with Palfinger that its contract to inspect and repair the lifeboats, as vessels, regardless of whether the lifeboats were themselves engaged in commerce, was a maritime contract.

Drawing heavily from decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court in North Pacific S.S. Co. v. Hall Bros. Marine Ry. & Shipbuilding Co. (1919) and Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Kirby (2004), the Fifth Circuit held that the district court misapplied Doiron by employing a “spatial” analysis that focused on where the work was performed (on the platform), rather than undertaking the requisite "conceptual analysis" of the nature and character of the contract and its relation to traditional maritime activities and maritime services. The requisite “conceptual” analysis, according to the Fifth Circuit, was crucial for properly analyzing the nature of Palfinger’s contract and its proper connection to traditional maritime concerns for “operation, navigation, or management” of the vessels in their use as such.

Considering these principles, the Court said that Doiron’s two-factor test “determines whether maritime law applies of its own force through a contract bearing the type of significant relationship to traditional maritime activities,” a test Palfinger’s contract easily met.

The presence of the lifeboats on the platform, required by Coast Guard regulations as escape craft, satisfied Doiron’s first factor that the contract facilitate Shell’s drilling or production of oil and gas. Doiron’s second factor was satisfied because the parties expected that the lifeboats, as vessels, played a substantial role in the contract’s completion, namely, their inspection and repair. The Court clarified that the second factor did not require that vessels be used, only that they play a substantial role in contract performance. Vessels play just such a substantial role when “the maintenance and repair of vessels are the purposes of the contract, as such are traditional maritime activities.”

Notably, the Court clarified that the vessel itself doesn't have to be engaged in maritime commerce for the contract to be governed under maritime law. In the Court’s view, Doiron’s first factor determines whether the contract’s purpose is to effectuate maritime commerce and “offshore oil and gas drilling is what satisfied” the commercial nature of the contract. “Regardless of whether employing a lifeboat as a lifeboat means its passengers are engaged in maritime activity, the lifeboats are a required component of ‘drilling and production of oil and gas on navigable waters from a vessel[, which] is commercial activity.”

Firm Highlights

  • Experience

    Burnell Joseph v. Atalco Gramercy, LLC et al., No. 3:23-cv-505, United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

    Bob Kerrigan and Jose Ruiz successfully secured summary judgment dismissal for their client, Velan, Inc., in a complex intentional tort and products liability act involving catastrophic injury. The plaintiff, a precipitation batch tank operator working at the Atalco alumina refinery in Gramercy, Louisiana, suffered severe and debilitating chemical burn injuries to his face, eyes, and body when he was sprayed with caustic liquor while working underneath a tank at the refinery. He claimed that the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank was leaking, which allowed the tank to become filled with liquor after it had been previously verified as empty. He filed suit against Velan, Inc., the manufacturer of the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank, alleging that the valve was unreasonable dangerous in accordance with the Louisiana Products Liability Act. He also filed an intentional tort claim against his employer, Atalco Gramercy, LLC, alleging that Atalco knew the valve was leaking and continued to force employees to work underneath the tank. He claimed that under these conditions, an incident such as his was substantially certain to occur. Following the close of discovery, Velan moved for summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims was appropriate because: (1) the plaintiff’s injuries were a result of Atalco’s misuse of the valve; (2) the plaintiff lacked the expert testimony needed to prove his theory of liability under the Louisiana Product’s Liability Act; (3) the Velan valve at issue was not unreasonably dangerous as defined by the Louisiana Products Liability Act; and (4) the plaintiff was unable to prove proximate causation needed to establish his case of liability against Velan. The Hon. Brian Jackson found that under the undisputed facts presented by Velan, summary judgment was appropriate and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against it, with prejudice.
  • Insight

    No Mercy for Employers in Louisiana Supreme Court’s Recent Magill Decision

    In its recent per curiam opinion, Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska[1], the Louisiana Supreme Court has foreclosed a routine defense strategy to shield employers from direct negligence claims. The high court has extended their 2022 decision in Martin v. Thomas[2], and now allows plaintiffs to pursue direct negligence claims against an employer despite the employer’s stipulation that its employee was in the course-and-scope of employment and caused the accident. Essentially, employers who fail to implement better employment practices will permit plaintiffs to ramp up potential exposure with evidence, if such exists, that heretofore they were routinely barred from introducing at trial. The Supreme Court’s Magill holding should encourage employers to update where needed their policies and procedures pertaining to hiring, training, supervising, and entrusting duties and property to employees, not only for the safety of their employees and customers in this state, but also eliminate employer’s exposure to direct negligence claims. Prior to Martin, a litigation strategy had taken shape where employers stipulated to 1) an employee being in course-and-scope of employment at the time of the accident, 2) that the employee was at fault for the accident being caused, or 3) both. By stipulating these facts, employers were largely able to exclude evidence of any direct negligence on part of the employer and/or narrow the scope of trial to only a contest of the plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court in Martin held that despite an employer admitting their employee was in course and scope when the accident occurred, plaintiffs could pursue direct negligence claims against the employer—as the issue of liability had not been admitted. Accordingly, employers found success by admitting both course and scope and liability—as seen in the Western District of Louisiana’s holding in Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona[3]. In Ferguson, the defendants stipulated that their employee was acting in course-and-scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. Due to the employer’s stipulation of fault, Judge Wicks of the Western District of Louisiana held that Martin did not apply and that plaintiffs could not pursue direct negligence claims. In Magill, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided scarce reasoning for their decision. The high court simply affirmed the District Court’s expansion of the holding in Martin and that the employer’s reliance on the Western District’s Ferguson holding was a misapplication of Louisiana law. The Supreme Court also cited the decision in Tardo v. Farrell.[4] where the Fifth Circuit held that even if an employer and employee stipulate to course and scope and fault, those admissions do not eliminate direct-negligence claims because those claims remain separate issues for the trier of fact. The Fifth Circuit notably stated, “the societal decisions as to who actually pays does not change the manner of assessing fault to all parties as required by law.” This statement raises concern, as plaintiffs may now attempt to challenge employer stipulations that historically narrowed trials. The Supreme Court did not explain its reliance on Tardo, so future litigation will likely clarify the decision’s full impact. Under Magill, plaintiffs are permitted to pursue direct negligence claims against the employer despite the employer admitting that their employee was acting in course and scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. The full effect of the Supreme Court’s decision remains to be seen. In praxis, Magill will permit plaintiffs to put on evidence of direct negligence by an employer in front of a jury who cannot assign fault—as fault has already been stipulated to by the defendants. Employers now face the practical risk that plaintiffs will encourage juries to increase damages as a form of punishment against an employer that admits fault but contests the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries. Employers should use this moment to rigorously review and strengthen policies and procedures related to hiring and training in order to limit exposure when plaintiffs assert direct-negligence claims.  [1] Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska, 2025-00892 (La. 11/12/25) [2] Martin v. Thomas, 21-01490 (La. 6/29/22), 346 So.3d 238 [3] Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, 17-1570, 2023 WL 173413 (W.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) [4] Tardo v. Ferrell, 25-123 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/25), 2025 WL 1516837 (unpublished).