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Open and Obvious Doctrine

January 12, 2023

Megan Demouy Champagne

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Open and Obvious Doctrine

Trip-and-fall or slip-and-fall accidents occur every day. In fact, such premises liability accidents are some of the most common personal injury claims. While some of those trip-and-falls or slip-and-falls may only cause a momentary instance of embarrassment, others can cause serious injuries. One defense that the Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized to premises liability accidents is that of the open and obvious doctrine.

In a premises liability claim against a property owner, the injured party must prove, among other things, that the thing had a defect and presented an unreasonable risk of harm1. Whether a defect presents an unreasonable risk of harm must be determined in light of the facts and circumstances of each particular case2. Courts have adopted a risk-utility balancing test to determine whether a condition is unreasonably dangerous3.  Under this risk-utility balancing test, courts are required to consider these four pertinent factors: (1) the utility of the complained-of-condition; (2) the likelihood and magnitude of the harm, including the obviousness and apparentness of the condition; (3) the cost of preventing the harm; and (4) the nature of the plaintiff’s activities in terms of social utility or whether the activities were dangerous by nature4.

A defendant does not generally have a duty to protect against an open and obvious hazard5. In order for a hazard to be considered open and obvious, the hazard should be one that is open and obvious to everyone who may potentially encounter it6. If a risk of harm is open and obvious to all who may encounter it, the likelihood that it will cause harm is diminished, and it will not be considered unreasonably dangerous under Louisiana law7. Therefore, the defendant may owe no duty to the injured party8.

One recent case involving the open and obvious doctrine stems from the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal. In Tromatore v. Jefferson Par. Hosp. Serv. Dist., the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s determination that the risk of harm presented by the concrete base of a 20-foot light pole that is 18 inches wide and 4 inches high was not open and obvious and therefore, was unreasonably dangerous9. The trial court’s decision centered on the fact that the concrete base is virtually indistinguishable from the concrete walking surface surrounding it due to their dark color caused by an accumulation of mold and dirt10. The court also determined that the base is often partially obstructed by shadows from a nearby ramp and light post11. Further, the court’s decision also considered that fact that the base had not been painted bright yellow like the other trip hazards in and around the walkway; thereby, making it more open and obvious to pedestrians navigating the area12. Despite the size of the light pole and its base, the court concluded that the concrete base was not open and obvious13.

Again, the main thing to remember when considering the open and obvious doctrine is that “[t]he focus on whether an alleged defect is open and obvious is ‘on the global knowledge of everyone who encounters the defective thing or dangerous condition, not the [injured person’s] actual or potentially ascertainable knowledge14.’”


[1] Louisiana Civil Code article 2317.

[2] Broussard v. State ex rel. Off. Of State Bldgs., 2012-1238 (La. 4/5/13), 113 So.3d 175, 183-84.

[3] Id.at 184; Bufkin v. Felipe’s Louisiana, LLC, 14-288 (La. 10/15/14), 171 So.3d 851, 856.

[4] Id.

[5] Broussard, 113 So.3d at 184.

[6] Id.; Caserta v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 12-0853, p. 1 (La. 6/22/12), 90 So. 3d 1042, 1043 (per curiam).

[7] Broussard,113 So.3d at 184.

[8] Morange v. Troxler, 20-386 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/27/21), 329 So.3d 1105, 1109.

[9] Tromatore v. Jefferson Par. Hosp. Serv. Dist.,21-551 (La. App. 5th Cir. 5/26/22), 341 So.3d 1269.

[10] Id.

[11] Id.

[12] Id.

[13] Id.

[14] Id.; Christiano v. S. Scrap Recycling, 13-595 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/27/13), 131 So.3d 1059, 1064 quoting Broussard, 113 So.3d at 188.

Firm Highlights

  • Insight

    No Mercy for Employers in Louisiana Supreme Court’s Recent Magill Decision

    In its recent per curiam opinion, Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska[1], the Louisiana Supreme Court has foreclosed a routine defense strategy to shield employers from direct negligence claims. The high court has extended their 2022 decision in Martin v. Thomas[2], and now allows plaintiffs to pursue direct negligence claims against an employer despite the employer’s stipulation that its employee was in the course-and-scope of employment and caused the accident. Essentially, employers who fail to implement better employment practices will permit plaintiffs to ramp up potential exposure with evidence, if such exists, that heretofore they were routinely barred from introducing at trial. The Supreme Court’s Magill holding should encourage employers to update where needed their policies and procedures pertaining to hiring, training, supervising, and entrusting duties and property to employees, not only for the safety of their employees and customers in this state, but also eliminate employer’s exposure to direct negligence claims. Prior to Martin, a litigation strategy had taken shape where employers stipulated to 1) an employee being in course-and-scope of employment at the time of the accident, 2) that the employee was at fault for the accident being caused, or 3) both. By stipulating these facts, employers were largely able to exclude evidence of any direct negligence on part of the employer and/or narrow the scope of trial to only a contest of the plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court in Martin held that despite an employer admitting their employee was in course and scope when the accident occurred, plaintiffs could pursue direct negligence claims against the employer—as the issue of liability had not been admitted. Accordingly, employers found success by admitting both course and scope and liability—as seen in the Western District of Louisiana’s holding in Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona[3]. In Ferguson, the defendants stipulated that their employee was acting in course-and-scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. Due to the employer’s stipulation of fault, Judge Wicks of the Western District of Louisiana held that Martin did not apply and that plaintiffs could not pursue direct negligence claims. In Magill, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided scarce reasoning for their decision. The high court simply affirmed the District Court’s expansion of the holding in Martin and that the employer’s reliance on the Western District’s Ferguson holding was a misapplication of Louisiana law. The Supreme Court also cited the decision in Tardo v. Farrell.[4] where the Fifth Circuit held that even if an employer and employee stipulate to course and scope and fault, those admissions do not eliminate direct-negligence claims because those claims remain separate issues for the trier of fact. The Fifth Circuit notably stated, “the societal decisions as to who actually pays does not change the manner of assessing fault to all parties as required by law.” This statement raises concern, as plaintiffs may now attempt to challenge employer stipulations that historically narrowed trials. The Supreme Court did not explain its reliance on Tardo, so future litigation will likely clarify the decision’s full impact. Under Magill, plaintiffs are permitted to pursue direct negligence claims against the employer despite the employer admitting that their employee was acting in course and scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. The full effect of the Supreme Court’s decision remains to be seen. In praxis, Magill will permit plaintiffs to put on evidence of direct negligence by an employer in front of a jury who cannot assign fault—as fault has already been stipulated to by the defendants. Employers now face the practical risk that plaintiffs will encourage juries to increase damages as a form of punishment against an employer that admits fault but contests the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries. Employers should use this moment to rigorously review and strengthen policies and procedures related to hiring and training in order to limit exposure when plaintiffs assert direct-negligence claims.  [1] Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska, 2025-00892 (La. 11/12/25) [2] Martin v. Thomas, 21-01490 (La. 6/29/22), 346 So.3d 238 [3] Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, 17-1570, 2023 WL 173413 (W.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) [4] Tardo v. Ferrell, 25-123 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/25), 2025 WL 1516837 (unpublished).
  • Experience

    Burnell Joseph v. Atalco Gramercy, LLC et al., No. 3:23-cv-505, United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

    Bob Kerrigan and Jose Ruiz successfully secured summary judgment dismissal for their client, Velan, Inc., in a complex intentional tort and products liability act involving catastrophic injury. The plaintiff, a precipitation batch tank operator working at the Atalco alumina refinery in Gramercy, Louisiana, suffered severe and debilitating chemical burn injuries to his face, eyes, and body when he was sprayed with caustic liquor while working underneath a tank at the refinery. He claimed that the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank was leaking, which allowed the tank to become filled with liquor after it had been previously verified as empty. He filed suit against Velan, Inc., the manufacturer of the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank, alleging that the valve was unreasonable dangerous in accordance with the Louisiana Products Liability Act. He also filed an intentional tort claim against his employer, Atalco Gramercy, LLC, alleging that Atalco knew the valve was leaking and continued to force employees to work underneath the tank. He claimed that under these conditions, an incident such as his was substantially certain to occur. Following the close of discovery, Velan moved for summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims was appropriate because: (1) the plaintiff’s injuries were a result of Atalco’s misuse of the valve; (2) the plaintiff lacked the expert testimony needed to prove his theory of liability under the Louisiana Product’s Liability Act; (3) the Velan valve at issue was not unreasonably dangerous as defined by the Louisiana Products Liability Act; and (4) the plaintiff was unable to prove proximate causation needed to establish his case of liability against Velan. The Hon. Brian Jackson found that under the undisputed facts presented by Velan, summary judgment was appropriate and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against it, with prejudice.