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Louisiana Supreme Court Distinguishes Off-Duty Premises Security and Law Enforcement Motorcade Escorts in Bolden v. Tisdale

April 19, 2022

Bryce M. Addison

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On a recent case of first impression before the Louisiana Supreme Court, the Court held in Bolden v. Tisdale, No. 21-cc-00224 (La. 01/28/22), that the visiting Tampa Bay Buccaneers did not enter into an employment relationship with New Orleans area law enforcement officers merely by requesting the local jurisdiction provide a law enforcement motorcade to escort team buses and personnel from the Mercedes-Benz Superdome to the airport following their September 20, 2015 game against the New Orleans Saints.

In reversing the trial court’s denial of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the Supreme Court engaged in a fact-intensive review of the extensive evidence presented on summary judgment. Specifically, the Court analyzed the evidence applying the Hillman and Hickman factors and concluded that the plaintiffs were unable to submit evidence demonstrating that a material question of fact remained. At first glance, this analysis implies that all summary judgments implicating employer-employee and independent contractor status should engage in the same degree of fact-intensive, case-by-case analysis. However, upon further review, the Bolden decision will make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for litigants to establish an employer-employee relationship between off-duty law enforcement officers performing a motorcade escort and the private entity who has requested the service.

In Bolden, the Supreme Court reiterates well-established jurisprudence: "[t]he single most important factor to consider in deciding whether the employer-employee relationship exists, for purposes of La. C.C. art. 2320, is the right of the employer to control the work of the employee1.” The Supreme Court then proceeded to distinguish between off-duty law enforcement officers providing premises security and off-duty law enforcement officers providing escort services.

The Court explained that private entities hiring off-duty law enforcement officers to provide premises security necessarily have greater control over the work performed because the private entity employers have custody and control of the premises where the work is performed. Conversely, “governmental entities have exclusive control over public thoroughfares; thus, in the context of a motorcycle escort, the law enforcement officers conducting the escort CANNOT relinquish control over the public roadway over which the motorcade travels2.” (Emphasis added.) In other words, the Supreme Court seems to acknowledge that in the context of a law enforcement escort, “the single most important factor to consider in deciding whether the employer-employee relationship exists,” cannot be satisfied as a matter of law. Accordingly, in light of Bolden, it will be challenging, if not impossible, for litigants to establish an employer-employee relationship between law enforcement officers and private entities who request law enforcement escort services for funerals, weddings, school events, and other matters.


[1]  Bolden v. Tisdale, 21-cc-00224 at p. 13 (La. 01/28/22), 2022 La. LEXIS 285 at *21, 2022 WL 262976.

[2]  Id. at *28-29.

Firm Highlights

  • Insight

    No Mercy for Employers in Louisiana Supreme Court’s Recent Magill Decision

    In its recent per curiam opinion, Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska[1], the Louisiana Supreme Court has foreclosed a routine defense strategy to shield employers from direct negligence claims. The high court has extended their 2022 decision in Martin v. Thomas[2], and now allows plaintiffs to pursue direct negligence claims against an employer despite the employer’s stipulation that its employee was in the course-and-scope of employment and caused the accident. Essentially, employers who fail to implement better employment practices will permit plaintiffs to ramp up potential exposure with evidence, if such exists, that heretofore they were routinely barred from introducing at trial. The Supreme Court’s Magill holding should encourage employers to update where needed their policies and procedures pertaining to hiring, training, supervising, and entrusting duties and property to employees, not only for the safety of their employees and customers in this state, but also eliminate employer’s exposure to direct negligence claims. Prior to Martin, a litigation strategy had taken shape where employers stipulated to 1) an employee being in course-and-scope of employment at the time of the accident, 2) that the employee was at fault for the accident being caused, or 3) both. By stipulating these facts, employers were largely able to exclude evidence of any direct negligence on part of the employer and/or narrow the scope of trial to only a contest of the plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court in Martin held that despite an employer admitting their employee was in course and scope when the accident occurred, plaintiffs could pursue direct negligence claims against the employer—as the issue of liability had not been admitted. Accordingly, employers found success by admitting both course and scope and liability—as seen in the Western District of Louisiana’s holding in Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona[3]. In Ferguson, the defendants stipulated that their employee was acting in course-and-scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. Due to the employer’s stipulation of fault, Judge Wicks of the Western District of Louisiana held that Martin did not apply and that plaintiffs could not pursue direct negligence claims. In Magill, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided scarce reasoning for their decision. The high court simply affirmed the District Court’s expansion of the holding in Martin and that the employer’s reliance on the Western District’s Ferguson holding was a misapplication of Louisiana law. The Supreme Court also cited the decision in Tardo v. Farrell.[4] where the Fifth Circuit held that even if an employer and employee stipulate to course and scope and fault, those admissions do not eliminate direct-negligence claims because those claims remain separate issues for the trier of fact. The Fifth Circuit notably stated, “the societal decisions as to who actually pays does not change the manner of assessing fault to all parties as required by law.” This statement raises concern, as plaintiffs may now attempt to challenge employer stipulations that historically narrowed trials. The Supreme Court did not explain its reliance on Tardo, so future litigation will likely clarify the decision’s full impact. Under Magill, plaintiffs are permitted to pursue direct negligence claims against the employer despite the employer admitting that their employee was acting in course and scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. The full effect of the Supreme Court’s decision remains to be seen. In praxis, Magill will permit plaintiffs to put on evidence of direct negligence by an employer in front of a jury who cannot assign fault—as fault has already been stipulated to by the defendants. Employers now face the practical risk that plaintiffs will encourage juries to increase damages as a form of punishment against an employer that admits fault but contests the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries. Employers should use this moment to rigorously review and strengthen policies and procedures related to hiring and training in order to limit exposure when plaintiffs assert direct-negligence claims.  [1] Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska, 2025-00892 (La. 11/12/25) [2] Martin v. Thomas, 21-01490 (La. 6/29/22), 346 So.3d 238 [3] Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, 17-1570, 2023 WL 173413 (W.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) [4] Tardo v. Ferrell, 25-123 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/25), 2025 WL 1516837 (unpublished).
  • Experience

    Burnell Joseph v. Atalco Gramercy, LLC et al., No. 3:23-cv-505, United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

    Bob Kerrigan and Jose Ruiz successfully secured summary judgment dismissal for their client, Velan, Inc., in a complex intentional tort and products liability act involving catastrophic injury. The plaintiff, a precipitation batch tank operator working at the Atalco alumina refinery in Gramercy, Louisiana, suffered severe and debilitating chemical burn injuries to his face, eyes, and body when he was sprayed with caustic liquor while working underneath a tank at the refinery. He claimed that the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank was leaking, which allowed the tank to become filled with liquor after it had been previously verified as empty. He filed suit against Velan, Inc., the manufacturer of the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank, alleging that the valve was unreasonable dangerous in accordance with the Louisiana Products Liability Act. He also filed an intentional tort claim against his employer, Atalco Gramercy, LLC, alleging that Atalco knew the valve was leaking and continued to force employees to work underneath the tank. He claimed that under these conditions, an incident such as his was substantially certain to occur. Following the close of discovery, Velan moved for summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims was appropriate because: (1) the plaintiff’s injuries were a result of Atalco’s misuse of the valve; (2) the plaintiff lacked the expert testimony needed to prove his theory of liability under the Louisiana Product’s Liability Act; (3) the Velan valve at issue was not unreasonably dangerous as defined by the Louisiana Products Liability Act; and (4) the plaintiff was unable to prove proximate causation needed to establish his case of liability against Velan. The Hon. Brian Jackson found that under the undisputed facts presented by Velan, summary judgment was appropriate and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against it, with prejudice.