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Snap Removal in Louisiana: Part 1 of 2

June 26, 2023

Jasmine H. Englert

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Snap Removal in Louisiana: Part 1 of 2

Snap removal is the practice of removing a state action to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction after the Petition has been filed in state court, but before a forum defendant has been served the Petition.

Based on the plain reading of the removal statute which prohibits removal by a forum defendant, 28 USC § 1441(b)(2), a defendant cannot remove an action otherwise removable on the basis of jurisdiction if any party in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought. The 5th Circuit explained there is a narrow window of time for a defendant who knows the Petition has been filed, to remove the case to federal court prior to being “properly joined and served” by a forum defendant. See Tex. Brine Co. v. AAA, 955 F.3d 482 (5th Cir. 2020); Gibbonc v. Brystol-Myers Squibb Co., 919F.3d 147 (2d Circ. 2019), Encompass Inc. Co. v. Stone Mansion Rest., Inc., 902 f.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2018.)

In Texas Brine, a claim arose after an arbitration fell apart due to claims of undisclosed conflicts by the arbitrators. Tex. Brine Co. at 484-485. Texas Brine Company, LLC (“TBC” and citizen of Texas), filed suit in the Civil District Court of New Orleans, alleging that defendants, AAA (citizen of New York) and the two arbitrators (both citizens of Louisiana), engaged in intentional and wrongful fraudulent conduct in connection with the arbitration proceedings and sought damages in excess of $12 million dollars. Id.

Before the arbitrators had been served, AAA filed a removal to the Eastern District of Louisiana (“EDLA.”) Id. Subsequently, all three defendants filed Answers and moved to dismiss the claims under Rule 129(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. TBC followed by moving to remand, disagreeing with the contention that the three defendants were properly joined. Id. The EDLA denied the remand holding that the plain language of the statute did not bar snap removal and granted the defendants dismissals with prejudice. Id. TBC appealed to the 5th Circuit and the 5th Circuit stated that they look to, “the plain meaning [of the language of the statute] and absurdity.” Id. at 486. Per the 5th Circuit, “The forum-defendant rule's procedural barrier to removal was irrelevant because the only defendant “properly joined and served”, AAA, was not a citizen of Louisiana, the forum state.” Id. TBC tried to argue that the result was absurd and defeated Congress’s intent and that the language in the statute at issue, “properly joined and served,” was meant to prevent plaintiffs from naming forum defendants merely for the purpose of destroying diversity and that purpose was not served based on the EDLA decision. Id. The 5th Circuit determined that the absurdity bar, which was a high bar, was not met, and that snap removal was “rational”. Id. The 5th Circuit held, “A non-forum defendant may remove an otherwise removable case even when a named defendant who has yet to be “properly joined and served” is a citizen of the forum state. ”Id. at 487.

What was left unanswered by the 5th Circuit in the Texas Brine case, was whether a forum defendant could move for snap removal if they have not yet been served. Other Circuits have answered this question, “Yes,” a non-served forum defendant can move for snap removal to federal court. Part 2 of this Article will provide an answer to this question as it relates to the Eastern District, Western District, and Middle District of Louisiana.

Part 2 of this series can be found here.

Firm Highlights

  • Experience

    Burnell Joseph v. Atalco Gramercy, LLC et al., No. 3:23-cv-505, United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

    Bob Kerrigan and Jose Ruiz successfully secured summary judgment dismissal for their client, Velan, Inc., in a complex intentional tort and products liability act involving catastrophic injury. The plaintiff, a precipitation batch tank operator working at the Atalco alumina refinery in Gramercy, Louisiana, suffered severe and debilitating chemical burn injuries to his face, eyes, and body when he was sprayed with caustic liquor while working underneath a tank at the refinery. He claimed that the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank was leaking, which allowed the tank to become filled with liquor after it had been previously verified as empty. He filed suit against Velan, Inc., the manufacturer of the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank, alleging that the valve was unreasonable dangerous in accordance with the Louisiana Products Liability Act. He also filed an intentional tort claim against his employer, Atalco Gramercy, LLC, alleging that Atalco knew the valve was leaking and continued to force employees to work underneath the tank. He claimed that under these conditions, an incident such as his was substantially certain to occur. Following the close of discovery, Velan moved for summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims was appropriate because: (1) the plaintiff’s injuries were a result of Atalco’s misuse of the valve; (2) the plaintiff lacked the expert testimony needed to prove his theory of liability under the Louisiana Product’s Liability Act; (3) the Velan valve at issue was not unreasonably dangerous as defined by the Louisiana Products Liability Act; and (4) the plaintiff was unable to prove proximate causation needed to establish his case of liability against Velan. The Hon. Brian Jackson found that under the undisputed facts presented by Velan, summary judgment was appropriate and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against it, with prejudice.
  • Insight

    No Mercy for Employers in Louisiana Supreme Court’s Recent Magill Decision

    In its recent per curiam opinion, Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska[1], the Louisiana Supreme Court has foreclosed a routine defense strategy to shield employers from direct negligence claims. The high court has extended their 2022 decision in Martin v. Thomas[2], and now allows plaintiffs to pursue direct negligence claims against an employer despite the employer’s stipulation that its employee was in the course-and-scope of employment and caused the accident. Essentially, employers who fail to implement better employment practices will permit plaintiffs to ramp up potential exposure with evidence, if such exists, that heretofore they were routinely barred from introducing at trial. The Supreme Court’s Magill holding should encourage employers to update where needed their policies and procedures pertaining to hiring, training, supervising, and entrusting duties and property to employees, not only for the safety of their employees and customers in this state, but also eliminate employer’s exposure to direct negligence claims. Prior to Martin, a litigation strategy had taken shape where employers stipulated to 1) an employee being in course-and-scope of employment at the time of the accident, 2) that the employee was at fault for the accident being caused, or 3) both. By stipulating these facts, employers were largely able to exclude evidence of any direct negligence on part of the employer and/or narrow the scope of trial to only a contest of the plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court in Martin held that despite an employer admitting their employee was in course and scope when the accident occurred, plaintiffs could pursue direct negligence claims against the employer—as the issue of liability had not been admitted. Accordingly, employers found success by admitting both course and scope and liability—as seen in the Western District of Louisiana’s holding in Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona[3]. In Ferguson, the defendants stipulated that their employee was acting in course-and-scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. Due to the employer’s stipulation of fault, Judge Wicks of the Western District of Louisiana held that Martin did not apply and that plaintiffs could not pursue direct negligence claims. In Magill, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided scarce reasoning for their decision. The high court simply affirmed the District Court’s expansion of the holding in Martin and that the employer’s reliance on the Western District’s Ferguson holding was a misapplication of Louisiana law. The Supreme Court also cited the decision in Tardo v. Farrell.[4] where the Fifth Circuit held that even if an employer and employee stipulate to course and scope and fault, those admissions do not eliminate direct-negligence claims because those claims remain separate issues for the trier of fact. The Fifth Circuit notably stated, “the societal decisions as to who actually pays does not change the manner of assessing fault to all parties as required by law.” This statement raises concern, as plaintiffs may now attempt to challenge employer stipulations that historically narrowed trials. The Supreme Court did not explain its reliance on Tardo, so future litigation will likely clarify the decision’s full impact. Under Magill, plaintiffs are permitted to pursue direct negligence claims against the employer despite the employer admitting that their employee was acting in course and scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. The full effect of the Supreme Court’s decision remains to be seen. In praxis, Magill will permit plaintiffs to put on evidence of direct negligence by an employer in front of a jury who cannot assign fault—as fault has already been stipulated to by the defendants. Employers now face the practical risk that plaintiffs will encourage juries to increase damages as a form of punishment against an employer that admits fault but contests the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries. Employers should use this moment to rigorously review and strengthen policies and procedures related to hiring and training in order to limit exposure when plaintiffs assert direct-negligence claims.  [1] Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska, 2025-00892 (La. 11/12/25) [2] Martin v. Thomas, 21-01490 (La. 6/29/22), 346 So.3d 238 [3] Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, 17-1570, 2023 WL 173413 (W.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) [4] Tardo v. Ferrell, 25-123 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/25), 2025 WL 1516837 (unpublished).