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The Effect of FERPA on the Discovery Process in Civil Litigation

January 19, 2023

Casey B. Wendling

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The Effect of FERPA on the Discovery Process in Civil Litigation

The Family Educational and Privacy Rights Act (“FERPA”), codified at 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232g, is the primary federal law governing educational records. Congress enacted FERPA to “protect [parents’ and students’] rights to privacy by limiting the transferability of their records without their consent.” To achieve this goal, FERPA prohibits educational institutions from disclosing the educational records of students (defined very broadly as any documents that contain information directly related to a student and maintained by an educational institution) without sufficient authorization and enforces these restrictions by threatening to withhold the educational institutions’ federal funding for violations of FERPA.

Although FERPA does not create an “evidentiary privilege” per se, FERPA significantly impacts an educational institution’s ability to respond to requests for documents in the context of civil litigation when a party requests educational records.

FERPA sets forth several requirements that the educational institution must satisfy prior to producing educational documents to other parties. Specifically, an educational institution may not disclose an educational record to anyone unless and until: (a) there is written consent from the student's parent specifying the records to be released, or (b) a court orders the disclosure of specific educational records, upon condition that all involved parents and students are notified of such an order in advance of the educational institution’s compliance therewith. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232g(b)(2)(A)–(B).

Courts have recognized that “documents covered by FERPA [may be] discoverable in the context of a civil action” when they are relevant and responsive to Requests for Production. Garza v. Scott & White Mem’l Hosp., 234 F.R.D. 617, 624 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2005). Therefore, the majority of Courts conduct in camera inspections to determine whether the challenged documents fall under the procedural protections of FERPA prior to ordering their disclosure to the requesting party.

An educational institution’s ability to respond to requests for documents is further complicated when the request is for educational records involving more than one student. Under FERPA, parents may only inspect and review their own child’s education records. 34 C.F.R. § 99.10(a) and 34 C.F.R. § 300.613(a). However, when the education records of their student contain information about other students, the parents may inspect and review only the specific information about their child. 34 C.F.R. § 99.12(a) and 34 C.F.R. § 300.615. This restriction requires the educational institution to carefully review all records requested and redact extraneous information when possible.

The U.S. Department of Education’s Office of the Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) has specifically addressed the disclosure of education records under FERPA in the context of a multi-student disciplinary incident in a 2017 letter to Wachter. The question arose from a situation that involved six students hazing two other students. A surveillance camera captured a video showing four of the perpetrators taking the two victims into the wrestling room where the incident occurred while the other two perpetrators remained in the hallway as “lookouts.” The district also collected witness statements as part of its investigation; these statements were used to discipline the students involved in the hazing. The district received a request from a parent of one of the disciplined students to review a copy of the video and witness statements. The district indicated that it did not have the ability to blur the images of the other students shown on the video and could not afford to purchase software to perform the task. The district asked if it could release the un-redacted video and witness statements to the parent without obtaining consent from the others. The CPO responded as follows:

  • The video and witness statements are education records of all the students who were disciplined as a result of the incident.
  • The video and witness statements are education records of the victims of the hazing incident.
  • The parents of these students have a right to view these education records, subject to the following conditions: (1) if the videos and witness statements contain personally identifiable information (PII) about other students, that information must be redacted or segregated before the viewing if that can be accomplished “without destroying its meaning,” and (2) if the PII about other students cannot be redacted or segregated without destroying its meaning, then the parents/eligible students must be allowed to access/review the un-redacted record.

Wachter concluded that FERPA did not require the school district to provide copies to the parents/eligible students unless failing to do so would effectively deny them their right to inspect and review the records. Further, under FERPA, an education agency cannot provide one parent with access to education records that directly relate to two or more students unless the parents of the other children give written consent. See Letter re: Regional Multicultural Magnet Sch. Dist., 108 LRP 29577 (FPCO 2008); A.B. v. Clarke Co. Sch. Dist., 54 IDELR 146 (11th Cir. 2010 (unpublished); and Letter to Anonymous, 113 LRP 14615 (FPCO 2013).

As a result of the various requirements and restrictions set forth by FERPA, an attorney representing an educational institution must be familiar with the conditions of FERPA and understand how to abide by all of the requirements set forth in the statute in order to effectively protect parents’ and students’ rights to privacy and the institutions’ receipt of federal funding, despite the fact that abiding by such requirements may cause complications and delay in the discovery process in civil litigation

Firm Highlights

  • Insight

    No Mercy for Employers in Louisiana Supreme Court’s Recent Magill Decision

    In its recent per curiam opinion, Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska[1], the Louisiana Supreme Court has foreclosed a routine defense strategy to shield employers from direct negligence claims. The high court has extended their 2022 decision in Martin v. Thomas[2], and now allows plaintiffs to pursue direct negligence claims against an employer despite the employer’s stipulation that its employee was in the course-and-scope of employment and caused the accident. Essentially, employers who fail to implement better employment practices will permit plaintiffs to ramp up potential exposure with evidence, if such exists, that heretofore they were routinely barred from introducing at trial. The Supreme Court’s Magill holding should encourage employers to update where needed their policies and procedures pertaining to hiring, training, supervising, and entrusting duties and property to employees, not only for the safety of their employees and customers in this state, but also eliminate employer’s exposure to direct negligence claims. Prior to Martin, a litigation strategy had taken shape where employers stipulated to 1) an employee being in course-and-scope of employment at the time of the accident, 2) that the employee was at fault for the accident being caused, or 3) both. By stipulating these facts, employers were largely able to exclude evidence of any direct negligence on part of the employer and/or narrow the scope of trial to only a contest of the plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court in Martin held that despite an employer admitting their employee was in course and scope when the accident occurred, plaintiffs could pursue direct negligence claims against the employer—as the issue of liability had not been admitted. Accordingly, employers found success by admitting both course and scope and liability—as seen in the Western District of Louisiana’s holding in Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona[3]. In Ferguson, the defendants stipulated that their employee was acting in course-and-scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. Due to the employer’s stipulation of fault, Judge Wicks of the Western District of Louisiana held that Martin did not apply and that plaintiffs could not pursue direct negligence claims. In Magill, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided scarce reasoning for their decision. The high court simply affirmed the District Court’s expansion of the holding in Martin and that the employer’s reliance on the Western District’s Ferguson holding was a misapplication of Louisiana law. The Supreme Court also cited the decision in Tardo v. Farrell.[4] where the Fifth Circuit held that even if an employer and employee stipulate to course and scope and fault, those admissions do not eliminate direct-negligence claims because those claims remain separate issues for the trier of fact. The Fifth Circuit notably stated, “the societal decisions as to who actually pays does not change the manner of assessing fault to all parties as required by law.” This statement raises concern, as plaintiffs may now attempt to challenge employer stipulations that historically narrowed trials. The Supreme Court did not explain its reliance on Tardo, so future litigation will likely clarify the decision’s full impact. Under Magill, plaintiffs are permitted to pursue direct negligence claims against the employer despite the employer admitting that their employee was acting in course and scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. The full effect of the Supreme Court’s decision remains to be seen. In praxis, Magill will permit plaintiffs to put on evidence of direct negligence by an employer in front of a jury who cannot assign fault—as fault has already been stipulated to by the defendants. Employers now face the practical risk that plaintiffs will encourage juries to increase damages as a form of punishment against an employer that admits fault but contests the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries. Employers should use this moment to rigorously review and strengthen policies and procedures related to hiring and training in order to limit exposure when plaintiffs assert direct-negligence claims.  [1] Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska, 2025-00892 (La. 11/12/25) [2] Martin v. Thomas, 21-01490 (La. 6/29/22), 346 So.3d 238 [3] Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, 17-1570, 2023 WL 173413 (W.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) [4] Tardo v. Ferrell, 25-123 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/25), 2025 WL 1516837 (unpublished).
  • Experience

    Burnell Joseph v. Atalco Gramercy, LLC et al., No. 3:23-cv-505, United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

    Bob Kerrigan and Jose Ruiz successfully secured summary judgment dismissal for their client, Velan, Inc., in a complex intentional tort and products liability act involving catastrophic injury. The plaintiff, a precipitation batch tank operator working at the Atalco alumina refinery in Gramercy, Louisiana, suffered severe and debilitating chemical burn injuries to his face, eyes, and body when he was sprayed with caustic liquor while working underneath a tank at the refinery. He claimed that the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank was leaking, which allowed the tank to become filled with liquor after it had been previously verified as empty. He filed suit against Velan, Inc., the manufacturer of the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank, alleging that the valve was unreasonable dangerous in accordance with the Louisiana Products Liability Act. He also filed an intentional tort claim against his employer, Atalco Gramercy, LLC, alleging that Atalco knew the valve was leaking and continued to force employees to work underneath the tank. He claimed that under these conditions, an incident such as his was substantially certain to occur. Following the close of discovery, Velan moved for summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims was appropriate because: (1) the plaintiff’s injuries were a result of Atalco’s misuse of the valve; (2) the plaintiff lacked the expert testimony needed to prove his theory of liability under the Louisiana Product’s Liability Act; (3) the Velan valve at issue was not unreasonably dangerous as defined by the Louisiana Products Liability Act; and (4) the plaintiff was unable to prove proximate causation needed to establish his case of liability against Velan. The Hon. Brian Jackson found that under the undisputed facts presented by Velan, summary judgment was appropriate and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against it, with prejudice.