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Louisiana Enacts New Laws that Extend Lawsuit Protections and Limited Liability for COVID-19 Exposure to a Broad Spectrum of Individuals and Businesses in Louisiana

September 19, 2020

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Earlier this week, Louisiana Governor John Bel Edwards signed into law a number of bills that enacts liability limitations for businesses that offered needed services to the public and may face lawsuits brought by both customers and employees related to COVID-19 exposure. While federal legislation geared towards providing some liability protections for businesses is being discussed, Louisiana joins several other states that have stepped into the void and enacted legislation that grants liability protections for businesses from these types of claims.

The first measure, Act 303, Senate Bill No. 491, amends and enacts La. Rev. Stat. §§ 29:735.3.1 and 29:735.3.2 to provide for limited liability and lawsuit protection to people and businesses who donate or volunteer any disaster relief, recovery services, or products, such as hand sanitizer and protective clothing. Such persons and businesses can only be liable for injury or death to persons and property that results from “gross negligence or willful misconduct.”

This first measure also reenacts La. Rev. Stat. § 29:735.3.2 to provide for limited liability and lawsuit protection to people and businesses that render and/or sell recovery services or products “outside of the typical course and scope of their operations.” Once again, such persons and businesses can only be liable for injury or death to persons and property that results from “gross negligence or willful misconduct.” 

The second measure, Act 305, Senate Bill No. 508, enacts La. Rev. Stat. § 29:773 and extends limited liability and lawsuit protection to restaurant owners and employees for claims arising out of injury or death due to COVID-19 infection transmitted through the preparation and serving of food and beverages during the emergency, which includes dine-in, takeout, drive-through, and delivery. Restaurants cannot be held liable as long as they are deemed “in substantial compliance” with state, federal, and local regulations that govern the business operations during the COVID-19 emergency. If the restaurant is governed by more than one set of procedures or guidelines, then the business must only “substantially comply” with one of them. The statute broadly defines “Restaurant” as “an eating establishment which gives or offers for retail sale prepared food to the public within its premises.” The lone exception to this limited liability for restaurant operations is when the injury or death results from “gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct” by the restaurant’s owners, employees, contractors, or agents.

The third measure, Act 336, House Bill No. 826, enacts two new statutes that extend limited liability and lawsuit protections to a broad range of businesses and business activity. Newly enacted La. Rev. Stat. § 9:2800.25 provides that persons, businesses, and state and local governments are not liable for “any civil damages for injury or death resulting from or related to actual or alleged exposure to COVID-19 in the course of” business operations unless (1) the business “failed to substantially comply with the applicable COVID-19 procedures established by the federal, state or local agency which governs the business” and (2) the injury or death resulted from the business’s “gross negligence or wanton or reckless misconduct.” If the business is governed by more than one set of procedures or guidelines, then the business must only “substantially comply” with one of them.

Another subsection of § 9:2800.25 extends protections to business event strategists and various kinds of event planners (e.g., conventions, trade shows, conventions, exhibitions, sporting events, etc.). These strategists and planners cannot be held liable for injury or death related to actual or alleged COVID-19 exposure “unless such damages were caused by “gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct.”

Employees covered by workers compensation who allege they contracted COVID-19 in the workplace is also barred from suing unless exposure to COVID-19 was “intentional” according to the law under the new law. In Louisiana, this intentional threshold is a very difficult hurdle for an injured employee to meet.

Finally, the third measure enacts La. Rev. Stat. § 29:773 that provides limited liability and lawsuit protections to persons and businesses that design, manufacture, label, or distribute personal protective equipment in response to the COVID-19 public health emergency. Once again, these protections do not apply when the damages were caused by “gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct.”

This same statute also provides that persons and businesses that use, employ, dispense, or administer personal protective equipment cannot be held liable for civil damages resulting from or related to that personal protective equipment. The limited liability and lawsuit protections do not apply if (1) the person “failed to substantially comply with the applicable procedures established by the federal, state or local agency which govern such personal protective equipment” and (2) the injury or death resulted from the business’ “gross negligence or wanton or reckless misconduct.” If the business is governed by more than one set of procedures or guidelines, then the business must only “substantially comply” with one of them.

The primary exception to the protections of these new laws is when the damages are caused by the actor’s “gross negligence or willful and wanton or reckless misconduct.” While the new laws use inconsistent wording and fail to offer any definition or guidance on what these phrases mean, Louisiana appellate courts have long defined this concept of “gross negligence or willful and wanton or reckless misconduct” as being distinctly separate and different from ordinary negligence. The terms have been described as the “want of even slight care and diligence” and the “want of that diligence which even careless men are accustomed to exercise.” Gross negligence has also been termed the “entire absence of care” and the “utter disregard of the dictates of prudence, amounting to complete neglect of the rights of others.” For the most part, these fluid, vague descriptions essentially mean no hard and fast rules exist, and our courts will decide what is “gross negligence or wanton or reckless misconduct” based on the specific facts of each case.

While the business community should view these laws as a welcome relief, the protections they afford do not create blanket immunity from being sued in court. It is important for businesses to make sure to document the actions being taken to keep both employees and customers safe. Businesses should also carefully and comprehensively document the source of the recommendations they are following in implementing these procedures, i.e. state municipal agencies, local Mayors, the Governor’s office, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and Occupational Safety and Health Administration, etc.

The protections associated with each of the new laws are retroactive to March 11, 2020, when Governor Edwards first declared a state of emergency related to COVID-19 in Louisiana.

Links to these new laws can be found here:

Firm Highlights

  • Experience

    Burnell Joseph v. Atalco Gramercy, LLC et al., No. 3:23-cv-505, United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

    Bob Kerrigan and Jose Ruiz successfully secured summary judgment dismissal for their client, Velan, Inc., in a complex intentional tort and products liability act involving catastrophic injury. The plaintiff, a precipitation batch tank operator working at the Atalco alumina refinery in Gramercy, Louisiana, suffered severe and debilitating chemical burn injuries to his face, eyes, and body when he was sprayed with caustic liquor while working underneath a tank at the refinery. He claimed that the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank was leaking, which allowed the tank to become filled with liquor after it had been previously verified as empty. He filed suit against Velan, Inc., the manufacturer of the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank, alleging that the valve was unreasonable dangerous in accordance with the Louisiana Products Liability Act. He also filed an intentional tort claim against his employer, Atalco Gramercy, LLC, alleging that Atalco knew the valve was leaking and continued to force employees to work underneath the tank. He claimed that under these conditions, an incident such as his was substantially certain to occur. Following the close of discovery, Velan moved for summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims was appropriate because: (1) the plaintiff’s injuries were a result of Atalco’s misuse of the valve; (2) the plaintiff lacked the expert testimony needed to prove his theory of liability under the Louisiana Product’s Liability Act; (3) the Velan valve at issue was not unreasonably dangerous as defined by the Louisiana Products Liability Act; and (4) the plaintiff was unable to prove proximate causation needed to establish his case of liability against Velan. The Hon. Brian Jackson found that under the undisputed facts presented by Velan, summary judgment was appropriate and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against it, with prejudice.
  • Insight

    No Mercy for Employers in Louisiana Supreme Court’s Recent Magill Decision

    In its recent per curiam opinion, Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska[1], the Louisiana Supreme Court has foreclosed a routine defense strategy to shield employers from direct negligence claims. The high court has extended their 2022 decision in Martin v. Thomas[2], and now allows plaintiffs to pursue direct negligence claims against an employer despite the employer’s stipulation that its employee was in the course-and-scope of employment and caused the accident. Essentially, employers who fail to implement better employment practices will permit plaintiffs to ramp up potential exposure with evidence, if such exists, that heretofore they were routinely barred from introducing at trial. The Supreme Court’s Magill holding should encourage employers to update where needed their policies and procedures pertaining to hiring, training, supervising, and entrusting duties and property to employees, not only for the safety of their employees and customers in this state, but also eliminate employer’s exposure to direct negligence claims. Prior to Martin, a litigation strategy had taken shape where employers stipulated to 1) an employee being in course-and-scope of employment at the time of the accident, 2) that the employee was at fault for the accident being caused, or 3) both. By stipulating these facts, employers were largely able to exclude evidence of any direct negligence on part of the employer and/or narrow the scope of trial to only a contest of the plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court in Martin held that despite an employer admitting their employee was in course and scope when the accident occurred, plaintiffs could pursue direct negligence claims against the employer—as the issue of liability had not been admitted. Accordingly, employers found success by admitting both course and scope and liability—as seen in the Western District of Louisiana’s holding in Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona[3]. In Ferguson, the defendants stipulated that their employee was acting in course-and-scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. Due to the employer’s stipulation of fault, Judge Wicks of the Western District of Louisiana held that Martin did not apply and that plaintiffs could not pursue direct negligence claims. In Magill, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided scarce reasoning for their decision. The high court simply affirmed the District Court’s expansion of the holding in Martin and that the employer’s reliance on the Western District’s Ferguson holding was a misapplication of Louisiana law. The Supreme Court also cited the decision in Tardo v. Farrell.[4] where the Fifth Circuit held that even if an employer and employee stipulate to course and scope and fault, those admissions do not eliminate direct-negligence claims because those claims remain separate issues for the trier of fact. The Fifth Circuit notably stated, “the societal decisions as to who actually pays does not change the manner of assessing fault to all parties as required by law.” This statement raises concern, as plaintiffs may now attempt to challenge employer stipulations that historically narrowed trials. The Supreme Court did not explain its reliance on Tardo, so future litigation will likely clarify the decision’s full impact. Under Magill, plaintiffs are permitted to pursue direct negligence claims against the employer despite the employer admitting that their employee was acting in course and scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. The full effect of the Supreme Court’s decision remains to be seen. In praxis, Magill will permit plaintiffs to put on evidence of direct negligence by an employer in front of a jury who cannot assign fault—as fault has already been stipulated to by the defendants. Employers now face the practical risk that plaintiffs will encourage juries to increase damages as a form of punishment against an employer that admits fault but contests the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries. Employers should use this moment to rigorously review and strengthen policies and procedures related to hiring and training in order to limit exposure when plaintiffs assert direct-negligence claims.  [1] Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska, 2025-00892 (La. 11/12/25) [2] Martin v. Thomas, 21-01490 (La. 6/29/22), 346 So.3d 238 [3] Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, 17-1570, 2023 WL 173413 (W.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) [4] Tardo v. Ferrell, 25-123 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/25), 2025 WL 1516837 (unpublished).