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Subpoenas Duces Tecum to Defense Experts

April 15, 2024

Casey B. Wendling

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Subpoenas Duces Tecum to Defense Experts

Although discovery is generally permissive, Louisiana courts have been unwilling to allow parties to obtain unlimited information from a defense expert witness, especially when it implicates the privacy interests of the defense expert and/or his patients.

The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure is clear that parties are entitled to obtain certain information and documents from a retained expert, including (1) a written report prepared and signed by the witness; (2) a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons therefore; and (3) the data or other information considered by the witness in forming the opinions. La. C.C.P. art. 1425. Further, upon the agreement of the parties or by order of the court, an expert may also be required to produce one or all of the following: (1) exhibits to be used as a summary of or support for the opinions; (2) the qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications authored by the witness within the preceding ten years; (3) the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony; and/or (4) a listing of any other cases in which the witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years.

Beyond these documents, a party seeking information or documents from a defense expert witness must do so through a subpoena duces tecum. Although parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, a party seeking the production of records from any non-party––including expert witnesses––through a subpoena duces tecum is required to make a showing of relevancy and good cause to discover the non-parties’ records. La. Code Civ. Pro. Art. 1422; Stolze v. Safety & Systems Assur. Consultants, Inc., 02-1197 (La. 5/24/02); 819 So.2d 287, 289; Centanni v. Centanni, 21-30, p. 7 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/19/21); 2021 WL 4852145, writ denied, 21-1851 (La. 2/15/22)21-1851 (La. 2/15/22); 332 So.3d 1184.

However, Louisiana law carves out several exceptions to this general rule, specifically protecting certain categories of information and documents from discovery. For example, Paragraph E of Article 1425 specifically excludes drafts of required expert reports and communications with testifying experts that would reveal the attorney’s mental impressions, opinions, or trial strategy, without sacrificing full discoverability of facts and data supporting the expert's opinions. Such documents are only discoverable on a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is impractical for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means. When documents or electronically stored information contain both facts and protected material of an attorney, the court may order production subject to redaction. See La. C.C.P. art. 1425, Comment–2007.

Further, Louisiana courts have specifically refused to allow parties to obtain certain financial and private patient information from expert witnesses. In Rodas v. Nutter, 22-106 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/27/22), the Fifth Circuit stated:

Due to the confidential and personal nature of the information contained in certain financial records, particularly tax records, the requesting party must demonstrate good cause for their production and further establish that the information could not be discovered in a less intrusive manner. Centanni, 2021 WL 4852145, p. 7. We also recognized that concerning plaintiff's request for the IME reports and related medical records of unrelated individuals, the Louisiana Supreme Court has stated that the privacy expectations of patients are not to be lightly set aside, and that the party seeking release of such records must make a substantial showing of both relevance and need. Gariepy v. Evans Indus., Inc., 06-106 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/25/07); 968 So.2d 753, 755 citing Moss v. State, 05-1963 (La. 4/4/06); 925 So.2d 1185, 1199.

However, the Rodas Court found Plaintiff was entitled to subpoena information regarding the IMEs performed by defendant’s IME doctor, specifically information regarding the number of IMEs performed previously, the identification of the entity or entities which retained his services to perform an IME for the last three years, as well as the percentage of income the doctor earned in relation to these IMEs.

Hopefully, Louisiana courts will continue to place fair limitations on the parties’ ability to obtain overly broad and private information from expert witnesses, specifically to protect defense medical experts from having to produce unlimited information regarding their patients and practice in connection with every lawsuit.

Firm Highlights

  • Insight

    No Mercy for Employers in Louisiana Supreme Court’s Recent Magill Decision

    In its recent per curiam opinion, Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska[1], the Louisiana Supreme Court has foreclosed a routine defense strategy to shield employers from direct negligence claims. The high court has extended their 2022 decision in Martin v. Thomas[2], and now allows plaintiffs to pursue direct negligence claims against an employer despite the employer’s stipulation that its employee was in the course-and-scope of employment and caused the accident. Essentially, employers who fail to implement better employment practices will permit plaintiffs to ramp up potential exposure with evidence, if such exists, that heretofore they were routinely barred from introducing at trial. The Supreme Court’s Magill holding should encourage employers to update where needed their policies and procedures pertaining to hiring, training, supervising, and entrusting duties and property to employees, not only for the safety of their employees and customers in this state, but also eliminate employer’s exposure to direct negligence claims. Prior to Martin, a litigation strategy had taken shape where employers stipulated to 1) an employee being in course-and-scope of employment at the time of the accident, 2) that the employee was at fault for the accident being caused, or 3) both. By stipulating these facts, employers were largely able to exclude evidence of any direct negligence on part of the employer and/or narrow the scope of trial to only a contest of the plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court in Martin held that despite an employer admitting their employee was in course and scope when the accident occurred, plaintiffs could pursue direct negligence claims against the employer—as the issue of liability had not been admitted. Accordingly, employers found success by admitting both course and scope and liability—as seen in the Western District of Louisiana’s holding in Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona[3]. In Ferguson, the defendants stipulated that their employee was acting in course-and-scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. Due to the employer’s stipulation of fault, Judge Wicks of the Western District of Louisiana held that Martin did not apply and that plaintiffs could not pursue direct negligence claims. In Magill, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided scarce reasoning for their decision. The high court simply affirmed the District Court’s expansion of the holding in Martin and that the employer’s reliance on the Western District’s Ferguson holding was a misapplication of Louisiana law. The Supreme Court also cited the decision in Tardo v. Farrell.[4] where the Fifth Circuit held that even if an employer and employee stipulate to course and scope and fault, those admissions do not eliminate direct-negligence claims because those claims remain separate issues for the trier of fact. The Fifth Circuit notably stated, “the societal decisions as to who actually pays does not change the manner of assessing fault to all parties as required by law.” This statement raises concern, as plaintiffs may now attempt to challenge employer stipulations that historically narrowed trials. The Supreme Court did not explain its reliance on Tardo, so future litigation will likely clarify the decision’s full impact. Under Magill, plaintiffs are permitted to pursue direct negligence claims against the employer despite the employer admitting that their employee was acting in course and scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. The full effect of the Supreme Court’s decision remains to be seen. In praxis, Magill will permit plaintiffs to put on evidence of direct negligence by an employer in front of a jury who cannot assign fault—as fault has already been stipulated to by the defendants. Employers now face the practical risk that plaintiffs will encourage juries to increase damages as a form of punishment against an employer that admits fault but contests the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries. Employers should use this moment to rigorously review and strengthen policies and procedures related to hiring and training in order to limit exposure when plaintiffs assert direct-negligence claims.  [1] Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska, 2025-00892 (La. 11/12/25) [2] Martin v. Thomas, 21-01490 (La. 6/29/22), 346 So.3d 238 [3] Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, 17-1570, 2023 WL 173413 (W.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) [4] Tardo v. Ferrell, 25-123 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/25), 2025 WL 1516837 (unpublished).
  • Experience

    Burnell Joseph v. Atalco Gramercy, LLC et al., No. 3:23-cv-505, United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

    Bob Kerrigan and Jose Ruiz successfully secured summary judgment dismissal for their client, Velan, Inc., in a complex intentional tort and products liability act involving catastrophic injury. The plaintiff, a precipitation batch tank operator working at the Atalco alumina refinery in Gramercy, Louisiana, suffered severe and debilitating chemical burn injuries to his face, eyes, and body when he was sprayed with caustic liquor while working underneath a tank at the refinery. He claimed that the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank was leaking, which allowed the tank to become filled with liquor after it had been previously verified as empty. He filed suit against Velan, Inc., the manufacturer of the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank, alleging that the valve was unreasonable dangerous in accordance with the Louisiana Products Liability Act. He also filed an intentional tort claim against his employer, Atalco Gramercy, LLC, alleging that Atalco knew the valve was leaking and continued to force employees to work underneath the tank. He claimed that under these conditions, an incident such as his was substantially certain to occur. Following the close of discovery, Velan moved for summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims was appropriate because: (1) the plaintiff’s injuries were a result of Atalco’s misuse of the valve; (2) the plaintiff lacked the expert testimony needed to prove his theory of liability under the Louisiana Product’s Liability Act; (3) the Velan valve at issue was not unreasonably dangerous as defined by the Louisiana Products Liability Act; and (4) the plaintiff was unable to prove proximate causation needed to establish his case of liability against Velan. The Hon. Brian Jackson found that under the undisputed facts presented by Velan, summary judgment was appropriate and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against it, with prejudice.