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Know Your Role: An Engineer’s Duties to Third Parties in Louisiana

April 6, 2021

Juan J. Miranda

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An engineer’s obligations on any given project are generally defined by the Engineering Services Agreement (ESA) between the engineer and either the project owner or the general contractor. Although the ESA defines the obligations among the parties to the agreement, those obligations may be used by courts to determine an engineer’s duties owed to third parties not privy to the ESA.

Under Louisiana law, the duties owed by an engineer to third parties, such as a construction worker, are generally determined by the obligations undertaken by the engineer in the ESA and from the obligations undertaken by the general contractor pursuant to the General Contract. SeeYocum v. City of Minden, 26, 424 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/25/95); 649 So. 2d 129. “[In] determining the duty owed to an employee of a contractor by an engineering firm also involved in the project, the court must consider the express provisions of the contract between the parties." Id. at 132. The only way a legal duty owed to a non-contracting third party can arise is if the contract between the owner and the general contractor and the owner and engineer lead to the conclusion that the engineer was responsible for those activities that a plaintiff alleges the engineer failed to perform. SeeBlack v. Gorman-Rupp, 2000-1223 (La. App. 4 Cir 07/11/01); 791 So. 2d 793, 795-96.

In other words, Louisiana courts look to all pertinent contracts, including the ESA and the General Contract, to determine whether an engineer owed a duty to an injured third party. If, for example, a construction worker is injured on a project due to unsafe site conditions, courts will look to all pertinent contracts to determine which party undertook the obligation for site safety, means and methods, supervision, and warnings.

Engineers should always be cognizant of the fact that the contractual obligations agreed to in the ESA may also give rise to duties owed to third parties. Likewise, the contract between the owner and general contractor may be determinative of whether the engineer owes a duty to a third party. The analysis used by Louisiana courts can be a double-edged sword for an engineer as the engineer may not always be aware of all contractual provisions of the General Contract. On the one hand, the engineer may benefit from the GC’s expansive obligations on a project, which generally include means, methods or techniques, site safety, and duties to protect against dangerous site conditions. On the other hand, the General Contract may delegate certain obligations to the engineer of record; obligations that may give rise to duties owed to third parties.

For example, an engineer may take on the obligation to provide contract administration and periodic site visits to make observations regarding technical issues. Such contract language may inadvertently give rise to duties owed to third parties if it is unclear from the pertinent contracts that such undertakings should not be construed as supervision of the construction of the project. As such, an engineer should always ensure that obligations undertaken in the ESA do not conflict with obligations undertaken by the general contractor in the General Contract and that the General Contract does not purport to expand the engineer’s obligations.

Courts will generally find that the engineer does not owe a duty to a third party when the pertinent contracts clearly define the engineer’s obligations and the obligations do not include activities complained of by the third party. For example, in Black v. Gorman-Rupp,an injured plaintiff alleged that an engineering firm was negligent in failing to properly supervise the work, design a system to safely remove water from the job site, and by failing to provide a safe place to work. 2000-1223 (La. App. 4 Cir 07/11/01), 791 So. 2d 793. The engineering firm argued that its contract was solely for engineering services and involved checking the construction work generally to make sure it complied with the contractual requirements.  In evaluating the case, the court stated:

The only way a legal duty to act can arise from the facts before this Court, is if the contract between the [Owner] and [the General Contractor] and the [Owner] and [Engineer] lead to the conclusion that [the Engineer] was responsible for performing those activities that appellant alleges that [the Engineer] failed to perform. After a careful review of the contracts, we are of the same opinion as the trial court that [the Engineer] did not have a contractual obligation to supervise construction or site safety. The mere fact that [the Engineer] was involved in the construction process and had contractual duties to the [Owner] does not create an all-encompassing duty to protect everyone from every risk which could be encountered during the course of the project. To defeat the summary judgment the plaintiff cannot merely allege that [the Engineer] owed a duty to [the deceased] but must demonstrate some basis in law for the imposition of this duty. In the absence of such a duty there can be no liability on the part of [the Engineer]. Id.at 795-796.

Blackand other cases demonstrate that courts will generally refer to applicable contracts to define the legal duties owed or not owed under the circumstances. Seee.g.,Yocum v. City of Minden, 26, 424 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/25/95), 649 So. 2d 129; Johnson v. R.R. Controls, L.P., No. 2:11-CV-1722, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16171, at *6-7 (W.D. La. Feb. 10, 2015). But the engineer should always be aware of potential pitfalls arising from lack of clarity or well-defined obligations in the contract documents. The engineer should know his role and obligations on the project and those of the owner, general contractor, subcontractors, and other engineering consultants on the project including clearly defined obligations in the contract documents will avoid inadvertently creating duties owed to third parties.

Firm Highlights

  • Insight

    No Mercy for Employers in Louisiana Supreme Court’s Recent Magill Decision

    In its recent per curiam opinion, Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska[1], the Louisiana Supreme Court has foreclosed a routine defense strategy to shield employers from direct negligence claims. The high court has extended their 2022 decision in Martin v. Thomas[2], and now allows plaintiffs to pursue direct negligence claims against an employer despite the employer’s stipulation that its employee was in the course-and-scope of employment and caused the accident. Essentially, employers who fail to implement better employment practices will permit plaintiffs to ramp up potential exposure with evidence, if such exists, that heretofore they were routinely barred from introducing at trial. The Supreme Court’s Magill holding should encourage employers to update where needed their policies and procedures pertaining to hiring, training, supervising, and entrusting duties and property to employees, not only for the safety of their employees and customers in this state, but also eliminate employer’s exposure to direct negligence claims. Prior to Martin, a litigation strategy had taken shape where employers stipulated to 1) an employee being in course-and-scope of employment at the time of the accident, 2) that the employee was at fault for the accident being caused, or 3) both. By stipulating these facts, employers were largely able to exclude evidence of any direct negligence on part of the employer and/or narrow the scope of trial to only a contest of the plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court in Martin held that despite an employer admitting their employee was in course and scope when the accident occurred, plaintiffs could pursue direct negligence claims against the employer—as the issue of liability had not been admitted. Accordingly, employers found success by admitting both course and scope and liability—as seen in the Western District of Louisiana’s holding in Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona[3]. In Ferguson, the defendants stipulated that their employee was acting in course-and-scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. Due to the employer’s stipulation of fault, Judge Wicks of the Western District of Louisiana held that Martin did not apply and that plaintiffs could not pursue direct negligence claims. In Magill, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided scarce reasoning for their decision. The high court simply affirmed the District Court’s expansion of the holding in Martin and that the employer’s reliance on the Western District’s Ferguson holding was a misapplication of Louisiana law. The Supreme Court also cited the decision in Tardo v. Farrell.[4] where the Fifth Circuit held that even if an employer and employee stipulate to course and scope and fault, those admissions do not eliminate direct-negligence claims because those claims remain separate issues for the trier of fact. The Fifth Circuit notably stated, “the societal decisions as to who actually pays does not change the manner of assessing fault to all parties as required by law.” This statement raises concern, as plaintiffs may now attempt to challenge employer stipulations that historically narrowed trials. The Supreme Court did not explain its reliance on Tardo, so future litigation will likely clarify the decision’s full impact. Under Magill, plaintiffs are permitted to pursue direct negligence claims against the employer despite the employer admitting that their employee was acting in course and scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. The full effect of the Supreme Court’s decision remains to be seen. In praxis, Magill will permit plaintiffs to put on evidence of direct negligence by an employer in front of a jury who cannot assign fault—as fault has already been stipulated to by the defendants. Employers now face the practical risk that plaintiffs will encourage juries to increase damages as a form of punishment against an employer that admits fault but contests the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries. Employers should use this moment to rigorously review and strengthen policies and procedures related to hiring and training in order to limit exposure when plaintiffs assert direct-negligence claims.  [1] Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska, 2025-00892 (La. 11/12/25) [2] Martin v. Thomas, 21-01490 (La. 6/29/22), 346 So.3d 238 [3] Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, 17-1570, 2023 WL 173413 (W.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) [4] Tardo v. Ferrell, 25-123 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/25), 2025 WL 1516837 (unpublished).
  • Experience

    Burnell Joseph v. Atalco Gramercy, LLC et al., No. 3:23-cv-505, United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

    Bob Kerrigan and Jose Ruiz successfully secured summary judgment dismissal for their client, Velan, Inc., in a complex intentional tort and products liability act involving catastrophic injury. The plaintiff, a precipitation batch tank operator working at the Atalco alumina refinery in Gramercy, Louisiana, suffered severe and debilitating chemical burn injuries to his face, eyes, and body when he was sprayed with caustic liquor while working underneath a tank at the refinery. He claimed that the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank was leaking, which allowed the tank to become filled with liquor after it had been previously verified as empty. He filed suit against Velan, Inc., the manufacturer of the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank, alleging that the valve was unreasonable dangerous in accordance with the Louisiana Products Liability Act. He also filed an intentional tort claim against his employer, Atalco Gramercy, LLC, alleging that Atalco knew the valve was leaking and continued to force employees to work underneath the tank. He claimed that under these conditions, an incident such as his was substantially certain to occur. Following the close of discovery, Velan moved for summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims was appropriate because: (1) the plaintiff’s injuries were a result of Atalco’s misuse of the valve; (2) the plaintiff lacked the expert testimony needed to prove his theory of liability under the Louisiana Product’s Liability Act; (3) the Velan valve at issue was not unreasonably dangerous as defined by the Louisiana Products Liability Act; and (4) the plaintiff was unable to prove proximate causation needed to establish his case of liability against Velan. The Hon. Brian Jackson found that under the undisputed facts presented by Velan, summary judgment was appropriate and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against it, with prejudice.