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An Update on Business Interruption Coverage for Claimed Losses Related to Covid-19 Closures

May 19, 2021

Bryce Addison

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To date, no state or federal appellate circuit in Louisiana has issued an opinion on business interruption coverage for claimed losses related to or arising out of the COVID-19 pandemic. This void will undoubtedly be filled within months, if not weeks, as claims make their way through the district courts and into appellate decisions. In the meantime, the overwhelming majority of federal and state district courts have determined that business interruption coverage generally does not apply to losses related to or arising out of COVID-19 closures.

Locally, in the case of Cajun Conti LLC, et al. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, the Business Income Coverage Form at issue required the insurer to pay for “the actual loss of Business Income you sustain due to the necessary ‘suspension’ of your ‘operations’ during the ‘period of restoration.’ The ‘suspension’ must be caused by direct physical loss of or damage to property at [your] premises… The loss or damage must be caused by or result from a Covered Cause of Loss.” The term “Covered Cause of Loss” was defined as “risks of direct physical loss” unless excluded or limited under the Policy. Importantly, the insurance policy at issue in Cajun Conti did not contain a virus exclusion.

The insurer in Cajun Conti argued that the Covid-19-related closures were not a “Covered Cause of Loss” because the policy excluded from coverage (1) loss or damage resulting from delay, loss of use, or loss of market and (2) loss of damage caused by or resulting from acts or decisions of governmental bodies. Additionally, the insurer argued that the Covid-19 related closures did not constitute a “direct physical loss of or damage to property,” and that the insurer never intended for the risk of the virus to be a covered cause of loss under the policy.

The insured, a French Quarter restaurant, relied upon scientific evidence and regulatory filings with the Department of Insurance in support of its argument that the policy language was intended, or could at least be reasonably interpreted, to include viral contamination as a “Covered Cause of Loss.” The insured argued that it was continuously contaminated by the SARS-CoV-2 virus, a “Covered Cause of Loss,” which resulted in the loss of use of the property, necessitating coverage.

The trial court ultimately sided with the insurer, denying the insured’s request for a declaratory judgment finding coverage. However, the trial court did not provide written reasons for its judgment, so it remains unclear what the trial court’s conclusions were as to whether SARS-CoV-2 contamination was a “Covered Cause of Loss” and whether the related closures were “caused by direct physical loss of or damage to property.” The insured has since appealed the trial court’s decision to the Louisiana Fourth Circuit, where it is now pending.

A review of similar decisions emanating from Louisiana state and federal courts suggests the trial court’s decision in Cajun Conti may likely be affirmed on appeal. For example, in a recent decision out of the Eastern District of Louisiana, the federal court concluded that “Louisiana jurisprudence indicates that lost profits from government-mandated business closures are not covered without evidence of physical property damage.”1 In that case, the court declined to construe “direct physical loss” broadly, reasoning that “COVID damages people not property” and observing that the insured was still able to operate using “effective health measures,” such as social distancing, capacity limitations, curbside pickup alternatives, and mask wearing.  Multiple federal courts have characterized this trend in excluding business interruption coverage related to Covid-19 closures as representing the “the overwhelming majority of courts” and “the prevailing consensus.”2

That said, federal courts have on occasion refused to dismiss business interruption claims for Covid-19 closures when insureds expressly allege both the physical nature of the SARS-CoV-2 virus and the likelihood of physical contamination at their particular premises.3 These courts have analogized the physical nature of the SARS-CoV-2 virus to asbestos fibers and jurisprudence finding that asbestos fibers constitute physical contamination. It is nonetheless important to note that the majority of the decisions rendered in favor of insureds on this issue were merely denials of motions to dismiss brought by the insureds, and were not positive findings of coverage.

One exception is a case out of the Northern District of Ohio, Henderson Rd. Rest. Sys. V. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., in which the federal court granted the insured’s motion for summary judgment finding that the insurer owed coverage for the insured’s business interruption claims related to COVID-19 closures.4 Not only was the operative policy language in Henderson Rd. identical to the coverage language in Cajun Conti, but unlike Cajun Conti, the Henderson Rd. insured had a Microorganism exclusion which broadly excluded coverage for loss “directly or indirectly caused by, contributed to, or aggravated by the presence, growth, proliferation, spread or any activity of ‘microorganisms.’”

The Ohio court observed that the policy language provided coverage for “direct physical loss of or damage to property,” and reasoned that the disjunctive conjunction “or” required that the terms held distinct meaning and effect. Specifically, the court reasoned that “physical loss of” property must have a distinct meaning from “damage to property,” and concluded that the insured was not required to demonstrate physical damage to property if the insured could alternatively prove a physical loss of the property. The court determined that the insured demonstrated that a “physical loss of” the property occurred when the government orders prohibited the insured from using the property for their intended purpose as dine-in restaurants. Additionally, the court found that the Microorganism exclusion did not apply to exclude coverage because the loss was caused by the government orders, not by any finding that the insured was contaminated.

It should be noted that it does not appear that any other courts have followed the reasoning in Henderson Rd. to find coverage under similar policy language and circumstances. Specifically, Louisiana’s federal district courts have issued at least five (5) opinions to date regarding business interruption coverage for Covid-19 closures.

As coverage litigators, we continue to monitor the growing number of cases making their way through the various state and federal appellate courts in conjunction with serving our clients’ coverage objectives. While these disputes have been litigated for as long as the SARS-CoV-2 virus has been detected in the United States, it would seem that we are only a few months, if not weeks, from having a robust jurisprudential framework governing the various strains of business interruption claims.


[1] Q Clothier New Orleans LLC v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., No. 20-1470 (E.D. La. 04/23/21), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78244, 2021 WL 1600247.

[2] Seee.g.Selery Fulfillment, Inc. v. Colony Ins. Co., No. 4:20-cv-843 (E.D. Tex. 03/15/21), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47483, 2021 WL 963742 at n. 2 (citing federal court observations regarding the majority opinion that business interruption coverage is typically not afford for Covid-19 related closures); Barbecue v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., No. 1:20-cv-665 (W.D. Tex. 12/14/20), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234939, 2020 WL 7351246 at n. 8 (providing survey of “great majority of courts outside the Fifth Circuit” which have held that Covid-19 and related civil authority shutdown orders do not constitute a direct physical loss of property).

[3] See, Studio 417 v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 478 F.Supp. 3d 794 (W.D. Mo. 08/12/20); Humans & Res., LLC v. Firstline Nat’l Ins. Co., No. 20-2152 (E.D. Pa. 01/08/21), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3998, 2021 WL 75775.

[4] Henderson Rd. Rest. Sys. V. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 1:20-cv-1239 (N.D. Ohio 01/19/21), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9521, 2021 WL 168422.

Firm Highlights

  • Insight

    No Mercy for Employers in Louisiana Supreme Court’s Recent Magill Decision

    In its recent per curiam opinion, Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska[1], the Louisiana Supreme Court has foreclosed a routine defense strategy to shield employers from direct negligence claims. The high court has extended their 2022 decision in Martin v. Thomas[2], and now allows plaintiffs to pursue direct negligence claims against an employer despite the employer’s stipulation that its employee was in the course-and-scope of employment and caused the accident. Essentially, employers who fail to implement better employment practices will permit plaintiffs to ramp up potential exposure with evidence, if such exists, that heretofore they were routinely barred from introducing at trial. The Supreme Court’s Magill holding should encourage employers to update where needed their policies and procedures pertaining to hiring, training, supervising, and entrusting duties and property to employees, not only for the safety of their employees and customers in this state, but also eliminate employer’s exposure to direct negligence claims. Prior to Martin, a litigation strategy had taken shape where employers stipulated to 1) an employee being in course-and-scope of employment at the time of the accident, 2) that the employee was at fault for the accident being caused, or 3) both. By stipulating these facts, employers were largely able to exclude evidence of any direct negligence on part of the employer and/or narrow the scope of trial to only a contest of the plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court in Martin held that despite an employer admitting their employee was in course and scope when the accident occurred, plaintiffs could pursue direct negligence claims against the employer—as the issue of liability had not been admitted. Accordingly, employers found success by admitting both course and scope and liability—as seen in the Western District of Louisiana’s holding in Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona[3]. In Ferguson, the defendants stipulated that their employee was acting in course-and-scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. Due to the employer’s stipulation of fault, Judge Wicks of the Western District of Louisiana held that Martin did not apply and that plaintiffs could not pursue direct negligence claims. In Magill, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided scarce reasoning for their decision. The high court simply affirmed the District Court’s expansion of the holding in Martin and that the employer’s reliance on the Western District’s Ferguson holding was a misapplication of Louisiana law. The Supreme Court also cited the decision in Tardo v. Farrell.[4] where the Fifth Circuit held that even if an employer and employee stipulate to course and scope and fault, those admissions do not eliminate direct-negligence claims because those claims remain separate issues for the trier of fact. The Fifth Circuit notably stated, “the societal decisions as to who actually pays does not change the manner of assessing fault to all parties as required by law.” This statement raises concern, as plaintiffs may now attempt to challenge employer stipulations that historically narrowed trials. The Supreme Court did not explain its reliance on Tardo, so future litigation will likely clarify the decision’s full impact. Under Magill, plaintiffs are permitted to pursue direct negligence claims against the employer despite the employer admitting that their employee was acting in course and scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. The full effect of the Supreme Court’s decision remains to be seen. In praxis, Magill will permit plaintiffs to put on evidence of direct negligence by an employer in front of a jury who cannot assign fault—as fault has already been stipulated to by the defendants. Employers now face the practical risk that plaintiffs will encourage juries to increase damages as a form of punishment against an employer that admits fault but contests the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries. Employers should use this moment to rigorously review and strengthen policies and procedures related to hiring and training in order to limit exposure when plaintiffs assert direct-negligence claims.  [1] Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska, 2025-00892 (La. 11/12/25) [2] Martin v. Thomas, 21-01490 (La. 6/29/22), 346 So.3d 238 [3] Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, 17-1570, 2023 WL 173413 (W.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) [4] Tardo v. Ferrell, 25-123 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/25), 2025 WL 1516837 (unpublished).
  • Experience

    Burnell Joseph v. Atalco Gramercy, LLC et al., No. 3:23-cv-505, United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

    Bob Kerrigan and Jose Ruiz successfully secured summary judgment dismissal for their client, Velan, Inc., in a complex intentional tort and products liability act involving catastrophic injury. The plaintiff, a precipitation batch tank operator working at the Atalco alumina refinery in Gramercy, Louisiana, suffered severe and debilitating chemical burn injuries to his face, eyes, and body when he was sprayed with caustic liquor while working underneath a tank at the refinery. He claimed that the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank was leaking, which allowed the tank to become filled with liquor after it had been previously verified as empty. He filed suit against Velan, Inc., the manufacturer of the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank, alleging that the valve was unreasonable dangerous in accordance with the Louisiana Products Liability Act. He also filed an intentional tort claim against his employer, Atalco Gramercy, LLC, alleging that Atalco knew the valve was leaking and continued to force employees to work underneath the tank. He claimed that under these conditions, an incident such as his was substantially certain to occur. Following the close of discovery, Velan moved for summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims was appropriate because: (1) the plaintiff’s injuries were a result of Atalco’s misuse of the valve; (2) the plaintiff lacked the expert testimony needed to prove his theory of liability under the Louisiana Product’s Liability Act; (3) the Velan valve at issue was not unreasonably dangerous as defined by the Louisiana Products Liability Act; and (4) the plaintiff was unable to prove proximate causation needed to establish his case of liability against Velan. The Hon. Brian Jackson found that under the undisputed facts presented by Velan, summary judgment was appropriate and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against it, with prejudice.