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Don’t Blow Your Gasquet, There’s Enough Money to Go Around – Gasquet Settlements in the Context of Multiple Claimants

March 30, 2021

Casey B. Wendling

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The Gasquet settlement has been a widely used doctrine of Louisiana insurance law since its application in litigation over 30 years ago in Gasquet v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., 391 So. 2d 466 (La. Ct. App. 1980). As part of a Gasquet settlement, Plaintiffs can expressly reserve their right to a direct action against a non-settling excess insurer for damages exceeding the settling primary insurers’ policy limits.1 However, Gasquet settlements have traditionally been applied in the context of a single settlement between the claimant(s) and the primary insurer for some amount less than the primary insurer’s policy limits. It is less clear how Gasquet settlements are executed in cases involving multiple claimants, whose individual claims each exceed the primary policy limits, who settle separately for the full primary policy limits.

Generally, when there are multiple claims arising out of a single accident, Louisiana courts allow a liability insurer “faced with a settlement demand arising out of multiple claims and inadequate proceeds” to enter compromise settlements with one or several claimants to the exclusion of others, even when such action exhausts the entire fund, leaving one or more of the injured parties with little or no recourse against such insurer.2

Louisiana law is clear that an insurer that has settled for its policy limits (or paid its full limits responsive to a judgment) has “exhausted” its limit of liability under the policy.3 Although a primary insurer’s liability is limited to the agreed-to policy limits, a liability insurer’s duty to defend its insured is not always discharged by exhaustion of its policy limits.4 Further, an excess insurer cannot be forced to “drop-down” and provide coverage for damages within the primary policy’s limits—a liability that the excess carrier did not bargain for.5

Accordingly, one claimant could settle her claims with the primary insurer, exhausting the primary policy limits, but expressly styles that settlement as a Gasquet by reserving her rights against the non-settling excess insurer. Under Gasquet, that claimant could proceed against the non-settling excess carrier for the proceeds of the excess insurance policy above the limits of the primary policy. However, what happens if there is a second injured claimant, who also sustained damages greater than the primary policy limits and wishes to settle their claim. Must she interact with the primary insurer, who has paid out the full limits of its policy? Can she immediately take advantage of the exhaustion of the underlying policy limits by another claimant and go directly to the excess insurer to seek damages from the excess policy? Further, what would happen to the Gasquet credit if the original claimant who settled with the primary insurer did not settle for the full policy limits? Would the calculation of the Gasquet credit owed to the excess carrier take this prior settlement into account, despite being with a different claimant and occurring prior to the Gasquet settlement?

The Fifth Circuit provided some insight on this issue in Miller v. Wladyslaw Estate, 338 F. App'x 454 (5th Cir. 2009). In Miller, a tractor-trailer owned by Allied Van Lines, Inc. drove into the rear end of a Suburban occupied by members of the Guerra and Garza families.6 The Guerra and Garza families filed suit against Allied, which had five layers of insurance totaling $110 million. Illinois National insured the fourth layer, providing $25,000,000 in excess coverage above the $30,000,000 provided by the three underlying layers. Allied and insurers in the lower layers of coverage (the “Settling Insurers”) paid the other claimants injured in the accident for a total of $6,477,900. Therefore, there was $23,522,100 remaining in underlying coverage to settle the claims of the other claimants before Illinois National’s policy would be triggered. Subsequently, the Settling Insurers and the Guerra and Garza families entered into a settlement agreement that released all liability within the limits of the Settling Insurers’ policies in exchange for a payment of $21,000,000. In effect, the Plaintiffs waived $2,522,100 in damages, which was the difference between the settlement ($21,000,000) and the remaining limits of the Settling Insurers’ policies ($23,522,100). The Plaintiffs expressly reserved their rights to proceed against the non-settling insurers in accordance with Gasquet.7

Following this partial settlement, a damages-only jury trial was conducted on the Guerra and Garza claims.8 As a result, of the jury’s verdict, Allied incurred $38,381,550 in total liability from the accident—$31,903,650 in damages awarded to the Guerra and Garza families, and $6,477,900 paid by the Settling Insurers to other claimants injured in the same accident.9 The trial court applied the $30,000,000 credit to the jury’s damage award ($1,903,650) and added the $6,477,900 paid by the Settling Insurers to other claimants. As a result, the court concluded that Illinois National was liable for $8,381,550.

Illinois National appealed the trial court’s calculation, asserting that it should not have considered the Settling Insurers’ payments to other claimants based on plain language in Gasquet: “the excess insurer is given a credit for the policy limits of the primary insurer.”10 The Fifth Circuit found this interpretation of Gasquet too rigid. Gasquet did not involve settlements or judgments with other injured parties. Therefore, the Gasquet Court did not have to differentiate between the underlying insurers’ “policy limits” and the insurers’ “available policy limits.”11 In Miller, at the time of trial on the Guerra and Garza claims, Illinois National had already paid $6,477,900 to the other claimants involved in the accident, reducing the underlying insurers’ available policy limit to $23,522,100. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit found that the $6,477,900 paid to the other claimants should be included in the calculation of the credit granted to Illinois National.12

Therefore, $30,000,000 credit received by Illinois National reduced the total liability incurred by the insured, not just the damages awarded to the Guerra and Garza claimants at the trial. By including the previous payment in the calculation of the credit owed to Illinois National after judgment on the Guerra and Garza claims, Illinois National was $6,477,900 closer to its layer of excess coverage at the commencement of the Guerra and Garza trial. However, because Illinois National was not obligated to pay any part of the first $30,000,000 of liability incurred by its insured, which was “precisely what Illinois National bargained for as an excess insurer,” the Fifth Circuit believed this was the correct result.13

The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Miller suggests that, when calculating the credit owed to an excess insurer, any money paid by any underlying insurer as part of any settlement—whether a Gasquetsettlement or not—with any claimant as a result of a single accident will be included in the total liability of the insured and offset by the value of the Gasquetcredit. Significant ambiguity remains as to the application of Gasquet settlements in the context of multiple, but separate, claimants. This uncertainty necessitates that Louisiana attorneys—representing an insurance company providing any layer of coverage—consider the application of Gasquet when crafting a litigation strategy.


[1] Gasquet v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., 391 So. 2d 466, 471–72 (La. Ct. App. 1980).

[2] See e.g.Pride Transp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 804 F. Supp. 2d 520, 525 (N.D. Tex. 2011) aff'd, 511 F. App'x 347 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Holtzclaw v. Falco, Inc., 355 So. 2d 1279 (La.1977); Merritt v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., 421 So. 2d 1000, 1001 (La. Ct. App. 1982).

[3] Pareti v. Sentry Indem. Co., 536 So. 2d 417, 421, 1988 La. LEXIS 2433, *10 (La. December 12, 1988).

[4] Id. 419. The Louisiana Supreme Court held:

We hold [] that once the liability insurer exhausted its policy limits through a good faith settlement, it was no longer obligated to defend the insured in the separate action based on the same accident. We do not suggest, however, that a liability insurer's duty to defend its insured will always be discharged by exhaustion of its policy limits. [O]ur holding today is premised upon both the language of the policy before us and the facts of this particular case.

Id. at 18–19.

[5] La. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 93-C-0911 (La. 1/14/94) n.1, 630 So. 2d 759, 760 (“Drop down coverage occurs when an insurance carrier of a higher level of coverage is obligated to provide the coverage that the carrier of the immediately underlying level of coverage has agreed to provide.”).

[6] Miller v. Wladyslaw Estate, 338 F. App’x 454, 455 (5th Cir. 2009). Two passengers, Cindy Guerra and Jennifer Garza, died in the accident after the Suburban was engulfed in flames. Two others, Lisa Guerra and Joe Alfaro, were horribly burned. Nine other vehicles were involved in the accident.

[7] Id.

[8] Id.

[9] Id. at 456.

[10] Gasquet, 391 So. 2d at 471.

[11] Miller, 338 F. App’x at 456.

[12] Id.(the Fifth Circuit believed this interpretation was more “consistent with Illinois National’s excess insurance policy.”).

[13] Id.

Firm Highlights

  • Experience

    Burnell Joseph v. Atalco Gramercy, LLC et al., No. 3:23-cv-505, United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

    Bob Kerrigan and Jose Ruiz successfully secured summary judgment dismissal for their client, Velan, Inc., in a complex intentional tort and products liability act involving catastrophic injury. The plaintiff, a precipitation batch tank operator working at the Atalco alumina refinery in Gramercy, Louisiana, suffered severe and debilitating chemical burn injuries to his face, eyes, and body when he was sprayed with caustic liquor while working underneath a tank at the refinery. He claimed that the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank was leaking, which allowed the tank to become filled with liquor after it had been previously verified as empty. He filed suit against Velan, Inc., the manufacturer of the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank, alleging that the valve was unreasonable dangerous in accordance with the Louisiana Products Liability Act. He also filed an intentional tort claim against his employer, Atalco Gramercy, LLC, alleging that Atalco knew the valve was leaking and continued to force employees to work underneath the tank. He claimed that under these conditions, an incident such as his was substantially certain to occur. Following the close of discovery, Velan moved for summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims was appropriate because: (1) the plaintiff’s injuries were a result of Atalco’s misuse of the valve; (2) the plaintiff lacked the expert testimony needed to prove his theory of liability under the Louisiana Product’s Liability Act; (3) the Velan valve at issue was not unreasonably dangerous as defined by the Louisiana Products Liability Act; and (4) the plaintiff was unable to prove proximate causation needed to establish his case of liability against Velan. The Hon. Brian Jackson found that under the undisputed facts presented by Velan, summary judgment was appropriate and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against it, with prejudice.
  • Insight

    No Mercy for Employers in Louisiana Supreme Court’s Recent Magill Decision

    In its recent per curiam opinion, Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska[1], the Louisiana Supreme Court has foreclosed a routine defense strategy to shield employers from direct negligence claims. The high court has extended their 2022 decision in Martin v. Thomas[2], and now allows plaintiffs to pursue direct negligence claims against an employer despite the employer’s stipulation that its employee was in the course-and-scope of employment and caused the accident. Essentially, employers who fail to implement better employment practices will permit plaintiffs to ramp up potential exposure with evidence, if such exists, that heretofore they were routinely barred from introducing at trial. The Supreme Court’s Magill holding should encourage employers to update where needed their policies and procedures pertaining to hiring, training, supervising, and entrusting duties and property to employees, not only for the safety of their employees and customers in this state, but also eliminate employer’s exposure to direct negligence claims. Prior to Martin, a litigation strategy had taken shape where employers stipulated to 1) an employee being in course-and-scope of employment at the time of the accident, 2) that the employee was at fault for the accident being caused, or 3) both. By stipulating these facts, employers were largely able to exclude evidence of any direct negligence on part of the employer and/or narrow the scope of trial to only a contest of the plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court in Martin held that despite an employer admitting their employee was in course and scope when the accident occurred, plaintiffs could pursue direct negligence claims against the employer—as the issue of liability had not been admitted. Accordingly, employers found success by admitting both course and scope and liability—as seen in the Western District of Louisiana’s holding in Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona[3]. In Ferguson, the defendants stipulated that their employee was acting in course-and-scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. Due to the employer’s stipulation of fault, Judge Wicks of the Western District of Louisiana held that Martin did not apply and that plaintiffs could not pursue direct negligence claims. In Magill, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided scarce reasoning for their decision. The high court simply affirmed the District Court’s expansion of the holding in Martin and that the employer’s reliance on the Western District’s Ferguson holding was a misapplication of Louisiana law. The Supreme Court also cited the decision in Tardo v. Farrell.[4] where the Fifth Circuit held that even if an employer and employee stipulate to course and scope and fault, those admissions do not eliminate direct-negligence claims because those claims remain separate issues for the trier of fact. The Fifth Circuit notably stated, “the societal decisions as to who actually pays does not change the manner of assessing fault to all parties as required by law.” This statement raises concern, as plaintiffs may now attempt to challenge employer stipulations that historically narrowed trials. The Supreme Court did not explain its reliance on Tardo, so future litigation will likely clarify the decision’s full impact. Under Magill, plaintiffs are permitted to pursue direct negligence claims against the employer despite the employer admitting that their employee was acting in course and scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. The full effect of the Supreme Court’s decision remains to be seen. In praxis, Magill will permit plaintiffs to put on evidence of direct negligence by an employer in front of a jury who cannot assign fault—as fault has already been stipulated to by the defendants. Employers now face the practical risk that plaintiffs will encourage juries to increase damages as a form of punishment against an employer that admits fault but contests the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries. Employers should use this moment to rigorously review and strengthen policies and procedures related to hiring and training in order to limit exposure when plaintiffs assert direct-negligence claims.  [1] Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska, 2025-00892 (La. 11/12/25) [2] Martin v. Thomas, 21-01490 (La. 6/29/22), 346 So.3d 238 [3] Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, 17-1570, 2023 WL 173413 (W.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) [4] Tardo v. Ferrell, 25-123 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/25), 2025 WL 1516837 (unpublished).