Insights

Deutsch Kerrigan Article /

Removal and Diversity Jurisdiction for LLCs

December 1, 2023

Megan Demouy Champagne

share this page

Removal and Diversity Jurisdiction for LLCs

“Is this action removable?” This is one of the first questions any defense counsel should be asking themselves upon receipt of a new case that is pending in a state court. A case is removable to federal court only if the federal court would have had subject matter jurisdiction in the first place.[1] The two bases for federal subject-matter jurisdiction are: (1) federal question jurisdiction and (2) diversity jurisdiction.

Federal question jurisdiction exists when a claim arises under or involves a federal statute or a constitutional question.[2]  Diversity jurisdiction exists when the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and there is complete diversity of citizenship between the parties.[3] For “complete diversity” to exist, no plaintiff can be a citizen of the same state of any defendant. When determining whether diversity of citizenship exists, remember to keep an eye out for “’fraudulent joinder,’ which involves improperly joining non-diverse “throw away” defendants – such as an individual employee - for the sole, strategic purpose of destroying diversity and keeping a litigation in the selected state court.”[4]

Another thing to keep in mind when determining whether diversity of citizenship exists are the requirements regarding non-natural persons. A corporation is “a citizen of every State and foreign state by which it has been incorporated and of the State or foreign state where it has its principal place of business.”[5] On the other hand, § 1332 citizenship of limited liability companies is determined by the citizenship of “all of its members.”[6] Therefore, a party “must specifically allege the citizenship of every member of every LLC” to establish diversity jurisdiction.[7] This notion can become even more convoluted when the member of the LLC is itself a limited liability company with multiple members that are limited liability companies. For individuals, citizenship has the same meaning as domicile and requires not only residence in fact but also the purpose to make the place of residence one’s home.[8] “Therefore, an allegation of residency alone does not satisfy the requirement of an allegation of citizenship.”[9] When removing a case, make sure to include evidence of both residence and domicile (intent to remain) in the record. Further, it is the citizenship of the parties when the suit is filed that controls.[10]


[1] Bona Law, PC, Requirements for Removing a Case from State Court to Federal Court, (July 15, 2020), https://www.bonalaw.com/insights/legal-resources/requirements-for-removing-a-case-from-state-court-to-federal-court.

[2] Allison Ng and Steven Harkins, How to Remove a Case to Federal Court, American Bar Association,  (April 1, 2021), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/mass-torts/practice/2021/how-to-remove-a-case-to-federal-court/.

[3] Miller v. Target Corp., No. 20-2508, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68291, 2021 WL 1311267, at *5 (E.D. La. April 8, 2021); see also 28 U.S.C. §1332(a).

[4] Michelle Ramirez, Morgan Branch, and Claire Lee, Fraudulent Joinder: Strategies for Removal to Federal Court, Bloomberg Law, (March 29, 2023), https://www.sidley.com/en/insights/publications/2023/03/fraudulent-joinder-strategies-for-removal-to-federal-court.

[5] Midcap Media Finance, L.L.C. v. Pathway Data, Incorporated, 929 F.3d 310, 314 (5th Cir. 2019); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).

[6] Harvey v. Grey Wolf Drilling Co.,, 542 F.3d 1077, 1080 (5th Cir. 2008).

[7] Settlement Funding, LLC v. Rapid Settlements, Ltd., 851 F.3d 530, 536 (5th Cir. 2017).

[8] Midcap Media Finance, L.L.C., 929 F.3d at 313.

[9] Id.

[10] Grup Detaflux v. Atlas Grp., L.P.,541 U.S. 567, 569-70, 124 S.Ct. 1920, 158 L.Ed.2d 866 (2004).

Firm Highlights

  • Experience

    Burnell Joseph v. Atalco Gramercy, LLC et al., No. 3:23-cv-505, United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

    Bob Kerrigan and Jose Ruiz successfully secured summary judgment dismissal for their client, Velan, Inc., in a complex intentional tort and products liability act involving catastrophic injury. The plaintiff, a precipitation batch tank operator working at the Atalco alumina refinery in Gramercy, Louisiana, suffered severe and debilitating chemical burn injuries to his face, eyes, and body when he was sprayed with caustic liquor while working underneath a tank at the refinery. He claimed that the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank was leaking, which allowed the tank to become filled with liquor after it had been previously verified as empty. He filed suit against Velan, Inc., the manufacturer of the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank, alleging that the valve was unreasonable dangerous in accordance with the Louisiana Products Liability Act. He also filed an intentional tort claim against his employer, Atalco Gramercy, LLC, alleging that Atalco knew the valve was leaking and continued to force employees to work underneath the tank. He claimed that under these conditions, an incident such as his was substantially certain to occur. Following the close of discovery, Velan moved for summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims was appropriate because: (1) the plaintiff’s injuries were a result of Atalco’s misuse of the valve; (2) the plaintiff lacked the expert testimony needed to prove his theory of liability under the Louisiana Product’s Liability Act; (3) the Velan valve at issue was not unreasonably dangerous as defined by the Louisiana Products Liability Act; and (4) the plaintiff was unable to prove proximate causation needed to establish his case of liability against Velan. The Hon. Brian Jackson found that under the undisputed facts presented by Velan, summary judgment was appropriate and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against it, with prejudice.
  • Insight

    No Mercy for Employers in Louisiana Supreme Court’s Recent Magill Decision

    In its recent per curiam opinion, Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska[1], the Louisiana Supreme Court has foreclosed a routine defense strategy to shield employers from direct negligence claims. The high court has extended their 2022 decision in Martin v. Thomas[2], and now allows plaintiffs to pursue direct negligence claims against an employer despite the employer’s stipulation that its employee was in the course-and-scope of employment and caused the accident. Essentially, employers who fail to implement better employment practices will permit plaintiffs to ramp up potential exposure with evidence, if such exists, that heretofore they were routinely barred from introducing at trial. The Supreme Court’s Magill holding should encourage employers to update where needed their policies and procedures pertaining to hiring, training, supervising, and entrusting duties and property to employees, not only for the safety of their employees and customers in this state, but also eliminate employer’s exposure to direct negligence claims. Prior to Martin, a litigation strategy had taken shape where employers stipulated to 1) an employee being in course-and-scope of employment at the time of the accident, 2) that the employee was at fault for the accident being caused, or 3) both. By stipulating these facts, employers were largely able to exclude evidence of any direct negligence on part of the employer and/or narrow the scope of trial to only a contest of the plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court in Martin held that despite an employer admitting their employee was in course and scope when the accident occurred, plaintiffs could pursue direct negligence claims against the employer—as the issue of liability had not been admitted. Accordingly, employers found success by admitting both course and scope and liability—as seen in the Western District of Louisiana’s holding in Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona[3]. In Ferguson, the defendants stipulated that their employee was acting in course-and-scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. Due to the employer’s stipulation of fault, Judge Wicks of the Western District of Louisiana held that Martin did not apply and that plaintiffs could not pursue direct negligence claims. In Magill, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided scarce reasoning for their decision. The high court simply affirmed the District Court’s expansion of the holding in Martin and that the employer’s reliance on the Western District’s Ferguson holding was a misapplication of Louisiana law. The Supreme Court also cited the decision in Tardo v. Farrell.[4] where the Fifth Circuit held that even if an employer and employee stipulate to course and scope and fault, those admissions do not eliminate direct-negligence claims because those claims remain separate issues for the trier of fact. The Fifth Circuit notably stated, “the societal decisions as to who actually pays does not change the manner of assessing fault to all parties as required by law.” This statement raises concern, as plaintiffs may now attempt to challenge employer stipulations that historically narrowed trials. The Supreme Court did not explain its reliance on Tardo, so future litigation will likely clarify the decision’s full impact. Under Magill, plaintiffs are permitted to pursue direct negligence claims against the employer despite the employer admitting that their employee was acting in course and scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. The full effect of the Supreme Court’s decision remains to be seen. In praxis, Magill will permit plaintiffs to put on evidence of direct negligence by an employer in front of a jury who cannot assign fault—as fault has already been stipulated to by the defendants. Employers now face the practical risk that plaintiffs will encourage juries to increase damages as a form of punishment against an employer that admits fault but contests the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries. Employers should use this moment to rigorously review and strengthen policies and procedures related to hiring and training in order to limit exposure when plaintiffs assert direct-negligence claims.  [1] Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska, 2025-00892 (La. 11/12/25) [2] Martin v. Thomas, 21-01490 (La. 6/29/22), 346 So.3d 238 [3] Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, 17-1570, 2023 WL 173413 (W.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) [4] Tardo v. Ferrell, 25-123 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/25), 2025 WL 1516837 (unpublished).