Insights

Deutsch Kerrigan Article /

21st Century Gold Rush: Cannabis Volume III - CBD Retail Operations

October 2, 2020

Jennifer E. Adams and Barbara B. Ormsby

share this page

For a PDF version of this article, please click here.

This article is the third in a series to be published on a monthly basis through 2020.  You can find the articles every month at www.deutschkerrigan.com.  Volume I:  What You Need to Know About Louisiana’s Therapeutic Marijuana Act; Volume II:  The Business Side of Cannabis; Volume IV:  Hemp Farming vs. Cannabis Farming; Volume V:  2020 Election Effect.   For questions, please contact jadams@deutschkerrigan.com or bormsby@deutschkerrigan.com.

As you drive around your hometown, dying to get out of your house because of the pandemic, you may notice storefront signs that say “CBD.”  In New Orleans, some might confuse that for the “Central Business District” of our downtown area, but “CBD” actually stands for cannabidiol.[2] It is the second most prevalent of the active ingredients of cannabis (marijuana).[3] While CBD is an essential component of medical marijuana, it is derived directly from the hemp plant, which is a cousin of the marijuana plant.[4] And, while CBD is a component of marijuana (one of hundreds), by itself it does not cause a “high.”[5]

On June 6, 2019, Louisiana Governor John Bel Edwards signed into law a bill (HB 491) that allows for the sale of hemp-derived CBD products with a concentration of less than 0.3 percent to be legally sold in the state.  The law follows in the footsteps of the federal Farm Bill (Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018) that legalized the agricultural production of hemp in the United States and the sale of hemp-derived products like CBD.[6]  More than 1485 permits have been obtained in Louisiana since the law went into effect.[7]

If you are an entrepreneur who wants to open a CBD shop in Louisiana, you have some options. Individuals or business entities can obtain Hemp CBD Retail Dealer permits from the Louisiana Office of Alcohol and Tobacco Control by submitting an application and paying a $175 fee.[8]  Such permits allow permittees to sell hemp or hemp-derived CBD products in Louisiana, though permittees cannot sell hemp or CBD products designed for inhalation, alcoholic beverages containing hemp or CBD, food products containing hemp or CBD (unless such products are FDA approved), or any CBD products marketed as dietary supplements.[9]  Any products sold by permittees must be: produced from hemp grown by an authorized grower in the state; registered and labeled in accordance with the State Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Law;[10] and approved by the Louisiana Department of Health.[11]  Hemp and CBD product labels cannot contain medical claims and must include the following language: “This product has not been evaluated by the Food and Drug Administration and is not intended to diagnose, treat, cure, or prevent any disease.”[12]  Labels must also have scannable codes or a web addressed linked to a document or website that “contains certification of analysis as provided in the law.”[13]  If a permitted CBD retailer sells CBD products that are not properly registered or approved by the Louisiana Department of Health, the retailer’s permit may be denied, suspended, or revoked, and the retailer may face monetary penalties.[14]

In contrast, Colorado has an industrial hemp/CBD and a cannabis market.  Both are very competitive and medical and recreational cannabis sales hit a record $1.75 billion in 2019, up 13% from 2018, according to data from the Colorado Department of Revenue’s Marijuana Enforcement Division.[15]   Marijuana tax collections also hit an all-time high, at more than $302 million in 2019.[16]  Thus, while Louisiana has opened the doors slightly for economic success in the CBD retail area, it has a long way to go before reaping the benefit of Colorado-type dollars.

October 2020


[1] Julie Schwartzwald, 2021 JD Candidate at Tulane University, and a 2020 summer law clerk with Deutsch Kerrigan, LLP, assisted with the research and writing of this article.

[2] “Cannabidiol (CBD)-what we know and what we don’t,” Harvard Health Blog. www.health.hardvard.edu/blog,Peter Grinspoon, MD., August 24, 2018.

[3] Id.

[4] Id.

[5] Id.

[6] “CBD retailers say new rules could limit sales in Louisiana,” Maria Clark, The Daily Advertiser, August 1, 2019. www.theadvertiser.com.

[7] https://atc.louisiana.gov/docs/CBD%20Current%20Permit%20List.pdf

[8] See Louisiana Office of Alcohol & Tobacco Control, Hemp Derived CBD Product Retail Permit Information, available at https://atc.louisiana.gov/docs/H-CBD%20Retail%20Application.pdf.

[9] Id.

[10] La. R.S. § 40:601 et. seq.

[11] Id.

[12] Id.

[13] Id.

[14] Id.

[15] “Colorado marijuana sales hit a record $1.75 billion in 2019,” Tieny Ricciardi, The Denver Post, February 18, 2020.  www.denverpost.com.

[16] Id.

Firm Highlights

  • Experience

    Burnell Joseph v. Atalco Gramercy, LLC et al., No. 3:23-cv-505, United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

    Bob Kerrigan and Jose Ruiz successfully secured summary judgment dismissal for their client, Velan, Inc., in a complex intentional tort and products liability act involving catastrophic injury. The plaintiff, a precipitation batch tank operator working at the Atalco alumina refinery in Gramercy, Louisiana, suffered severe and debilitating chemical burn injuries to his face, eyes, and body when he was sprayed with caustic liquor while working underneath a tank at the refinery. He claimed that the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank was leaking, which allowed the tank to become filled with liquor after it had been previously verified as empty. He filed suit against Velan, Inc., the manufacturer of the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank, alleging that the valve was unreasonable dangerous in accordance with the Louisiana Products Liability Act. He also filed an intentional tort claim against his employer, Atalco Gramercy, LLC, alleging that Atalco knew the valve was leaking and continued to force employees to work underneath the tank. He claimed that under these conditions, an incident such as his was substantially certain to occur. Following the close of discovery, Velan moved for summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims was appropriate because: (1) the plaintiff’s injuries were a result of Atalco’s misuse of the valve; (2) the plaintiff lacked the expert testimony needed to prove his theory of liability under the Louisiana Product’s Liability Act; (3) the Velan valve at issue was not unreasonably dangerous as defined by the Louisiana Products Liability Act; and (4) the plaintiff was unable to prove proximate causation needed to establish his case of liability against Velan. The Hon. Brian Jackson found that under the undisputed facts presented by Velan, summary judgment was appropriate and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against it, with prejudice.
  • Insight

    No Mercy for Employers in Louisiana Supreme Court’s Recent Magill Decision

    In its recent per curiam opinion, Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska[1], the Louisiana Supreme Court has foreclosed a routine defense strategy to shield employers from direct negligence claims. The high court has extended their 2022 decision in Martin v. Thomas[2], and now allows plaintiffs to pursue direct negligence claims against an employer despite the employer’s stipulation that its employee was in the course-and-scope of employment and caused the accident. Essentially, employers who fail to implement better employment practices will permit plaintiffs to ramp up potential exposure with evidence, if such exists, that heretofore they were routinely barred from introducing at trial. The Supreme Court’s Magill holding should encourage employers to update where needed their policies and procedures pertaining to hiring, training, supervising, and entrusting duties and property to employees, not only for the safety of their employees and customers in this state, but also eliminate employer’s exposure to direct negligence claims. Prior to Martin, a litigation strategy had taken shape where employers stipulated to 1) an employee being in course-and-scope of employment at the time of the accident, 2) that the employee was at fault for the accident being caused, or 3) both. By stipulating these facts, employers were largely able to exclude evidence of any direct negligence on part of the employer and/or narrow the scope of trial to only a contest of the plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court in Martin held that despite an employer admitting their employee was in course and scope when the accident occurred, plaintiffs could pursue direct negligence claims against the employer—as the issue of liability had not been admitted. Accordingly, employers found success by admitting both course and scope and liability—as seen in the Western District of Louisiana’s holding in Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona[3]. In Ferguson, the defendants stipulated that their employee was acting in course-and-scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. Due to the employer’s stipulation of fault, Judge Wicks of the Western District of Louisiana held that Martin did not apply and that plaintiffs could not pursue direct negligence claims. In Magill, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided scarce reasoning for their decision. The high court simply affirmed the District Court’s expansion of the holding in Martin and that the employer’s reliance on the Western District’s Ferguson holding was a misapplication of Louisiana law. The Supreme Court also cited the decision in Tardo v. Farrell.[4] where the Fifth Circuit held that even if an employer and employee stipulate to course and scope and fault, those admissions do not eliminate direct-negligence claims because those claims remain separate issues for the trier of fact. The Fifth Circuit notably stated, “the societal decisions as to who actually pays does not change the manner of assessing fault to all parties as required by law.” This statement raises concern, as plaintiffs may now attempt to challenge employer stipulations that historically narrowed trials. The Supreme Court did not explain its reliance on Tardo, so future litigation will likely clarify the decision’s full impact. Under Magill, plaintiffs are permitted to pursue direct negligence claims against the employer despite the employer admitting that their employee was acting in course and scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. The full effect of the Supreme Court’s decision remains to be seen. In praxis, Magill will permit plaintiffs to put on evidence of direct negligence by an employer in front of a jury who cannot assign fault—as fault has already been stipulated to by the defendants. Employers now face the practical risk that plaintiffs will encourage juries to increase damages as a form of punishment against an employer that admits fault but contests the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries. Employers should use this moment to rigorously review and strengthen policies and procedures related to hiring and training in order to limit exposure when plaintiffs assert direct-negligence claims.  [1] Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska, 2025-00892 (La. 11/12/25) [2] Martin v. Thomas, 21-01490 (La. 6/29/22), 346 So.3d 238 [3] Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, 17-1570, 2023 WL 173413 (W.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) [4] Tardo v. Ferrell, 25-123 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/25), 2025 WL 1516837 (unpublished).