Insights

Deutsch Kerrigan Article /

First Texas COVID-19 Insurance Coverage Lawsuit Filed in Harris County

April 9, 2020

share this page

APRIL 21, 2020
MULTI-DISTRICT LITIGATION SOUGHT ON COVID19 BUSINESS INTERRUPTION LAWSUITS

Approximately a month since the Louisiana state action, at least nine (9) separate lawsuits[1] have been filed in federal courts throughout the country seeking coverage as a result of the negative impact caused by COVID-19 and the related government orders. Consequently, on April 20, 2020, a pair of Pennsylvania restaurants suing for insurance coverage after they were forced to close due to the outbreak of the COVID19 pandemic filed a Motion for Transfer of Actions Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1407 for Coordinated or Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings asking that all related federal actions be transferred to the United States District Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (“Motion”).  According to the Motion, the transfer of the similar cases is necessary to provide a “consistent and uniform resolution to the common factual issue” of whether the various COVID19 Governmental Orders trigger coverage under plaintiffs’ business interruption insurance policies, and if so, whether any exclusion applies. The Motion goes on to say that the coordination of a multi-district litigation is of “national interest” and will affect “thousands upon thousands of small businesses and millions of workers.”  A copy of the Motion is attached.

As with all of the insurance coverage lawsuits being filed across the country, we will continue to monitor and analyze how these matters progress and update the information as it arises.  We stand ready and able to answer any questions that you might have or assist in any way that we can.

[1] The federal lawsuits are currently situated in the Northern District of Illinois, Southern district of Florida, Southern District of New York, Eastern District of Wisconsin, Northern District of Ohio, Central District of California, District of Oregon and Northern District of Texas.   Several other similar lawsuits have also been filed in state courts.


APRIL 9, 2020
FIRST TEXAS COVID-19 INSURANCE COVERAGE LAWSUIT FILED IN HARRIS COUNTY

The State of Texas has seen its first insurance coverage lawsuit filed by a Houston-area wig store claiming business interruption losses.  The suit was filed in Harris County against Twin City Fire Insurance Company, a Hartford Insurance company. Similar to other coverage lawsuits filed nationwide, the plaintiff alleges that they have sustained and will continue to sustain covered losses during the COVID-19 outbreak and specifically as a result of the Harris County Stay Home Order eventually issued. The lawsuit further alleges that plaintiff claims for business interruption costs under the Twin City policy was denied.

The plaintiff has asserted claims for  breach of contract, unfair settlement practices, violation of the Prompt Pay Act, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing for Twin City’s wrongful denial of the claim.

As with all of the insurance coverage lawsuits being filed across the country, we will continue to monitor and analyze how these progress and update the information as it arises.  We stand ready and able to answer any questions that you might have or assist in any way that we can.


MARCH 18, 2020
LOUISIANA RESTAURANT FIRST TO SEEK DECLARATORY JUDGMENT SEEKING COVERAGE DUE TO COVID19 CLOSURES

Not surprisingly, the first COVID-19 insurance coverage lawsuit was filed in Louisiana on March 16, 2020.  Specifically, in Cajun Conti, LLC v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, filed in Civil District Court of Orleans Parish, the restaurant seeks a declaratory judgment that their Lloyd’s of London commercial policy must cover lost sales and costs of cleaning due to state and local civil emergency orders limiting the number of the restaurant’s patrons and its hours of operation (“Lawsuit”).  The Lawsuit suggests that the policy’s direct physical loss requirement is satisfied by the existence of the virus, and the state and city civil orders trigger the policy’s “civil authority” coverage.

The Lawsuit asserts that the contamination of the restaurant by the virus qualifies as a direct physical loss because the virus remains on the surface of objects or materials for up to 28 days, with the ability to infect others.  The petition specifically cites in support for its position Louisiana precedent on lead or gaseous fumes.  Of real significance (at least as alleged), unlike most first-party policies, the Lloyds policy at issue allegedly does not have an exclusion for losses due to virus or bacteria. Without that exclusion, the restaurant alleges that the absence of an exclusion for a particular cause of loss means that the loss is covered.  Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that they seek a declaration “because the policy provided by Lloyd’s does not contain an exclusion for a viral pandemic, the policy provides coverage to plaintiffs for any future civil authority shutdowns of restaurants in the New Orleans area due to physical loss from Coronavirus contamination.”   If accurate, the lack of such exclusion could work against the insurer in this type of venue, and will likely limit the coverage dispute to whether the direct physical loss requirement is satisfied. Interestingly, it is not clear from this Lawsuit whether the insurer actually denied coverage before the insured initiated the Lawsuit. 

To date, Louisiana has not enacted any legislation like some other states that require coverage for business loss claims due to COVID19.  However, what could be viewed as an effort to provide some support to these types of claims, Governor John Bel Edwards, a former Plaintiff’s attorney, included in Proclamation Number JBE 2020-30, Additional Measures for COVID-19 Public Health Emergency, dated March 16, 2020, the following language:

WHEREAS, these measures relating to gaming establishments, restaurants, bars, cafes and coffee shops are necessary because of the ability of the COVID-19 virus to spread via personal interactions and because of physical contamination of property due to its propensity to attach to surfaces for prolonged periods of time; and…

We can expect that claimants will attempt to rely, in part, on this language, along with potential scientific expert testimony to support their arguments that the presence of the virus constitutes a direct physical loss, hence triggering coverage under the applicable policies.

We will continue to monitor and analyze how this matter progress and update the information as it arises.  We stand ready and able to answer any questions that you might have or assist in any way that we can.

Firm Highlights

  • Insight

    No Mercy for Employers in Louisiana Supreme Court’s Recent Magill Decision

    In its recent per curiam opinion, Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska[1], the Louisiana Supreme Court has foreclosed a routine defense strategy to shield employers from direct negligence claims. The high court has extended their 2022 decision in Martin v. Thomas[2], and now allows plaintiffs to pursue direct negligence claims against an employer despite the employer’s stipulation that its employee was in the course-and-scope of employment and caused the accident. Essentially, employers who fail to implement better employment practices will permit plaintiffs to ramp up potential exposure with evidence, if such exists, that heretofore they were routinely barred from introducing at trial. The Supreme Court’s Magill holding should encourage employers to update where needed their policies and procedures pertaining to hiring, training, supervising, and entrusting duties and property to employees, not only for the safety of their employees and customers in this state, but also eliminate employer’s exposure to direct negligence claims. Prior to Martin, a litigation strategy had taken shape where employers stipulated to 1) an employee being in course-and-scope of employment at the time of the accident, 2) that the employee was at fault for the accident being caused, or 3) both. By stipulating these facts, employers were largely able to exclude evidence of any direct negligence on part of the employer and/or narrow the scope of trial to only a contest of the plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court in Martin held that despite an employer admitting their employee was in course and scope when the accident occurred, plaintiffs could pursue direct negligence claims against the employer—as the issue of liability had not been admitted. Accordingly, employers found success by admitting both course and scope and liability—as seen in the Western District of Louisiana’s holding in Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona[3]. In Ferguson, the defendants stipulated that their employee was acting in course-and-scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. Due to the employer’s stipulation of fault, Judge Wicks of the Western District of Louisiana held that Martin did not apply and that plaintiffs could not pursue direct negligence claims. In Magill, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided scarce reasoning for their decision. The high court simply affirmed the District Court’s expansion of the holding in Martin and that the employer’s reliance on the Western District’s Ferguson holding was a misapplication of Louisiana law. The Supreme Court also cited the decision in Tardo v. Farrell.[4] where the Fifth Circuit held that even if an employer and employee stipulate to course and scope and fault, those admissions do not eliminate direct-negligence claims because those claims remain separate issues for the trier of fact. The Fifth Circuit notably stated, “the societal decisions as to who actually pays does not change the manner of assessing fault to all parties as required by law.” This statement raises concern, as plaintiffs may now attempt to challenge employer stipulations that historically narrowed trials. The Supreme Court did not explain its reliance on Tardo, so future litigation will likely clarify the decision’s full impact. Under Magill, plaintiffs are permitted to pursue direct negligence claims against the employer despite the employer admitting that their employee was acting in course and scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. The full effect of the Supreme Court’s decision remains to be seen. In praxis, Magill will permit plaintiffs to put on evidence of direct negligence by an employer in front of a jury who cannot assign fault—as fault has already been stipulated to by the defendants. Employers now face the practical risk that plaintiffs will encourage juries to increase damages as a form of punishment against an employer that admits fault but contests the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries. Employers should use this moment to rigorously review and strengthen policies and procedures related to hiring and training in order to limit exposure when plaintiffs assert direct-negligence claims.  [1] Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska, 2025-00892 (La. 11/12/25) [2] Martin v. Thomas, 21-01490 (La. 6/29/22), 346 So.3d 238 [3] Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, 17-1570, 2023 WL 173413 (W.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) [4] Tardo v. Ferrell, 25-123 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/25), 2025 WL 1516837 (unpublished).
  • Experience

    Burnell Joseph v. Atalco Gramercy, LLC et al., No. 3:23-cv-505, United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

    Bob Kerrigan and Jose Ruiz successfully secured summary judgment dismissal for their client, Velan, Inc., in a complex intentional tort and products liability act involving catastrophic injury. The plaintiff, a precipitation batch tank operator working at the Atalco alumina refinery in Gramercy, Louisiana, suffered severe and debilitating chemical burn injuries to his face, eyes, and body when he was sprayed with caustic liquor while working underneath a tank at the refinery. He claimed that the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank was leaking, which allowed the tank to become filled with liquor after it had been previously verified as empty. He filed suit against Velan, Inc., the manufacturer of the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank, alleging that the valve was unreasonable dangerous in accordance with the Louisiana Products Liability Act. He also filed an intentional tort claim against his employer, Atalco Gramercy, LLC, alleging that Atalco knew the valve was leaking and continued to force employees to work underneath the tank. He claimed that under these conditions, an incident such as his was substantially certain to occur. Following the close of discovery, Velan moved for summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims was appropriate because: (1) the plaintiff’s injuries were a result of Atalco’s misuse of the valve; (2) the plaintiff lacked the expert testimony needed to prove his theory of liability under the Louisiana Product’s Liability Act; (3) the Velan valve at issue was not unreasonably dangerous as defined by the Louisiana Products Liability Act; and (4) the plaintiff was unable to prove proximate causation needed to establish his case of liability against Velan. The Hon. Brian Jackson found that under the undisputed facts presented by Velan, summary judgment was appropriate and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against it, with prejudice.