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Supreme Court Sets Forth Framework for Imposing Restrictions on Scope of Additional Medical Examinations

January 31, 2023

Devin J. Barnett

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Supreme Court Sets Forth Framework for Imposing Restrictions on Scope of Additional Medical Examinations

On October 21, 2022, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Augustine v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Oregon, 2022 WL 12360946 (La. 10/21/22) provided guidance on placing restrictions on additional medical examinations under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure art. 1464. The Court held that if a plaintiff wishes to place restrictions on the examination, it is the plaintiff’s burden to prove that need for the restrictions and the harm that may result if such restrictions are not imposed.

In Augustine, the plaintiffs were injured in an automobile accident. Plaintiffs filed suit against the other driver and his insurer, Safeco Insurance Company of Oregon. The defendants retained Dr. Kevin Greve, a board-certified neuropsychologist, to perform an additional medical examination of the plaintiffs pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1464. While the plaintiffs agreed to the additional medical examination, the plaintiffs requested certain restrictions be placed on the examination. Specifically, the plaintiffs sought to limit the scope of the examination to tests previously performed by the plaintiffs’ treating physicians. Plaintiffs argued this limitation was necessary because they suffered from traumatic brain injuries and they should not be subjected to an intense two-day neuropsychological evaluation. Defendants argued that placing restrictions on the additional medical examination would prevent the trial from being conducted on a level playing field because plaintiffs will be able to present evidence favorable to them while defendants will be prevented from conducting full testing which may lead to evidence that will refute plaintiffs’ position. The parties were ultimately unable to reach an agreement as to the scope of the additional medical examination. As a result, defendants filed a motion to compel the additional medical examination.

The district court granted defendants’ motion to compel the additional medical examination in part and denied it in part. The court compelled plaintiffs to submit to the additional medical examination but limited the exam to only tests previously performed by plaintiffs’ treating physicians, explaining it did not want the examination to be “just a fishing expedition.” Defendants sought supervisory review of the district court’s ruling. The court of appeal denied writs “on the showing made.” Defendants then sought review of the ruling with the Louisiana Supreme Court. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the district court’s ruling.

The Louisiana Supreme Court recognized it was now confronted with the question of whether a district court which has found good cause for ordering an additional medical examination may place restrictions on how that examination is conducted. In beginning their inquiry, the Court noted that Louisiana jurisprudence has long recognized that “it must be presumed that doctors will conduct their physical examinations properly.” Id.at *5. To rebut this presumption, the courts have required the party seeking to place conditions on the examination to make a showing of special circumstances.

The Court then arrived at a practical framework for addressing the issue of whether to place restrictions on the additional medical exam. The Court explained that the initial burden of establishing good cause for seeking an additional medical examination rests with the moving party, which is typically the defendants. Once the court finds this burden has been satisfied and good cause exists for ordering an additional medical examination, the Court should presume that the examination will be conducted in a reasonable manner. If the opposing party wishes to place restrictions on the examination, the burden shifts to that party to establish special circumstances justifying the imposition of restrictions on the examination. In meeting this burden, the party may not rely on mere allegations or speculation, but must produce competent evidence establishing a need for restrictions and the harm which may result if such restrictions are not imposed.

The Court ultimately vacated the district court’s ruling in which it placed restrictions on the additional medical examination and remanded the case to the district court to conduct a new hearing consistent with the principles discussed above.

In sum, if a plaintiff wishes to place restrictions on an additional medical examination, plaintiff must come forward with evidence to prove the need for the restrictions and the harm which may result if such restrictions are not imposed. Absent evidence showing the need for the restrictions and the harm which may result if the restrictions are not imposed, a defendant is entitled to have a doctor perform an unrestricted additional medical examination under La. C.C.P. art. 1464.

Firm Highlights

  • Experience

    Burnell Joseph v. Atalco Gramercy, LLC et al., No. 3:23-cv-505, United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

    Bob Kerrigan and Jose Ruiz successfully secured summary judgment dismissal for their client, Velan, Inc., in a complex intentional tort and products liability act involving catastrophic injury. The plaintiff, a precipitation batch tank operator working at the Atalco alumina refinery in Gramercy, Louisiana, suffered severe and debilitating chemical burn injuries to his face, eyes, and body when he was sprayed with caustic liquor while working underneath a tank at the refinery. He claimed that the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank was leaking, which allowed the tank to become filled with liquor after it had been previously verified as empty. He filed suit against Velan, Inc., the manufacturer of the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank, alleging that the valve was unreasonable dangerous in accordance with the Louisiana Products Liability Act. He also filed an intentional tort claim against his employer, Atalco Gramercy, LLC, alleging that Atalco knew the valve was leaking and continued to force employees to work underneath the tank. He claimed that under these conditions, an incident such as his was substantially certain to occur. Following the close of discovery, Velan moved for summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims was appropriate because: (1) the plaintiff’s injuries were a result of Atalco’s misuse of the valve; (2) the plaintiff lacked the expert testimony needed to prove his theory of liability under the Louisiana Product’s Liability Act; (3) the Velan valve at issue was not unreasonably dangerous as defined by the Louisiana Products Liability Act; and (4) the plaintiff was unable to prove proximate causation needed to establish his case of liability against Velan. The Hon. Brian Jackson found that under the undisputed facts presented by Velan, summary judgment was appropriate and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against it, with prejudice.
  • Insight

    No Mercy for Employers in Louisiana Supreme Court’s Recent Magill Decision

    In its recent per curiam opinion, Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska[1], the Louisiana Supreme Court has foreclosed a routine defense strategy to shield employers from direct negligence claims. The high court has extended their 2022 decision in Martin v. Thomas[2], and now allows plaintiffs to pursue direct negligence claims against an employer despite the employer’s stipulation that its employee was in the course-and-scope of employment and caused the accident. Essentially, employers who fail to implement better employment practices will permit plaintiffs to ramp up potential exposure with evidence, if such exists, that heretofore they were routinely barred from introducing at trial. The Supreme Court’s Magill holding should encourage employers to update where needed their policies and procedures pertaining to hiring, training, supervising, and entrusting duties and property to employees, not only for the safety of their employees and customers in this state, but also eliminate employer’s exposure to direct negligence claims. Prior to Martin, a litigation strategy had taken shape where employers stipulated to 1) an employee being in course-and-scope of employment at the time of the accident, 2) that the employee was at fault for the accident being caused, or 3) both. By stipulating these facts, employers were largely able to exclude evidence of any direct negligence on part of the employer and/or narrow the scope of trial to only a contest of the plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court in Martin held that despite an employer admitting their employee was in course and scope when the accident occurred, plaintiffs could pursue direct negligence claims against the employer—as the issue of liability had not been admitted. Accordingly, employers found success by admitting both course and scope and liability—as seen in the Western District of Louisiana’s holding in Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona[3]. In Ferguson, the defendants stipulated that their employee was acting in course-and-scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. Due to the employer’s stipulation of fault, Judge Wicks of the Western District of Louisiana held that Martin did not apply and that plaintiffs could not pursue direct negligence claims. In Magill, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided scarce reasoning for their decision. The high court simply affirmed the District Court’s expansion of the holding in Martin and that the employer’s reliance on the Western District’s Ferguson holding was a misapplication of Louisiana law. The Supreme Court also cited the decision in Tardo v. Farrell.[4] where the Fifth Circuit held that even if an employer and employee stipulate to course and scope and fault, those admissions do not eliminate direct-negligence claims because those claims remain separate issues for the trier of fact. The Fifth Circuit notably stated, “the societal decisions as to who actually pays does not change the manner of assessing fault to all parties as required by law.” This statement raises concern, as plaintiffs may now attempt to challenge employer stipulations that historically narrowed trials. The Supreme Court did not explain its reliance on Tardo, so future litigation will likely clarify the decision’s full impact. Under Magill, plaintiffs are permitted to pursue direct negligence claims against the employer despite the employer admitting that their employee was acting in course and scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. The full effect of the Supreme Court’s decision remains to be seen. In praxis, Magill will permit plaintiffs to put on evidence of direct negligence by an employer in front of a jury who cannot assign fault—as fault has already been stipulated to by the defendants. Employers now face the practical risk that plaintiffs will encourage juries to increase damages as a form of punishment against an employer that admits fault but contests the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries. Employers should use this moment to rigorously review and strengthen policies and procedures related to hiring and training in order to limit exposure when plaintiffs assert direct-negligence claims.  [1] Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska, 2025-00892 (La. 11/12/25) [2] Martin v. Thomas, 21-01490 (La. 6/29/22), 346 So.3d 238 [3] Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, 17-1570, 2023 WL 173413 (W.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) [4] Tardo v. Ferrell, 25-123 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/25), 2025 WL 1516837 (unpublished).