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Louisiana Department of Insurance Issues Emergency Rule 47 Suspending Certain Insurance Statutes Regarding Premium Payments, Claim Filings, and More

September 5, 2021

Jose Ruiz

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In the wake of Hurricane Ida, the Louisiana Department of Insurance issued Emergency Rule 47, extending certain benefits, entitlements, and protections to insureds affected by the hurricane and its immediate aftermath. Emergency Rule 47 has an effective date of August 26, 2021 at 12:01 a.m. and is set to expire on September 27, 2021 at 11:59 p.m. or at the cessation of Governor John Bel Edwards’ Emergency Proclamation JBE 0221-165, whichever occurs first.

The Emergency Rule covers all types of insurers conducting business in the State of Louisiana and applies to all types of insurance enumerated under the Louisiana Insurance Code, although those insurance types can be broken into two main categories:

  1. Any and all kinds of insurance set forth in La. R.S. §22:47, including, but not limited to, life, vehicle, liability, workers’ compensation, burglary and forgery, fidelity, title, fire and allied lines, crop, marine and transportation, homeowners’, credit property and casualty, and industrial fire; and
  2. Health and accident Insurance, including but not limited to group and individual health and accident insurance, limited benefit insurance, Medicare supplemental insurance, Medicare select insurance, HMO’s, PPO’s, excess loss insurance, stop loss insurance, disability income insurance, short-term health insurance, long-term care insurance, and any and all other health insurance.

An understanding of the new guidelines set forth by Emergency Rule 47 is important, as any insurer who violates any provision of Emergency Rule 47 is subject to regulatory action by the insurance commissioner under any applicable provisions of the Louisiana Insurance Code.

First, it is important to note that Emergency Rule 47 is not a blanket declaration that will apply statewide to all insureds in Louisiana. It is designed to protect those who were affected by Hurricane Ida and its immediate aftermath. Specifically, it applies to individuals who reside in or own property in one of the following twenty-five (25) parishes:

Ascension, Assumption, East Baton Rouge, East Feliciana, Iberia, Iberville, Jefferson, Lafourche, Livingston, Orleans, Plaquemines, Pointe Coupee, St. Bernard, St. Charles, St. Helena, St. James, St. John the Baptist, St. Martin, St. Mary, St. Tammany, Tangipahoa, Terrebonne, Washington, West Baton Rouge, and West Feliciana.

Additionally, in terms of health and accident insurance, Emergency Rule 47 applies to any person whose primary place of employment was in, or whose permanent employer had assigned said person to a business located in, one of the twenty-five (25) above-listed parishes.

The primary purpose of Emergency Rule 47 appears to be to protect insureds from a cancellation or lapse in their insurance coverage as a result in the wake of Hurricane Ida. To that end, under the Rule, no insurer may issue any notice of cancellation, nonrenewal, or non-reinstatement of any type of insurance policy to any affected insured during the pendency of Rule 47. This includes any notice of cancellation related to nonpayment of premium by the insured. However, Rule 47 does not apply to any insurance policy issued on or after 12:01 a.m. on August 26, 2021.

Additionally, any notice that was previously sent for any policy of insurance that was in full force and effect at 12:01 a.m. on August 26, 2021 is null and void, and must be re-issued after the expiration of the Rule.

There are two exceptions to this moratorium on cancellations on insurance policies. The first is when the insured either requests a cancellation in writing or concurs to a cancellation in writing. The second is when the insured has engaged in fraud or a material misrepresentation. Absent either of these two circumstances, an insurer who attempts to cancel a policy of insurance during the pendency of Rule 47 can be subject to regulatory action by the Louisiana insurance commissioner.

The fact that an insurer cannot cancel a policy of insurance does not, however, relieve an insured of their obligation to pay their insurance premiums. In fact, Emergency Rule 47 specifically notes that unless a policy is cancelled by the insured in writing, all insureds have an obligation to continue paying their premium, and that Rule 47 is to be treated as a grace period to facilitate the payment of their premium, not a waiver of the obligation to pay. Rule 47 further directs insurers to work with insureds who reside in impacted parishes whose payments are due during this moratorium by either: (1) establishing a payment plan for the insured; or (2) providing a further extension of time for payment of the unpaid premium. Rule 47 also prohibits any insurer from imposing any interest, penalty, or other charge against an insured as a result of this premium payment suspension.

If an insurer receives a claim from an insured owing a premium payment, the insurer may offset the premium owed by the insured against the claim being made. It is important to note that this offset does not apply to health and accident insurers.

While the majority of Emergency Rule 47 is focused on the above-listed protections for affected insureds, there is also a section that provides some additional protections for property and casualty insurers as it pertains to loss adjustment of claims.

Under §4743(A) of Rule 47, Hurricane Ida is deemed to be a catastrophic loss event under La. R.S. §22:1892(A)(3) that would normally require insurers to initiate loss adjustment of a property damage claim within thirty (30) days after notification of loss by an insured claimant. However, §4743(B) grants insurers an additional thirty (30) days to initiate loss adjustment given the severity and extent of the destruction caused by Hurricane Ida, providing a total of sixty (60) days to initiate loss adjustment of a property damage claim after notification of loss by an insured claimant.

Please note that this article does not include an exhaustive list of all provisions set forth by Emergency Rule 47, and there are additional provisions of the Rule that pertain to specific issues with health and accident insurance. 

Please contact a Deutsch Kerrigan attorney with any questions you may have.

Firm Highlights

  • Experience

    Burnell Joseph v. Atalco Gramercy, LLC et al., No. 3:23-cv-505, United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

    Bob Kerrigan and Jose Ruiz successfully secured summary judgment dismissal for their client, Velan, Inc., in a complex intentional tort and products liability act involving catastrophic injury. The plaintiff, a precipitation batch tank operator working at the Atalco alumina refinery in Gramercy, Louisiana, suffered severe and debilitating chemical burn injuries to his face, eyes, and body when he was sprayed with caustic liquor while working underneath a tank at the refinery. He claimed that the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank was leaking, which allowed the tank to become filled with liquor after it had been previously verified as empty. He filed suit against Velan, Inc., the manufacturer of the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank, alleging that the valve was unreasonable dangerous in accordance with the Louisiana Products Liability Act. He also filed an intentional tort claim against his employer, Atalco Gramercy, LLC, alleging that Atalco knew the valve was leaking and continued to force employees to work underneath the tank. He claimed that under these conditions, an incident such as his was substantially certain to occur. Following the close of discovery, Velan moved for summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims was appropriate because: (1) the plaintiff’s injuries were a result of Atalco’s misuse of the valve; (2) the plaintiff lacked the expert testimony needed to prove his theory of liability under the Louisiana Product’s Liability Act; (3) the Velan valve at issue was not unreasonably dangerous as defined by the Louisiana Products Liability Act; and (4) the plaintiff was unable to prove proximate causation needed to establish his case of liability against Velan. The Hon. Brian Jackson found that under the undisputed facts presented by Velan, summary judgment was appropriate and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against it, with prejudice.
  • Insight

    No Mercy for Employers in Louisiana Supreme Court’s Recent Magill Decision

    In its recent per curiam opinion, Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska[1], the Louisiana Supreme Court has foreclosed a routine defense strategy to shield employers from direct negligence claims. The high court has extended their 2022 decision in Martin v. Thomas[2], and now allows plaintiffs to pursue direct negligence claims against an employer despite the employer’s stipulation that its employee was in the course-and-scope of employment and caused the accident. Essentially, employers who fail to implement better employment practices will permit plaintiffs to ramp up potential exposure with evidence, if such exists, that heretofore they were routinely barred from introducing at trial. The Supreme Court’s Magill holding should encourage employers to update where needed their policies and procedures pertaining to hiring, training, supervising, and entrusting duties and property to employees, not only for the safety of their employees and customers in this state, but also eliminate employer’s exposure to direct negligence claims. Prior to Martin, a litigation strategy had taken shape where employers stipulated to 1) an employee being in course-and-scope of employment at the time of the accident, 2) that the employee was at fault for the accident being caused, or 3) both. By stipulating these facts, employers were largely able to exclude evidence of any direct negligence on part of the employer and/or narrow the scope of trial to only a contest of the plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court in Martin held that despite an employer admitting their employee was in course and scope when the accident occurred, plaintiffs could pursue direct negligence claims against the employer—as the issue of liability had not been admitted. Accordingly, employers found success by admitting both course and scope and liability—as seen in the Western District of Louisiana’s holding in Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona[3]. In Ferguson, the defendants stipulated that their employee was acting in course-and-scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. Due to the employer’s stipulation of fault, Judge Wicks of the Western District of Louisiana held that Martin did not apply and that plaintiffs could not pursue direct negligence claims. In Magill, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided scarce reasoning for their decision. The high court simply affirmed the District Court’s expansion of the holding in Martin and that the employer’s reliance on the Western District’s Ferguson holding was a misapplication of Louisiana law. The Supreme Court also cited the decision in Tardo v. Farrell.[4] where the Fifth Circuit held that even if an employer and employee stipulate to course and scope and fault, those admissions do not eliminate direct-negligence claims because those claims remain separate issues for the trier of fact. The Fifth Circuit notably stated, “the societal decisions as to who actually pays does not change the manner of assessing fault to all parties as required by law.” This statement raises concern, as plaintiffs may now attempt to challenge employer stipulations that historically narrowed trials. The Supreme Court did not explain its reliance on Tardo, so future litigation will likely clarify the decision’s full impact. Under Magill, plaintiffs are permitted to pursue direct negligence claims against the employer despite the employer admitting that their employee was acting in course and scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. The full effect of the Supreme Court’s decision remains to be seen. In praxis, Magill will permit plaintiffs to put on evidence of direct negligence by an employer in front of a jury who cannot assign fault—as fault has already been stipulated to by the defendants. Employers now face the practical risk that plaintiffs will encourage juries to increase damages as a form of punishment against an employer that admits fault but contests the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries. Employers should use this moment to rigorously review and strengthen policies and procedures related to hiring and training in order to limit exposure when plaintiffs assert direct-negligence claims.  [1] Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska, 2025-00892 (La. 11/12/25) [2] Martin v. Thomas, 21-01490 (La. 6/29/22), 346 So.3d 238 [3] Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, 17-1570, 2023 WL 173413 (W.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) [4] Tardo v. Ferrell, 25-123 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/25), 2025 WL 1516837 (unpublished).