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Is it obvious what is open and obvious? Louisiana Supreme Court clarifies the law concerning open and obvious conditions

April 13, 2023

Colin L. Casciato

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Is it obvious what is open and obvious? Louisiana Supreme Court clarifies the law concerning open and obvious conditions

Recently, the Louisiana Supreme Court clarified the “open and obvious” doctrine in Farell v. Circle K Stores, Inc., 2022-00849 (La. 3/17/2023). The Court held that whether a condition is open and obvious is a factor to be considered under the breach of duty element and not the duty element.

In Farell, the Plaintiffs stopped at a Circle K to get gas. One of the Plaintiffs got out of the car to take their dog for a walk. As this Plaintiff was walking across the parking lot, she had to traverse a pool of water. When she attempted to step over the water, she fell and sustained injury. Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit for personal injury. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing they were not liable because the alleged hazardous condition was “open and obvious.” The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment and the appellate court denied the writ application. Defendants filed a writ to the Supreme Court, which was granted.

The Supreme Court noted that whether the claim arises in negligence under La. C.C. art. 2315 or in premises liability under La. C.C. art. 2317.1, the duty/risk analysis is the same. Under the duty/risk analysis, the plaintiff must prove five separate elements: (1) the defendant had a duty to conform his conduct to a specific standard (the duty element); (2) the defendant's conduct failed to conform to the appropriate standard (the breach element); (3) the defendant's substandard conduct was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injuries (the cause-in-fact element); (4) the defendant's substandard conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries (the scope of duty element); and, (5) proof of actual damages (the damages element).

The Court noted that whether a condition is open and obvious has been considered as a part of the duty element in some cases and as a part of the breach of duty element in other cases. The Court stated that even after prior attempts at clarification lower courts were still holding there was no duty when the condition was open and obvious.

Under the breach of duty element, the Court noted a risk/utility balancing test is used. The following four factors are considered in the risk/utility balancing test: (1) the utility of the complained-of condition; (2) the likelihood and magnitude of harm, including the obviousness and apparentness of the condition; (3) the cost of preventing the harm; and, (4) the nature of the plaintiff's activities in terms of social utility or whether the activities were dangerous by nature.

The Court stated that the likelihood and magnitude of the harm includes a consideration of the open and obviousness of the condition. The Court noted that the phrase “open and obvious” is a figment of judicial imagination and does not appear in any of the premises liability statutes. The Court noted that the analysis of whether a condition is open and obvious has been applied inconsistently in the jurisprudence.

The Court specifically stated in Farrell that “whether a condition is open and obvious is embraced within the breach of the duty element of the duty/risk analysis and is not a jurisprudential doctrine barring recovery, but only a factor of the risk/utility balancing test.” “Specifically, it falls within the ambit of the second factor of the risk/utility balancing test, which considers the likelihood and magnitude of the harm.”

“For a hazard to be considered open and obvious, it must be one that is open and obvious to all who may encounter it.” “The open and obvious concept asks whether the complained of condition would be apparent to any reasonable person who might encounter it.” “Whether the plaintiff has knowledge of the condition is irrelevant in determining whether the thing is defective.” However, “the plaintiff’s knowledge is appropriately considered in assessing fault, but is not appropriate for summary judgment proceedings.” The Court concluded that the pool of water at issue in this case was not an unreasonably dangerous condition, no breach occurred, and the Court granted summary judgment for the defendants.

The Court made it clear that if you are arguing a condition is open and obvious, this argument should be made under the breach of duty element. While defendants may have preferred that open and obvious be considered under the duty element because the existence of a duty is a question of law, the Court made it clear that summary judgment can still be granted on the breach of duty element, a mixed question of law and fact. Practitioners should avoid arguing that a defendant does not have a duty because the condition is open and obvious. Instead, under the breach of duty element, they should argue that the condition would be apparent to any reasonable person and a reasonable person would avoid encountering the condition. If the condition is apparent, that factor would be in favor of finding the condition was not unreasonably dangerous due to its open and obvious nature. If the condition is not unreasonably dangerous, there is no breach of duty, and summary judgment can be granted in favor of defendants.

Firm Highlights

  • Insight

    No Mercy for Employers in Louisiana Supreme Court’s Recent Magill Decision

    In its recent per curiam opinion, Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska[1], the Louisiana Supreme Court has foreclosed a routine defense strategy to shield employers from direct negligence claims. The high court has extended their 2022 decision in Martin v. Thomas[2], and now allows plaintiffs to pursue direct negligence claims against an employer despite the employer’s stipulation that its employee was in the course-and-scope of employment and caused the accident. Essentially, employers who fail to implement better employment practices will permit plaintiffs to ramp up potential exposure with evidence, if such exists, that heretofore they were routinely barred from introducing at trial. The Supreme Court’s Magill holding should encourage employers to update where needed their policies and procedures pertaining to hiring, training, supervising, and entrusting duties and property to employees, not only for the safety of their employees and customers in this state, but also eliminate employer’s exposure to direct negligence claims. Prior to Martin, a litigation strategy had taken shape where employers stipulated to 1) an employee being in course-and-scope of employment at the time of the accident, 2) that the employee was at fault for the accident being caused, or 3) both. By stipulating these facts, employers were largely able to exclude evidence of any direct negligence on part of the employer and/or narrow the scope of trial to only a contest of the plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court in Martin held that despite an employer admitting their employee was in course and scope when the accident occurred, plaintiffs could pursue direct negligence claims against the employer—as the issue of liability had not been admitted. Accordingly, employers found success by admitting both course and scope and liability—as seen in the Western District of Louisiana’s holding in Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona[3]. In Ferguson, the defendants stipulated that their employee was acting in course-and-scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. Due to the employer’s stipulation of fault, Judge Wicks of the Western District of Louisiana held that Martin did not apply and that plaintiffs could not pursue direct negligence claims. In Magill, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided scarce reasoning for their decision. The high court simply affirmed the District Court’s expansion of the holding in Martin and that the employer’s reliance on the Western District’s Ferguson holding was a misapplication of Louisiana law. The Supreme Court also cited the decision in Tardo v. Farrell.[4] where the Fifth Circuit held that even if an employer and employee stipulate to course and scope and fault, those admissions do not eliminate direct-negligence claims because those claims remain separate issues for the trier of fact. The Fifth Circuit notably stated, “the societal decisions as to who actually pays does not change the manner of assessing fault to all parties as required by law.” This statement raises concern, as plaintiffs may now attempt to challenge employer stipulations that historically narrowed trials. The Supreme Court did not explain its reliance on Tardo, so future litigation will likely clarify the decision’s full impact. Under Magill, plaintiffs are permitted to pursue direct negligence claims against the employer despite the employer admitting that their employee was acting in course and scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. The full effect of the Supreme Court’s decision remains to be seen. In praxis, Magill will permit plaintiffs to put on evidence of direct negligence by an employer in front of a jury who cannot assign fault—as fault has already been stipulated to by the defendants. Employers now face the practical risk that plaintiffs will encourage juries to increase damages as a form of punishment against an employer that admits fault but contests the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries. Employers should use this moment to rigorously review and strengthen policies and procedures related to hiring and training in order to limit exposure when plaintiffs assert direct-negligence claims.  [1] Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska, 2025-00892 (La. 11/12/25) [2] Martin v. Thomas, 21-01490 (La. 6/29/22), 346 So.3d 238 [3] Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, 17-1570, 2023 WL 173413 (W.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) [4] Tardo v. Ferrell, 25-123 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/25), 2025 WL 1516837 (unpublished).
  • Experience

    Burnell Joseph v. Atalco Gramercy, LLC et al., No. 3:23-cv-505, United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

    Bob Kerrigan and Jose Ruiz successfully secured summary judgment dismissal for their client, Velan, Inc., in a complex intentional tort and products liability act involving catastrophic injury. The plaintiff, a precipitation batch tank operator working at the Atalco alumina refinery in Gramercy, Louisiana, suffered severe and debilitating chemical burn injuries to his face, eyes, and body when he was sprayed with caustic liquor while working underneath a tank at the refinery. He claimed that the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank was leaking, which allowed the tank to become filled with liquor after it had been previously verified as empty. He filed suit against Velan, Inc., the manufacturer of the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank, alleging that the valve was unreasonable dangerous in accordance with the Louisiana Products Liability Act. He also filed an intentional tort claim against his employer, Atalco Gramercy, LLC, alleging that Atalco knew the valve was leaking and continued to force employees to work underneath the tank. He claimed that under these conditions, an incident such as his was substantially certain to occur. Following the close of discovery, Velan moved for summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims was appropriate because: (1) the plaintiff’s injuries were a result of Atalco’s misuse of the valve; (2) the plaintiff lacked the expert testimony needed to prove his theory of liability under the Louisiana Product’s Liability Act; (3) the Velan valve at issue was not unreasonably dangerous as defined by the Louisiana Products Liability Act; and (4) the plaintiff was unable to prove proximate causation needed to establish his case of liability against Velan. The Hon. Brian Jackson found that under the undisputed facts presented by Velan, summary judgment was appropriate and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against it, with prejudice.