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Local Lawsuit Filed Seeking Relief Under Lease Agreement

April 6, 2020

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On March 22, 2020, the Governor of Louisiana entered a “Stay-at-Home” Order for all of Louisiana, including the City of New Orleans.  Additionally, the Mayor of New Orleans followed suit.  As a result, Louisiana and the City of New Orleans are now beginning to see lawsuits filed related to COVID-19 and the interruption of business.  Undoubtedly, the number of lawsuits will continue to increase almost simultaneously as the days under the Order continue to increase.

For example, on March 22, 2020, the Shops and Garage at Canal Place, L.L.C. (“SG”) filed suit in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans against Wilson Canal Place II, LLC (“Wilson”) for a declaratory judgment regarding their current lease agreement. On February 24, 2016, SG and Wilson entered into a lease agreement (the “Lease”) leasing the parking garage at the Shops at Canal Place to SG (“Lawsuit”).  According to the Lease, SG is allowed to operate the parking garage for the operation of a commercial parking garage.  Most of the customers of the parking garage are patrons and guests of the Shops at Canal Place and/or the Westin Hotel.

Under the Governor’s “Stay at Home” Order, any public and/or social gathering of 10 or more people is strictly prohibited.  In fact, the New Orleans Police Department is policing all streets and public areas to ensure strict compliance with the government Orders.  Consequently, the Shops at Canal Place and the Westin Hotel are closed. There is no dispute that the Shops at Canal Place are closed due to the mandatory Stay at Home Orders.

In the Lawsuit, SG argues that since there are no customers coming to the Parking Garage given the Order, the Parking Garage’s business is interrupted, and SG seeks a reduction in the Minimum Rent of the Parking Garage while under these Orders.  To seek such a reduction, SG cites to its Lease with Wilson.  Accordingly, Section 13.5 of the Lease provides for an abatement of Minimum Rent in certain circumstances, including when an “unforeseen act of God or unforeseen cause beyond the reasonable control” of SG interrupts or substantially impairs the use for the operation of a commercial parking facility.  In fact, Section 13.2 of the Lease provides for calculation of the Minimum Rent payments under these circumstances.

On March 17, 2020, SG sent a letter to Wilson requesting an abatement of Minimum Rent given the circumstances surrounding the business interruptions experienced due to COVID-19.  On March 18, 2020, Wilson responded by disputing SG’s request for abatement of Minimum Rent under Sections 13.5 and 13.2 of the Lease.  Wilson disagrees that the provisions of Section 13.5 are invoked because they contend that the operation of a commercial parking facility has not been interrupted or substantially impaired.  Rather, Wilson takes the position that SG is able to continue operating the Parking Garage as a commercial parking facility, regardless of any closure to the Shops at Canal Place.  Wilson further urges that just because the traffic to the Parking Garage may be reduced due to the current circumstances does not entitle SG to a reduction in rent under the Lease.  Wilson maintains that if Minimum Rent is not continued under the Lease, then Wilson will exercise all remedies provided under the terms of the Lease.

SG points out that if Wilson truly believed that there was no substantial impairment to operating the Shops at Canal Place, then it would be open for business, and customers and guests would still be utilizing the Parking Garage.  SG urges that the closing of the Shops at Canal Place in and of itself is a direct admission that Section 13.5 of the Lease is enacted as any “unforeseen act of God or unforeseen cause beyond the reasonable control of the Tenant, then the Minimum Rent shall be abated on a daily basis beginning the day of interruption or substantial impairment of use is removed.”

Through the Lawsuit, SG simply seeks a declaratory judgment that: (1) the circumstances presented by the COVID-19 pandemic constitute an unforeseen act of God or unforeseen cause beyond the reasonable control of SG, which has interrupted and substantially impaired the use of the Parking Garage as a commercial parking garage as contemplated by Lease Section 13.5 beginning at least the week of March 13, 2020, and (2) under Lease Section 13.5, SG is entitled to abate Minimum Rent and to pay rent calculated under Section 13.2 of the Lease beginning the day of the interruption or substantial impairment of use and continuing until the day after the cause of the interruption is removed.

Put simply, SG is not seeking termination of the Lease, although SG does reserve its rights to do so.  Rather, SG is seeking relief from rent payments that would be reasonable under reasonable business circumstances but now are not reasonable in light of the business interruptions brought on by COVID-19 mandatory closures.    It is unclear how quickly any decision will be made on SG’s Lawsuit in light of the closures of the Courts.

While the outcome is unknown, we anticipate there are many businesses throughout the City of New Orleans in the same situation as SG, and you should be looking at the terms of your lease agreements to determine what, if any, relief may be available to you during this national crisis.  There may be timely written notice requirements that you need to trigger to take advantage of any potential relief. 

If we can be of any assistance or provide any resources as it pertains to any questions, claims or lawsuits, please do not hesitate to contact us, as we stand ready and able to assist you in any way we can.

Firm Highlights

  • Insight

    No Mercy for Employers in Louisiana Supreme Court’s Recent Magill Decision

    In its recent per curiam opinion, Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska[1], the Louisiana Supreme Court has foreclosed a routine defense strategy to shield employers from direct negligence claims. The high court has extended their 2022 decision in Martin v. Thomas[2], and now allows plaintiffs to pursue direct negligence claims against an employer despite the employer’s stipulation that its employee was in the course-and-scope of employment and caused the accident. Essentially, employers who fail to implement better employment practices will permit plaintiffs to ramp up potential exposure with evidence, if such exists, that heretofore they were routinely barred from introducing at trial. The Supreme Court’s Magill holding should encourage employers to update where needed their policies and procedures pertaining to hiring, training, supervising, and entrusting duties and property to employees, not only for the safety of their employees and customers in this state, but also eliminate employer’s exposure to direct negligence claims. Prior to Martin, a litigation strategy had taken shape where employers stipulated to 1) an employee being in course-and-scope of employment at the time of the accident, 2) that the employee was at fault for the accident being caused, or 3) both. By stipulating these facts, employers were largely able to exclude evidence of any direct negligence on part of the employer and/or narrow the scope of trial to only a contest of the plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court in Martin held that despite an employer admitting their employee was in course and scope when the accident occurred, plaintiffs could pursue direct negligence claims against the employer—as the issue of liability had not been admitted. Accordingly, employers found success by admitting both course and scope and liability—as seen in the Western District of Louisiana’s holding in Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona[3]. In Ferguson, the defendants stipulated that their employee was acting in course-and-scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. Due to the employer’s stipulation of fault, Judge Wicks of the Western District of Louisiana held that Martin did not apply and that plaintiffs could not pursue direct negligence claims. In Magill, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided scarce reasoning for their decision. The high court simply affirmed the District Court’s expansion of the holding in Martin and that the employer’s reliance on the Western District’s Ferguson holding was a misapplication of Louisiana law. The Supreme Court also cited the decision in Tardo v. Farrell.[4] where the Fifth Circuit held that even if an employer and employee stipulate to course and scope and fault, those admissions do not eliminate direct-negligence claims because those claims remain separate issues for the trier of fact. The Fifth Circuit notably stated, “the societal decisions as to who actually pays does not change the manner of assessing fault to all parties as required by law.” This statement raises concern, as plaintiffs may now attempt to challenge employer stipulations that historically narrowed trials. The Supreme Court did not explain its reliance on Tardo, so future litigation will likely clarify the decision’s full impact. Under Magill, plaintiffs are permitted to pursue direct negligence claims against the employer despite the employer admitting that their employee was acting in course and scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. The full effect of the Supreme Court’s decision remains to be seen. In praxis, Magill will permit plaintiffs to put on evidence of direct negligence by an employer in front of a jury who cannot assign fault—as fault has already been stipulated to by the defendants. Employers now face the practical risk that plaintiffs will encourage juries to increase damages as a form of punishment against an employer that admits fault but contests the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries. Employers should use this moment to rigorously review and strengthen policies and procedures related to hiring and training in order to limit exposure when plaintiffs assert direct-negligence claims.  [1] Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska, 2025-00892 (La. 11/12/25) [2] Martin v. Thomas, 21-01490 (La. 6/29/22), 346 So.3d 238 [3] Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, 17-1570, 2023 WL 173413 (W.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) [4] Tardo v. Ferrell, 25-123 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/25), 2025 WL 1516837 (unpublished).
  • Experience

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    Bob Kerrigan and Jose Ruiz successfully secured summary judgment dismissal for their client, Velan, Inc., in a complex intentional tort and products liability act involving catastrophic injury. The plaintiff, a precipitation batch tank operator working at the Atalco alumina refinery in Gramercy, Louisiana, suffered severe and debilitating chemical burn injuries to his face, eyes, and body when he was sprayed with caustic liquor while working underneath a tank at the refinery. He claimed that the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank was leaking, which allowed the tank to become filled with liquor after it had been previously verified as empty. He filed suit against Velan, Inc., the manufacturer of the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank, alleging that the valve was unreasonable dangerous in accordance with the Louisiana Products Liability Act. He also filed an intentional tort claim against his employer, Atalco Gramercy, LLC, alleging that Atalco knew the valve was leaking and continued to force employees to work underneath the tank. He claimed that under these conditions, an incident such as his was substantially certain to occur. Following the close of discovery, Velan moved for summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims was appropriate because: (1) the plaintiff’s injuries were a result of Atalco’s misuse of the valve; (2) the plaintiff lacked the expert testimony needed to prove his theory of liability under the Louisiana Product’s Liability Act; (3) the Velan valve at issue was not unreasonably dangerous as defined by the Louisiana Products Liability Act; and (4) the plaintiff was unable to prove proximate causation needed to establish his case of liability against Velan. The Hon. Brian Jackson found that under the undisputed facts presented by Velan, summary judgment was appropriate and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against it, with prejudice.