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Louisiana Supreme Court Holds That an Insurer May Suspensively Appeal a Judgment Up to Its Policy Limits Without Posting the Excess Amount

November 26, 2024

F. Douglas Ortego

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Louisiana Supreme Court Holds That an Insurer May Suspensively Appeal a Judgment Up to Its Policy Limits Without Posting the Excess Amount

The Louisiana Supreme Court recently ruled that an insurance company can suspensively appeal the amount of the judgment representing its policy limit on behalf of itself and its insureds without posting the amount of the entire judgment, when the judgment exceeds the policy limit.

Martinez v. Am. Transp. Grp. Risk Retention Grp., Inc. arose from a 2019 motor vehicle accident in which the vehicle driven by Huberto Martinez slid off I-49 in Shreveport due to ice on the highway. [1] A short time later, a tractor trailer owned by Starr Carriers, LLC (“Starr Carriers”) and driven by Salah Dahir (“Dahir”) slid off the interstate due to the same icy condition and struck Martinez’s vehicle. Starr Carriers’ insurer, American Transportation Group Risk Retention Group, Inc. (“ATG”) carried a $1 million policy limit. Martinez sued ATG, Starr Carriers, and Mr. Dahir the driver.  Three passengers in his car filed a separate suit, which was consolidated for trial.

Martinez settled before trial. The jury awarded the passengers of $2,802,054.66 in total damages, plus legal interest and $55,207.88 in costs. The judgment on the verdict, however, did not delineate fault or set forth ATG's policy limits.

Defendants filed for a suspensive appeal. The trial court set the suspensive appeal bond at $2,802,054.66, plus additional interest as “the amount of the judgment, including the interest allowed by the judgment to the date the security is furnished,” but did not reflect ATG’s policy limits.

ATG furnished an appeal bond in the amount of $1,429,081, representing ATG’s remaining policy limits plus interest on the entire judgment and costs. ATG then applied for supervisory review of the trial court’s ruling fixing the suspensive appeal bond. The Second Circuit denied the writ application. The Supreme Court granted ATG’s subsequent writ application and reduced the bond to the amount posted by ATG.

In upholding ATG’s bond, the Supreme Court held that La. Code of Civ. P. article 2124(B) does not require an insurer “with contractually enforceable limits of liability, to post funds in excess of its policy limits to secure a suspensive appeal for its portion of the judgment.”

The Court reasoned that absent bad faith, it is “axiomatic” in Louisiana law that an insurer cannot be liable for more than its policy limits. Thus, to require ATG “to post a bond in excess of its policy limits as security for a suspensive appeal would render meaningless the limits of the insurance policy, which is a critical term of an insurance contract.”  To hold otherwise would, in the Court’s view, violate the contract clause in Louisiana’s Constitution that prohibits the enactment of any law “impairing the obligation of contracts.” La. Const. Art. 1, § 23.

The Court noted that the trial court should have made clear in its order granting the Defendants’ suspensive appeal the amount of security required to be posted by ATG in accordance with the limitations of its policy obligations. The Court’s decision recognized that its holding left unresolved the core issue of “what happens when an insurer's policy limit, and therefore the amount that it is required to post as security for a suspensive appeal, does not cover the entire amount of the judgment.” The Court’s solution, rather than reducing the suspensive appeal amount for all Defendants, was to “permit Defendants to suspensively appeal up to the amount of the policy limit, and devolutively appeal the remainder of the case for the insureds.” That solution conforms to the usual remedy for converting an insufficient suspensive appeal to a devolutive appeal, instead of dismissing the appeal altogether.

It is now clear that under Louisiana law, an insurer is permitted to suspensively appeal the amount of the judgment representing its policy limit on behalf of itself and its insureds without posting the amount of the entire judgment when the judgment exceeds the policy limit.

The Court did add one caveat to its ruling, however. In keeping with the strong duty insurers have to their insureds under Louisiana law, the Court held that under an insurer’s “duty to defend in good faith, an insurer should make a reasonable effort to help the insured protect his property pending the outcome of the appeal.”[2] The question of what lengths an insurer would need to go to, in order to protect its insured’s property in line with that caveat, remains unresolved at this time.


[1] Martinez v. Am. Transp. Grp. Risk Retention Grp., Inc., 2023-01716 (La. 10/25/24)

[2] Smith at 376.

Firm Highlights

  • Experience

    Burnell Joseph v. Atalco Gramercy, LLC et al., No. 3:23-cv-505, United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

    Bob Kerrigan and Jose Ruiz successfully secured summary judgment dismissal for their client, Velan, Inc., in a complex intentional tort and products liability act involving catastrophic injury. The plaintiff, a precipitation batch tank operator working at the Atalco alumina refinery in Gramercy, Louisiana, suffered severe and debilitating chemical burn injuries to his face, eyes, and body when he was sprayed with caustic liquor while working underneath a tank at the refinery. He claimed that the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank was leaking, which allowed the tank to become filled with liquor after it had been previously verified as empty. He filed suit against Velan, Inc., the manufacturer of the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank, alleging that the valve was unreasonable dangerous in accordance with the Louisiana Products Liability Act. He also filed an intentional tort claim against his employer, Atalco Gramercy, LLC, alleging that Atalco knew the valve was leaking and continued to force employees to work underneath the tank. He claimed that under these conditions, an incident such as his was substantially certain to occur. Following the close of discovery, Velan moved for summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims was appropriate because: (1) the plaintiff’s injuries were a result of Atalco’s misuse of the valve; (2) the plaintiff lacked the expert testimony needed to prove his theory of liability under the Louisiana Product’s Liability Act; (3) the Velan valve at issue was not unreasonably dangerous as defined by the Louisiana Products Liability Act; and (4) the plaintiff was unable to prove proximate causation needed to establish his case of liability against Velan. The Hon. Brian Jackson found that under the undisputed facts presented by Velan, summary judgment was appropriate and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against it, with prejudice.
  • Insight

    No Mercy for Employers in Louisiana Supreme Court’s Recent Magill Decision

    In its recent per curiam opinion, Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska[1], the Louisiana Supreme Court has foreclosed a routine defense strategy to shield employers from direct negligence claims. The high court has extended their 2022 decision in Martin v. Thomas[2], and now allows plaintiffs to pursue direct negligence claims against an employer despite the employer’s stipulation that its employee was in the course-and-scope of employment and caused the accident. Essentially, employers who fail to implement better employment practices will permit plaintiffs to ramp up potential exposure with evidence, if such exists, that heretofore they were routinely barred from introducing at trial. The Supreme Court’s Magill holding should encourage employers to update where needed their policies and procedures pertaining to hiring, training, supervising, and entrusting duties and property to employees, not only for the safety of their employees and customers in this state, but also eliminate employer’s exposure to direct negligence claims. Prior to Martin, a litigation strategy had taken shape where employers stipulated to 1) an employee being in course-and-scope of employment at the time of the accident, 2) that the employee was at fault for the accident being caused, or 3) both. By stipulating these facts, employers were largely able to exclude evidence of any direct negligence on part of the employer and/or narrow the scope of trial to only a contest of the plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court in Martin held that despite an employer admitting their employee was in course and scope when the accident occurred, plaintiffs could pursue direct negligence claims against the employer—as the issue of liability had not been admitted. Accordingly, employers found success by admitting both course and scope and liability—as seen in the Western District of Louisiana’s holding in Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona[3]. In Ferguson, the defendants stipulated that their employee was acting in course-and-scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. Due to the employer’s stipulation of fault, Judge Wicks of the Western District of Louisiana held that Martin did not apply and that plaintiffs could not pursue direct negligence claims. In Magill, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided scarce reasoning for their decision. The high court simply affirmed the District Court’s expansion of the holding in Martin and that the employer’s reliance on the Western District’s Ferguson holding was a misapplication of Louisiana law. The Supreme Court also cited the decision in Tardo v. Farrell.[4] where the Fifth Circuit held that even if an employer and employee stipulate to course and scope and fault, those admissions do not eliminate direct-negligence claims because those claims remain separate issues for the trier of fact. The Fifth Circuit notably stated, “the societal decisions as to who actually pays does not change the manner of assessing fault to all parties as required by law.” This statement raises concern, as plaintiffs may now attempt to challenge employer stipulations that historically narrowed trials. The Supreme Court did not explain its reliance on Tardo, so future litigation will likely clarify the decision’s full impact. Under Magill, plaintiffs are permitted to pursue direct negligence claims against the employer despite the employer admitting that their employee was acting in course and scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. The full effect of the Supreme Court’s decision remains to be seen. In praxis, Magill will permit plaintiffs to put on evidence of direct negligence by an employer in front of a jury who cannot assign fault—as fault has already been stipulated to by the defendants. Employers now face the practical risk that plaintiffs will encourage juries to increase damages as a form of punishment against an employer that admits fault but contests the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries. Employers should use this moment to rigorously review and strengthen policies and procedures related to hiring and training in order to limit exposure when plaintiffs assert direct-negligence claims.  [1] Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska, 2025-00892 (La. 11/12/25) [2] Martin v. Thomas, 21-01490 (La. 6/29/22), 346 So.3d 238 [3] Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, 17-1570, 2023 WL 173413 (W.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) [4] Tardo v. Ferrell, 25-123 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/25), 2025 WL 1516837 (unpublished).