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Arbitration Agreements in Foreign Insurer’s Surplus Line Policies

June 25, 2024 - Deutsch Kerrigan

Talbot M. Quinn

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Arbitration Agreements in Foreign Insurer’s Surplus Line Policies

Due to the significant volume of homeowner’s insurance lawsuits filed in the aftermath of Hurricane Ida, a critical legal issue has surfaced in Louisiana federal district courts and the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The question is whether these homeowners’ lawsuits must be subject to mandatory arbitration pursuant to the arbitration agreements in homeowner’s surplus line insurance policies issued by foreign insurers. This requirement is grounded in federal law, particularly the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the "Convention").

This has been a highly litigated issue in the Louisiana federal district courts.  Two recent U.S. Fifth Circuit decisions have provided guidance on how the arbitration agreements should be interpreted and applied.  Most insureds in these cases argue that La. R.S. 22:868 renders the arbitration clause unenforceable. Further, two New York Southern District Court cases applying Louisiana law stated that the arbitration agreements are unenforceable based on La. R.S. 22:868 states that no insurance contract delivered in Louisiana shall contain a condition depriving the courts of Louisiana of the jurisdiction or venue of action against the insurer.

The Bufkin[1] case essentially concerned an identical policy form and arbitration clause as in the New York Southern District cases. Judge James D. Cain, Jr. in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana denied Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay the Proceedings in that matter. The U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Judge Cain’s decision, holding that “The Convention is an exception to Louisiana’s general bar on policy terms that deprive its state courts of jurisdiction and venue in actions against insurers. See La. Rev. Stat. § 22:868. The Fifth Circuit had held in Bufkin that § 22:868 does not reverse preempt the Convention because the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not apply to treaties.” Coincidentally, the court further held that “while Bufkin was certainly free to name and then dismiss the foreign insurers, the district court was not free to disregard them in considering the domestic insurers’ motion to compel arbitration.”[2] Instead, the appellate court ruled that the arbitration provision in the surplus lines policies was subject to the Convention through equitable estoppel, including the alleged “interdependent and misconduct as it pertains to all of the insurers.”[3] The U.S. Fifth Circuit was specifically critical of the plaintiff’s tactic: “The upshot is that indulging Bufkin’s pleading-and-then-dismissing gamesmanship by denying arbitration turns on its head the axiom that “[t]he linchpin for equitable estoppel is equity – fairness.” Id.

Following Bufkin, the U.S. Fifth Circuit held in Belmont Commons, involving another almost identical form policy as the New York cases, “Given that the Louisiana Supreme Court has characterized arbitration clauses as a type of venue selection clause, we conclude that the carve-out contained in LA. R.S. § 22:868(D) unambiguously includes arbitration clauses. Moreover, including arbitration clauses in the carve-out does not lead to absurd consequences; LA. R.S. § 22:868(D) provides a measure of flexibility to surplus lines insurers—who - by definition - are willing to ensure risks and provide coverage for consumers who cannot get coverage in the standard market—by exempting them from the strictures of LA. R.S. § 22:868(A).”[4]

In short, the recent Fifth Circuit decisions in Bufkin and Bellmont Commons make clear that arbitration agreements in foreign surplus line insurance policies are enforceable, and the insureds must have their claims resolved by arbitration rather than by Louisiana courts.


[1] See Bufkin, citing Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 587 F.3d 714, 718 (5 Cir. 2009).

[2] See Bufkin, p. 10.

[3] See Bufkin, citing Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 528 (5 Cir. 2000).

[4] See Indian Harbor Insurance Company, et al. v. Belmont Commons, LLC, et al, No. 23-30246 (U.S. 5th Cir. March 6, 2024).

Firm Highlights

  • Experience

    Burnell Joseph v. Atalco Gramercy, LLC et al., No. 3:23-cv-505, United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

    Bob Kerrigan and Jose Ruiz successfully secured summary judgment dismissal for their client, Velan, Inc., in a complex intentional tort and products liability act involving catastrophic injury. The plaintiff, a precipitation batch tank operator working at the Atalco alumina refinery in Gramercy, Louisiana, suffered severe and debilitating chemical burn injuries to his face, eyes, and body when he was sprayed with caustic liquor while working underneath a tank at the refinery. He claimed that the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank was leaking, which allowed the tank to become filled with liquor after it had been previously verified as empty. He filed suit against Velan, Inc., the manufacturer of the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank, alleging that the valve was unreasonable dangerous in accordance with the Louisiana Products Liability Act. He also filed an intentional tort claim against his employer, Atalco Gramercy, LLC, alleging that Atalco knew the valve was leaking and continued to force employees to work underneath the tank. He claimed that under these conditions, an incident such as his was substantially certain to occur. Following the close of discovery, Velan moved for summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims was appropriate because: (1) the plaintiff’s injuries were a result of Atalco’s misuse of the valve; (2) the plaintiff lacked the expert testimony needed to prove his theory of liability under the Louisiana Product’s Liability Act; (3) the Velan valve at issue was not unreasonably dangerous as defined by the Louisiana Products Liability Act; and (4) the plaintiff was unable to prove proximate causation needed to establish his case of liability against Velan. The Hon. Brian Jackson found that under the undisputed facts presented by Velan, summary judgment was appropriate and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against it, with prejudice.
  • Insight

    No Mercy for Employers in Louisiana Supreme Court’s Recent Magill Decision

    In its recent per curiam opinion, Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska[1], the Louisiana Supreme Court has foreclosed a routine defense strategy to shield employers from direct negligence claims. The high court has extended their 2022 decision in Martin v. Thomas[2], and now allows plaintiffs to pursue direct negligence claims against an employer despite the employer’s stipulation that its employee was in the course-and-scope of employment and caused the accident. Essentially, employers who fail to implement better employment practices will permit plaintiffs to ramp up potential exposure with evidence, if such exists, that heretofore they were routinely barred from introducing at trial. The Supreme Court’s Magill holding should encourage employers to update where needed their policies and procedures pertaining to hiring, training, supervising, and entrusting duties and property to employees, not only for the safety of their employees and customers in this state, but also eliminate employer’s exposure to direct negligence claims. Prior to Martin, a litigation strategy had taken shape where employers stipulated to 1) an employee being in course-and-scope of employment at the time of the accident, 2) that the employee was at fault for the accident being caused, or 3) both. By stipulating these facts, employers were largely able to exclude evidence of any direct negligence on part of the employer and/or narrow the scope of trial to only a contest of the plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court in Martin held that despite an employer admitting their employee was in course and scope when the accident occurred, plaintiffs could pursue direct negligence claims against the employer—as the issue of liability had not been admitted. Accordingly, employers found success by admitting both course and scope and liability—as seen in the Western District of Louisiana’s holding in Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona[3]. In Ferguson, the defendants stipulated that their employee was acting in course-and-scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. Due to the employer’s stipulation of fault, Judge Wicks of the Western District of Louisiana held that Martin did not apply and that plaintiffs could not pursue direct negligence claims. In Magill, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided scarce reasoning for their decision. The high court simply affirmed the District Court’s expansion of the holding in Martin and that the employer’s reliance on the Western District’s Ferguson holding was a misapplication of Louisiana law. The Supreme Court also cited the decision in Tardo v. Farrell.[4] where the Fifth Circuit held that even if an employer and employee stipulate to course and scope and fault, those admissions do not eliminate direct-negligence claims because those claims remain separate issues for the trier of fact. The Fifth Circuit notably stated, “the societal decisions as to who actually pays does not change the manner of assessing fault to all parties as required by law.” This statement raises concern, as plaintiffs may now attempt to challenge employer stipulations that historically narrowed trials. The Supreme Court did not explain its reliance on Tardo, so future litigation will likely clarify the decision’s full impact. Under Magill, plaintiffs are permitted to pursue direct negligence claims against the employer despite the employer admitting that their employee was acting in course and scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. The full effect of the Supreme Court’s decision remains to be seen. In praxis, Magill will permit plaintiffs to put on evidence of direct negligence by an employer in front of a jury who cannot assign fault—as fault has already been stipulated to by the defendants. Employers now face the practical risk that plaintiffs will encourage juries to increase damages as a form of punishment against an employer that admits fault but contests the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries. Employers should use this moment to rigorously review and strengthen policies and procedures related to hiring and training in order to limit exposure when plaintiffs assert direct-negligence claims.  [1] Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska, 2025-00892 (La. 11/12/25) [2] Martin v. Thomas, 21-01490 (La. 6/29/22), 346 So.3d 238 [3] Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, 17-1570, 2023 WL 173413 (W.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) [4] Tardo v. Ferrell, 25-123 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/25), 2025 WL 1516837 (unpublished).