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Assuming the Best-Case Scenario: How many assumptions can the trier of fact make when determining an appropriate award for future loss of earnings?

September 18, 2023

Casey B. Wendling

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Assuming the Best-Case Scenario: How many assumptions can the trier of fact make when determining an appropriate award for future loss of earnings?

An award for loss of future income encompasses the loss or reduction of a person’s earning potential, which includes their capability to do what they would otherwise be equipped to do by nature, training, and experience.1 To determine an appropriate award for future lost income, a court will give “substantial consideration” to an expert vocational rehabilitation expert’s calculation. Although vocational rehabilitation experts must rely on specific facts and evidence when assessing a plaintiff’s impairment of earning capacity, Louisiana law is clear that an award for loss of future income is “at best speculative” and cannot be fixed with mathematical precision.2

Recognizing the danger of unfettered “speculation” and excessive awards, Louisiana courts fortunately have set limits to the number of assumptions a vocational rehabilitation expert can make when opining on a plaintiff’s future loss of income and determining an appropriate award future loss of earnings.

Bernard v. Royal Ins. Co., 586 So. 2d 607 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 589 So. 2d 1058 (La. 1991) provides a good illustration of those limits. The Fourth Circuit held that the jury’s award of $1,850,000 for future lost income was based on a highly speculative assumption that the 24-year-old plaintiff, with only a B.S. degree for two full years before the accident but no effort to apply to graduate school, would eventually obtain a doctorate degree in tropical medicine.3

The following facts were revealed during discovery:

  • Plaintiff graduated in May 1983 from Xavier University with a B.S. degree.
  • At the time of the accident in 1985, Ms. Bernard had taken no steps to begin a graduate program.
  • She did not work in her specialty or at a full-time job from May 1983 until July 1985.
  • Ms. Bernard's only employment after college was as a substitute teacher for two years and she did not remember whether she earned enough money to file a tax return.
  • In her 1987 deposition, she said she considered attending medical school “sometime in the future.”
  • In her 1989 deposition, she mentioned that she intended to seek a graduate degree in public health.

Rather than basing his opinions on these facts and Plaintiff’s current employment status, Plaintiff’s vocational rehabilitation counsel, Dr. Wolfson, calculated Plaintiff’s future lost income based on the assumption that Plaintiff would eventually obtain a doctorate degree in tropical medicine. The Fourth Circuit held that this assumption was too speculative for purposes of calculating an award for future loss of income, stating:

"There is no evidence or indication that Ms. Bernard would complete a master's program and earn a doctorate degree. She made no effort to initiate a graduate career. Thus, Dr. Wolfson's calculation of $1,630,415 was based on very unrealistic assumptions."

The Court reduced the award to the amount calculated by Dr. Wolfson based on “the plausible assumption that plaintiff would work in a laboratory without a graduate degree, which is the position she accepted just prior to her accident”.4

Louisiana courts recognize the importance of limiting the number of mental leaps that can be made by an expert when calculating an appropriate award for future loss of earnings. Defendants should not be expected to pay for a plaintiff’s lost earnings from their “dream job” when no evidence exists that the plaintiff made any efforts to obtain it. To successfully challenge the expert’s opinion of lost future earnings it is critical to identify the assumptions the expert has used to calculate the alleged loss. An expert should focus on the facts, as pointed out by the court in Bernard, including (1) the academic degrees the plaintiff has earned, (2) enrollment in additional programs or courses, (3) employment history, and (4) employment status at the time of the incident sued upon. When an expert’s opinion relies upon assumptions that reach beyond these types of facts, those opinions should not be considered by the trier of fact when determining an appropriate award for future loss of earnings.5


[1] Coco v. Winston Industries, 341 So.2d at 332.

[2] Robinson v. Graves, 343 So.2d 147 (La.1977)Sherlock v. Berry, 487 So.2d 555 (La. App. 4th Cir.1986), writ not considered489 So.2d 912 (La. 1986).

[3] Bernard,586 So.2d at 617.

[4] Bernard v. Royal Ins. Co.,586 So. 2d 607, 617 (La. Ct. App.)writ denied,589 So. 2d 1058 (La. 1991).

[5] See Engles v. City of New Orleans, 2003-0692 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/25/04), 872 So. 2d 1166 for a circumstance where the Court found the assumptions made for a future lost wage projection were not too speculative.

Firm Highlights

  • Insight

    No Mercy for Employers in Louisiana Supreme Court’s Recent Magill Decision

    In its recent per curiam opinion, Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska[1], the Louisiana Supreme Court has foreclosed a routine defense strategy to shield employers from direct negligence claims. The high court has extended their 2022 decision in Martin v. Thomas[2], and now allows plaintiffs to pursue direct negligence claims against an employer despite the employer’s stipulation that its employee was in the course-and-scope of employment and caused the accident. Essentially, employers who fail to implement better employment practices will permit plaintiffs to ramp up potential exposure with evidence, if such exists, that heretofore they were routinely barred from introducing at trial. The Supreme Court’s Magill holding should encourage employers to update where needed their policies and procedures pertaining to hiring, training, supervising, and entrusting duties and property to employees, not only for the safety of their employees and customers in this state, but also eliminate employer’s exposure to direct negligence claims. Prior to Martin, a litigation strategy had taken shape where employers stipulated to 1) an employee being in course-and-scope of employment at the time of the accident, 2) that the employee was at fault for the accident being caused, or 3) both. By stipulating these facts, employers were largely able to exclude evidence of any direct negligence on part of the employer and/or narrow the scope of trial to only a contest of the plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court in Martin held that despite an employer admitting their employee was in course and scope when the accident occurred, plaintiffs could pursue direct negligence claims against the employer—as the issue of liability had not been admitted. Accordingly, employers found success by admitting both course and scope and liability—as seen in the Western District of Louisiana’s holding in Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona[3]. In Ferguson, the defendants stipulated that their employee was acting in course-and-scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. Due to the employer’s stipulation of fault, Judge Wicks of the Western District of Louisiana held that Martin did not apply and that plaintiffs could not pursue direct negligence claims. In Magill, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided scarce reasoning for their decision. The high court simply affirmed the District Court’s expansion of the holding in Martin and that the employer’s reliance on the Western District’s Ferguson holding was a misapplication of Louisiana law. The Supreme Court also cited the decision in Tardo v. Farrell.[4] where the Fifth Circuit held that even if an employer and employee stipulate to course and scope and fault, those admissions do not eliminate direct-negligence claims because those claims remain separate issues for the trier of fact. The Fifth Circuit notably stated, “the societal decisions as to who actually pays does not change the manner of assessing fault to all parties as required by law.” This statement raises concern, as plaintiffs may now attempt to challenge employer stipulations that historically narrowed trials. The Supreme Court did not explain its reliance on Tardo, so future litigation will likely clarify the decision’s full impact. Under Magill, plaintiffs are permitted to pursue direct negligence claims against the employer despite the employer admitting that their employee was acting in course and scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. The full effect of the Supreme Court’s decision remains to be seen. In praxis, Magill will permit plaintiffs to put on evidence of direct negligence by an employer in front of a jury who cannot assign fault—as fault has already been stipulated to by the defendants. Employers now face the practical risk that plaintiffs will encourage juries to increase damages as a form of punishment against an employer that admits fault but contests the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries. Employers should use this moment to rigorously review and strengthen policies and procedures related to hiring and training in order to limit exposure when plaintiffs assert direct-negligence claims.  [1] Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska, 2025-00892 (La. 11/12/25) [2] Martin v. Thomas, 21-01490 (La. 6/29/22), 346 So.3d 238 [3] Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, 17-1570, 2023 WL 173413 (W.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) [4] Tardo v. Ferrell, 25-123 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/25), 2025 WL 1516837 (unpublished).
  • Experience

    Burnell Joseph v. Atalco Gramercy, LLC et al., No. 3:23-cv-505, United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

    Bob Kerrigan and Jose Ruiz successfully secured summary judgment dismissal for their client, Velan, Inc., in a complex intentional tort and products liability act involving catastrophic injury. The plaintiff, a precipitation batch tank operator working at the Atalco alumina refinery in Gramercy, Louisiana, suffered severe and debilitating chemical burn injuries to his face, eyes, and body when he was sprayed with caustic liquor while working underneath a tank at the refinery. He claimed that the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank was leaking, which allowed the tank to become filled with liquor after it had been previously verified as empty. He filed suit against Velan, Inc., the manufacturer of the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank, alleging that the valve was unreasonable dangerous in accordance with the Louisiana Products Liability Act. He also filed an intentional tort claim against his employer, Atalco Gramercy, LLC, alleging that Atalco knew the valve was leaking and continued to force employees to work underneath the tank. He claimed that under these conditions, an incident such as his was substantially certain to occur. Following the close of discovery, Velan moved for summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims was appropriate because: (1) the plaintiff’s injuries were a result of Atalco’s misuse of the valve; (2) the plaintiff lacked the expert testimony needed to prove his theory of liability under the Louisiana Product’s Liability Act; (3) the Velan valve at issue was not unreasonably dangerous as defined by the Louisiana Products Liability Act; and (4) the plaintiff was unable to prove proximate causation needed to establish his case of liability against Velan. The Hon. Brian Jackson found that under the undisputed facts presented by Velan, summary judgment was appropriate and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against it, with prejudice.