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Fourth Circuit Affirms Orleans Parish 35.75 Million Dollar Jury Award to Mesothelioma Plaintiff

May 18, 2023

Barbara Ormsby

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Fourth Circuit Affirms Orleans Parish 35.75 Million Dollar Jury Award to Mesothelioma Plaintiff

On May 3, 2023, the Fourth Circuit affirmed a $35.75 million jury award for general damages assessed by an Orleans Parish jury for the pain, suffering, mental anguish, disability, and loss of enjoyment of life endured by a plaintiff diagnosed with mesothelioma as a result of alleged asbestos exposure. Walker v. Anco Insulations, Inc., et al., No. 2022-CA-0763 (4th Cir. 2023). 

Background
In July 2021, William Walker was diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma. One month later, he filed a Petition for Damages alleging occupational exposure to asbestos from his work as a pipefitter/welder at numerous industrial and petrochemical sites up and down the Mississippi River in Louisiana from approximately 1967 through 1970. Several of Mr. Walker’s former employers, premise owners, and asbestos-containing product manufacturers, suppliers, and contractors were named as defendants. Before trial, Plaintiff resolved with all defendants, leaving one contractor defendant (“Level 3”) against whom Plaintiff tried the case.   

A seven-day jury trial commenced on May 16, 2022. Mr. Walker was 79 years old at the time of trial. The jury heard from plaintiff experts, defense experts, as well as from Mr. Walker and his wife. On May 23, 2022, the jury returned a total verdict of nearly $37 million ($35,750,000 in past and future pain & suffering, plus $1,008,170 in past and future medical expenses).  

Because Mr. Walker’s asbestos exposure occurred between 1967 and 1970, Louisiana’s pre-comparative fault governed the case. Level 3 was held liable for 11/21 virile shares and the Court entered a judgment against Level 3 in the amount of $19,254,279.23. The jury verdict form listed a total of twenty-seven entities as possible joint tortfeasors for Mr. Walker’s asbestos-related injuries. The jury determined that twenty-one (21) of the twenty-seven (27) entities were solidarily liable for Mr. Walker’s injuries. Ten (10) of the twenty-one (21) entities settled with Mr. Walker before trial (“Settled Parties”). Another two (2) entities were voluntarily dismissed (“Dismissed Parties”), and eight (8) entities were not named as parties (“Non-Parties”).

Ruling
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the $35,750,000 jury award for general damages, finding that the jury did not abuse its broad discretion in awarding the $35,750,000. The decision highlighted the extensive testimony from Mr. and Mrs. Walker, as well as from treating physicians, detailing Mr. Walker’s physical and emotional damages since the mesothelioma diagnosis, including constant fear of imminent death. Although the jury’s award was “indeed significant in relation to other awards,” the Fourth Circuit found that great deference should be afforded to the factfinder, noting that “general damages will fluctuate and increase in time given changes in economic conditions, particularly rampant inflation.”

On the issue of virile shares, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the jury’s assessment of 11/21 virile shares against the remaining defendant. First, regarding the Settled Parties, Level 3 received a virile share credit for the ten Settled Parties because (a) Mr. Walker released the ten Settled Parties, and (b) the released ten Settled Parties were found liable for Mr. Walker’s asbestos-related injuries by the jury at trial. Second, regarding the Non-Parties, the Fourth Circuit agreed that a non-party found liable at trial may be assigned a virile share. However, as noted in a footnote in the decision, upon payment to Mr. Walker, Level 3 has a cause of action against each of the Non-Parties. When the whole performance is sought from a single solidary obligor that solidary obligor may seek “contribution” from other joint tortfeasors “in the amount of the joint tortfeasor’s virile share. Thus, Level 3 in this case may seek contribution from the Non-Parties for each of their virile share portions of 1/21. Third, regarding the Dismissed Parties, the Fourth Circuit found that Level 3 was not entitled to two extra virile share credits because an obligor is entitled to a virile share credit when it is shown that (a) the plaintiff settled and released the party and (b) the party is liable as a joint tortfeasor. Thus, similar to available recourse against the Non-Parties, Level 3 has a cause of action, in the form of contribution, from the Dismissed Parties. 

Implications
This sizeable adverse jury verdict highlights the importance of understanding Louisiana’s virile share implications when a jury is assessing liability at trial.

Firm Highlights

  • Insight

    No Mercy for Employers in Louisiana Supreme Court’s Recent Magill Decision

    In its recent per curiam opinion, Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska[1], the Louisiana Supreme Court has foreclosed a routine defense strategy to shield employers from direct negligence claims. The high court has extended their 2022 decision in Martin v. Thomas[2], and now allows plaintiffs to pursue direct negligence claims against an employer despite the employer’s stipulation that its employee was in the course-and-scope of employment and caused the accident. Essentially, employers who fail to implement better employment practices will permit plaintiffs to ramp up potential exposure with evidence, if such exists, that heretofore they were routinely barred from introducing at trial. The Supreme Court’s Magill holding should encourage employers to update where needed their policies and procedures pertaining to hiring, training, supervising, and entrusting duties and property to employees, not only for the safety of their employees and customers in this state, but also eliminate employer’s exposure to direct negligence claims. Prior to Martin, a litigation strategy had taken shape where employers stipulated to 1) an employee being in course-and-scope of employment at the time of the accident, 2) that the employee was at fault for the accident being caused, or 3) both. By stipulating these facts, employers were largely able to exclude evidence of any direct negligence on part of the employer and/or narrow the scope of trial to only a contest of the plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court in Martin held that despite an employer admitting their employee was in course and scope when the accident occurred, plaintiffs could pursue direct negligence claims against the employer—as the issue of liability had not been admitted. Accordingly, employers found success by admitting both course and scope and liability—as seen in the Western District of Louisiana’s holding in Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona[3]. In Ferguson, the defendants stipulated that their employee was acting in course-and-scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. Due to the employer’s stipulation of fault, Judge Wicks of the Western District of Louisiana held that Martin did not apply and that plaintiffs could not pursue direct negligence claims. In Magill, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided scarce reasoning for their decision. The high court simply affirmed the District Court’s expansion of the holding in Martin and that the employer’s reliance on the Western District’s Ferguson holding was a misapplication of Louisiana law. The Supreme Court also cited the decision in Tardo v. Farrell.[4] where the Fifth Circuit held that even if an employer and employee stipulate to course and scope and fault, those admissions do not eliminate direct-negligence claims because those claims remain separate issues for the trier of fact. The Fifth Circuit notably stated, “the societal decisions as to who actually pays does not change the manner of assessing fault to all parties as required by law.” This statement raises concern, as plaintiffs may now attempt to challenge employer stipulations that historically narrowed trials. The Supreme Court did not explain its reliance on Tardo, so future litigation will likely clarify the decision’s full impact. Under Magill, plaintiffs are permitted to pursue direct negligence claims against the employer despite the employer admitting that their employee was acting in course and scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. The full effect of the Supreme Court’s decision remains to be seen. In praxis, Magill will permit plaintiffs to put on evidence of direct negligence by an employer in front of a jury who cannot assign fault—as fault has already been stipulated to by the defendants. Employers now face the practical risk that plaintiffs will encourage juries to increase damages as a form of punishment against an employer that admits fault but contests the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries. Employers should use this moment to rigorously review and strengthen policies and procedures related to hiring and training in order to limit exposure when plaintiffs assert direct-negligence claims.  [1] Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska, 2025-00892 (La. 11/12/25) [2] Martin v. Thomas, 21-01490 (La. 6/29/22), 346 So.3d 238 [3] Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, 17-1570, 2023 WL 173413 (W.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) [4] Tardo v. Ferrell, 25-123 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/25), 2025 WL 1516837 (unpublished).
  • Experience

    Burnell Joseph v. Atalco Gramercy, LLC et al., No. 3:23-cv-505, United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

    Bob Kerrigan and Jose Ruiz successfully secured summary judgment dismissal for their client, Velan, Inc., in a complex intentional tort and products liability act involving catastrophic injury. The plaintiff, a precipitation batch tank operator working at the Atalco alumina refinery in Gramercy, Louisiana, suffered severe and debilitating chemical burn injuries to his face, eyes, and body when he was sprayed with caustic liquor while working underneath a tank at the refinery. He claimed that the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank was leaking, which allowed the tank to become filled with liquor after it had been previously verified as empty. He filed suit against Velan, Inc., the manufacturer of the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank, alleging that the valve was unreasonable dangerous in accordance with the Louisiana Products Liability Act. He also filed an intentional tort claim against his employer, Atalco Gramercy, LLC, alleging that Atalco knew the valve was leaking and continued to force employees to work underneath the tank. He claimed that under these conditions, an incident such as his was substantially certain to occur. Following the close of discovery, Velan moved for summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims was appropriate because: (1) the plaintiff’s injuries were a result of Atalco’s misuse of the valve; (2) the plaintiff lacked the expert testimony needed to prove his theory of liability under the Louisiana Product’s Liability Act; (3) the Velan valve at issue was not unreasonably dangerous as defined by the Louisiana Products Liability Act; and (4) the plaintiff was unable to prove proximate causation needed to establish his case of liability against Velan. The Hon. Brian Jackson found that under the undisputed facts presented by Velan, summary judgment was appropriate and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against it, with prejudice.