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Federal Criminal Subpoenas: Do I Tell My Client I Received One?

January 20, 2021

Beverly Aloisio DeLaune

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It is not uncommon for CPAs to be served with federal criminal subpoenas seeking information regarding accounting services rendered to clients. These subpoenas sometimes are accompanied by a cover letter from the issuing Assistant US Attorney (“AUSA”) or the investigating officer (FBI, investigative division of the IRS or FDIC) requesting the CPA not disclose the existence of the subpoena to the CPA’s client.1 This begs the question of whether the CPA should, and legally can, disclose the existence of the subpoena to their client.

Unless the issuing court has ordered the matter to be sealed, the AUSA or investigating officer cannot prevent the CPA from advising his or her client of the subpoena. However, the lack of an order requiring silence actually puts the CPA in a more difficult position, as the CPA must now balance the federal government’s request with the CPA’s relationship and obligations to their client.  This is one of the situations a lawyer can help a CPA work through. For example, when we are engaged to assist with a subpoena response2, we usually contact the issuing AUSA to advise that our client would like to disclose the subpoena to his or her client.  Most times, the AUSA has no objection. However, in some circumstances, the AUSA may ask that the CPA not disclose the subpoena and scope of the requested information to the client.  What is the CPA to do at that point?

The AICPA guidelines provide help on this issue. AICPA Standard 1.700.100, governing “Disclosing Confidential Client Information as a result of a Subpoena or Summons,” states:

.01 The member’s disclosure of confidential client information in compliance with a validly issued and enforceable subpoena or summons would not violate the “Confidential Client Information Rule.” [1.700.001].

.02 When complying with such subpoena or summons, THE MEMBER IS NOT REQUIRED TO NOTIFY THE CLIENT THAT ITS RECORDS HAVE BEEN SUBPOENAED OR THAT A SUMMONS RELATED TO THE CLIENT’S RECORDS HAS BEEN ISSUED. The member may also wish to consult with legal counsel to determine the validity and enforceability of the subpoena or summons and the specific client information required to be provided. The member may also wish to consult with his or her state board of accountancy. (emphasis added).

It is still a choice the CPA will have to make based upon the specific circumstances, such as whether the CPA is still providing services to the client, the type of relationship the CPA has with the client (friend of the family, family member, church member), statements made by the AUSA, comments from counsel after consultation and whether the CPA feels deceived by the client. Nonetheless, the AICPA guidelines make clear that the CPA can choose not to notify the client of the subpoena3.


[1] Sometimes the language looks more like an order than a request.

[2] Many errors and omissions policies also provide ancillary coverage to provide their insured CPAs with subpoena response assistance counsel, often free of a deductible.

[3] In many states, including Louisiana, the state legislatures have created specific laws governing the disclosure of accounting records and information. For instance, in Louisiana, accounting records are protected by an accountant-client privilege and accountants are prohibited from producing such information without the consent of the client or an order (not subpoena) from the Court issued after a contradictory hearing. Please consult an attorney to determine your state’s specific laws and requirements and whether state law may prohibit production even in response to federal subpoena. (Louisiana’s accountant-client privilege does not apply to a federal criminal subpoena, but may apply to a federal civil subpoena.)

Firm Highlights

  • Insight

    No Mercy for Employers in Louisiana Supreme Court’s Recent Magill Decision

    In its recent per curiam opinion, Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska[1], the Louisiana Supreme Court has foreclosed a routine defense strategy to shield employers from direct negligence claims. The high court has extended their 2022 decision in Martin v. Thomas[2], and now allows plaintiffs to pursue direct negligence claims against an employer despite the employer’s stipulation that its employee was in the course-and-scope of employment and caused the accident. Essentially, employers who fail to implement better employment practices will permit plaintiffs to ramp up potential exposure with evidence, if such exists, that heretofore they were routinely barred from introducing at trial. The Supreme Court’s Magill holding should encourage employers to update where needed their policies and procedures pertaining to hiring, training, supervising, and entrusting duties and property to employees, not only for the safety of their employees and customers in this state, but also eliminate employer’s exposure to direct negligence claims. Prior to Martin, a litigation strategy had taken shape where employers stipulated to 1) an employee being in course-and-scope of employment at the time of the accident, 2) that the employee was at fault for the accident being caused, or 3) both. By stipulating these facts, employers were largely able to exclude evidence of any direct negligence on part of the employer and/or narrow the scope of trial to only a contest of the plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court in Martin held that despite an employer admitting their employee was in course and scope when the accident occurred, plaintiffs could pursue direct negligence claims against the employer—as the issue of liability had not been admitted. Accordingly, employers found success by admitting both course and scope and liability—as seen in the Western District of Louisiana’s holding in Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona[3]. In Ferguson, the defendants stipulated that their employee was acting in course-and-scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. Due to the employer’s stipulation of fault, Judge Wicks of the Western District of Louisiana held that Martin did not apply and that plaintiffs could not pursue direct negligence claims. In Magill, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided scarce reasoning for their decision. The high court simply affirmed the District Court’s expansion of the holding in Martin and that the employer’s reliance on the Western District’s Ferguson holding was a misapplication of Louisiana law. The Supreme Court also cited the decision in Tardo v. Farrell.[4] where the Fifth Circuit held that even if an employer and employee stipulate to course and scope and fault, those admissions do not eliminate direct-negligence claims because those claims remain separate issues for the trier of fact. The Fifth Circuit notably stated, “the societal decisions as to who actually pays does not change the manner of assessing fault to all parties as required by law.” This statement raises concern, as plaintiffs may now attempt to challenge employer stipulations that historically narrowed trials. The Supreme Court did not explain its reliance on Tardo, so future litigation will likely clarify the decision’s full impact. Under Magill, plaintiffs are permitted to pursue direct negligence claims against the employer despite the employer admitting that their employee was acting in course and scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. The full effect of the Supreme Court’s decision remains to be seen. In praxis, Magill will permit plaintiffs to put on evidence of direct negligence by an employer in front of a jury who cannot assign fault—as fault has already been stipulated to by the defendants. Employers now face the practical risk that plaintiffs will encourage juries to increase damages as a form of punishment against an employer that admits fault but contests the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries. Employers should use this moment to rigorously review and strengthen policies and procedures related to hiring and training in order to limit exposure when plaintiffs assert direct-negligence claims.  [1] Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska, 2025-00892 (La. 11/12/25) [2] Martin v. Thomas, 21-01490 (La. 6/29/22), 346 So.3d 238 [3] Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, 17-1570, 2023 WL 173413 (W.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) [4] Tardo v. Ferrell, 25-123 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/25), 2025 WL 1516837 (unpublished).
  • Experience

    Burnell Joseph v. Atalco Gramercy, LLC et al., No. 3:23-cv-505, United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

    Bob Kerrigan and Jose Ruiz successfully secured summary judgment dismissal for their client, Velan, Inc., in a complex intentional tort and products liability act involving catastrophic injury. The plaintiff, a precipitation batch tank operator working at the Atalco alumina refinery in Gramercy, Louisiana, suffered severe and debilitating chemical burn injuries to his face, eyes, and body when he was sprayed with caustic liquor while working underneath a tank at the refinery. He claimed that the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank was leaking, which allowed the tank to become filled with liquor after it had been previously verified as empty. He filed suit against Velan, Inc., the manufacturer of the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank, alleging that the valve was unreasonable dangerous in accordance with the Louisiana Products Liability Act. He also filed an intentional tort claim against his employer, Atalco Gramercy, LLC, alleging that Atalco knew the valve was leaking and continued to force employees to work underneath the tank. He claimed that under these conditions, an incident such as his was substantially certain to occur. Following the close of discovery, Velan moved for summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims was appropriate because: (1) the plaintiff’s injuries were a result of Atalco’s misuse of the valve; (2) the plaintiff lacked the expert testimony needed to prove his theory of liability under the Louisiana Product’s Liability Act; (3) the Velan valve at issue was not unreasonably dangerous as defined by the Louisiana Products Liability Act; and (4) the plaintiff was unable to prove proximate causation needed to establish his case of liability against Velan. The Hon. Brian Jackson found that under the undisputed facts presented by Velan, summary judgment was appropriate and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against it, with prejudice.