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Recent First Circuit Decision Helpful for Design Professionals Asserting Peremption as Defense to Untimely Claims

February 6, 2024

Brian S. Schaps

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Recent First Circuit Decision Helpful for Design  Professionals Asserting Peremption as Defense to Untimely Claims

Architects and engineers should be aware of a peremption statute that may bar untimely claims against them.

All professional architects, landscape architects, engineers, surveyors, and their associated interns, as well as interior designers and real estate developers using development plans certified by professional engineers or architects – all licensed in Louisiana -- should be aware of the protection against untimely claims against them afforded by the five-year period of peremption established in La. R.S. 9:5607(A).

A period of peremption, under Louisiana law, is the period of time the Legislature has established for the existence of a cause of action, or claim. against certain classes of professionals for damages caused by their professional negligence or breach of contract. Once the period of time commences, it cannot be interrupted, suspended, or renounced. Once it expires, any cause of action against the professional is extinguished. That is, the cause of action, or claim, against that professional simply no longer exists and cannot be revived, even by adding the professional to a suit that is timely brought against other parties arising out of the same project.

The critical question then is when does the period of peremption begin or “commence”?

For the professionals enumerated in La. R.S. 9:5607(A), the period of peremption can begin or “commence” from three different points in time: 

  1. the date of registry of the owner’s acceptance of the work in the parish mortgage office;
  2. the date of the owner’s occupancy or possession of the project; or
  3. the date of completion of the services that (a) are not preparatory to construction or (b) if preparatory, the services do not include an inspection of the work.

In Conti Enterprises, Inc. v. Providence/GSE Associates, LLC, rendered on October 30, 2023, the First Circuit interpreted and applied the third point in time for the commencement of peremption.

The Court held that the period of peremption applicable to the suit by St. Tammany Parish Consolidated Government (the “Parish”) against Hartmann Engineering, Inc., its professional engineer, commenced on the date when Hartmann had completed its engineering services and delivered its final stamped revised plans and specifications in September 2013. The peremption period did not commence on the later date in June 2017, when the Parish recorded its acceptance of the construction work.

Hartmann was the design engineer of record that had prepared the plans and specifications for a road construction project called the “Hollywood Road Widening Project,” sponsored and partially funded by the DOTD. The undisputed facts showed that Hartmann had no contractual obligation to provide, and did not in fact provide, any inspection of the work after it was let for bid.

Even though the successful contractor for the Project timely sued the Parish and other entities for alleged cost overruns, delay damages, and extras, allegedly caused by errors in the design and construction administration, the First Circuit held that the Parish’s third-party demand against Hartmann filed in May 2020 was untimely, as all claims against Hartmann had by then expired – that is perempted – in September 2018, five years after Hartmann had delivered its stamped plans.

The Court rejected the Parish’ argument that the peremption period against Hartmann commenced on June 23, 2017, the acceptance recordation date, because Hartmann’s contract did not include contract administration that would have included any inspection services.

The First Circuit also rejected the Parish’s argument that Hartmann’s responses in 2014 to emails from the DOTD Engineer and a bidding contractor concerning questions about the bid or that later furnishing a contractor a “copy of its native design files” as a “matter of courtesy” constituted additional “services’ under Hartmann’s contract that would have extended the peremption period beyond September, 2016. The Court noted that in both situations Hartmann received no additional compensation after final payment in 2013.

Finally, the Court rejected the Parish’s argument that its later retention of one of Hartmann’s engineers to testify as an expert in an expropriation suit brought by a property owner constituted either a “design service” or “inspection of the work” under its original contract that would render La. R.S. 9:5607(A)(3) in applicable.

Lesson?  Be mindful of the time periods when the services you render under your contracts are completed. The commencement of the peremption period may begin before the completion of the project.

Firm Highlights

  • Experience

    Burnell Joseph v. Atalco Gramercy, LLC et al., No. 3:23-cv-505, United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

    Bob Kerrigan and Jose Ruiz successfully secured summary judgment dismissal for their client, Velan, Inc., in a complex intentional tort and products liability act involving catastrophic injury. The plaintiff, a precipitation batch tank operator working at the Atalco alumina refinery in Gramercy, Louisiana, suffered severe and debilitating chemical burn injuries to his face, eyes, and body when he was sprayed with caustic liquor while working underneath a tank at the refinery. He claimed that the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank was leaking, which allowed the tank to become filled with liquor after it had been previously verified as empty. He filed suit against Velan, Inc., the manufacturer of the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank, alleging that the valve was unreasonable dangerous in accordance with the Louisiana Products Liability Act. He also filed an intentional tort claim against his employer, Atalco Gramercy, LLC, alleging that Atalco knew the valve was leaking and continued to force employees to work underneath the tank. He claimed that under these conditions, an incident such as his was substantially certain to occur. Following the close of discovery, Velan moved for summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims was appropriate because: (1) the plaintiff’s injuries were a result of Atalco’s misuse of the valve; (2) the plaintiff lacked the expert testimony needed to prove his theory of liability under the Louisiana Product’s Liability Act; (3) the Velan valve at issue was not unreasonably dangerous as defined by the Louisiana Products Liability Act; and (4) the plaintiff was unable to prove proximate causation needed to establish his case of liability against Velan. The Hon. Brian Jackson found that under the undisputed facts presented by Velan, summary judgment was appropriate and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against it, with prejudice.
  • Insight

    No Mercy for Employers in Louisiana Supreme Court’s Recent Magill Decision

    In its recent per curiam opinion, Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska[1], the Louisiana Supreme Court has foreclosed a routine defense strategy to shield employers from direct negligence claims. The high court has extended their 2022 decision in Martin v. Thomas[2], and now allows plaintiffs to pursue direct negligence claims against an employer despite the employer’s stipulation that its employee was in the course-and-scope of employment and caused the accident. Essentially, employers who fail to implement better employment practices will permit plaintiffs to ramp up potential exposure with evidence, if such exists, that heretofore they were routinely barred from introducing at trial. The Supreme Court’s Magill holding should encourage employers to update where needed their policies and procedures pertaining to hiring, training, supervising, and entrusting duties and property to employees, not only for the safety of their employees and customers in this state, but also eliminate employer’s exposure to direct negligence claims. Prior to Martin, a litigation strategy had taken shape where employers stipulated to 1) an employee being in course-and-scope of employment at the time of the accident, 2) that the employee was at fault for the accident being caused, or 3) both. By stipulating these facts, employers were largely able to exclude evidence of any direct negligence on part of the employer and/or narrow the scope of trial to only a contest of the plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court in Martin held that despite an employer admitting their employee was in course and scope when the accident occurred, plaintiffs could pursue direct negligence claims against the employer—as the issue of liability had not been admitted. Accordingly, employers found success by admitting both course and scope and liability—as seen in the Western District of Louisiana’s holding in Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona[3]. In Ferguson, the defendants stipulated that their employee was acting in course-and-scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. Due to the employer’s stipulation of fault, Judge Wicks of the Western District of Louisiana held that Martin did not apply and that plaintiffs could not pursue direct negligence claims. In Magill, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided scarce reasoning for their decision. The high court simply affirmed the District Court’s expansion of the holding in Martin and that the employer’s reliance on the Western District’s Ferguson holding was a misapplication of Louisiana law. The Supreme Court also cited the decision in Tardo v. Farrell.[4] where the Fifth Circuit held that even if an employer and employee stipulate to course and scope and fault, those admissions do not eliminate direct-negligence claims because those claims remain separate issues for the trier of fact. The Fifth Circuit notably stated, “the societal decisions as to who actually pays does not change the manner of assessing fault to all parties as required by law.” This statement raises concern, as plaintiffs may now attempt to challenge employer stipulations that historically narrowed trials. The Supreme Court did not explain its reliance on Tardo, so future litigation will likely clarify the decision’s full impact. Under Magill, plaintiffs are permitted to pursue direct negligence claims against the employer despite the employer admitting that their employee was acting in course and scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. The full effect of the Supreme Court’s decision remains to be seen. In praxis, Magill will permit plaintiffs to put on evidence of direct negligence by an employer in front of a jury who cannot assign fault—as fault has already been stipulated to by the defendants. Employers now face the practical risk that plaintiffs will encourage juries to increase damages as a form of punishment against an employer that admits fault but contests the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries. Employers should use this moment to rigorously review and strengthen policies and procedures related to hiring and training in order to limit exposure when plaintiffs assert direct-negligence claims.  [1] Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska, 2025-00892 (La. 11/12/25) [2] Martin v. Thomas, 21-01490 (La. 6/29/22), 346 So.3d 238 [3] Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, 17-1570, 2023 WL 173413 (W.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) [4] Tardo v. Ferrell, 25-123 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/25), 2025 WL 1516837 (unpublished).