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The Landowners Protection Act - Miss. Code Ann. §11-1-66.1

November 30, 2022

Zachary S. Wessler

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On July 1, 2019, Mississippi’s Landowner Protection Act (the “LPA”) went into effect and significantly changed Mississippi premises liability law. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-66.1. The LPA codified pre-existing common law and defined the level and type of proof necessary to establish a premises liability claim based on the intentional conduct of a third party. Id. By limiting a landowner’s liability to the specifically defined instances discussed below, the LPA made it more difficult for Mississippi plaintiffs to bring a successful premises liability lawsuit based on injuries sustained at a landowner’s business premises as a result of a third party’s intentional criminal or tortious actions.

PRIOR TO THE LANDOWNERS PROTECTION ACT, AN “ATMOSPHERE OF VIOLENCE” + A BUSINESS INVITEE BEING INJURED BY A THIRD PARTY’S CRIMINAL OR TORTIOUS ACTION = LANDOWNER LIABILITY.

Prior to the enactment of the LPA, a Mississippi plaintiff could bring a successful premises liability claim and recover damages for injuries sustained at a business as a result of a third party’s intentional criminal or tortious actions by establishing that:

  1. the plaintiff was a business invitee (a person who lawfully entered a commercial premises for the purpose of doing business),
  2. the business had a duty to warn or protect the plaintiff from a known dangerous condition (the third party’s intentional criminal or tortious act), and
  3. the business failed to warn or make safe the dangerous condition that caused the plaintiff’s injury. Kroger Co. v. Knox, 98 So. 3d 441 (Miss. 2012).

To prove the existence of a business’s duty to warn or protect its patrons from third-party acts of violence, prior to the LPA, a Mississippi plaintiff could use evidence of criminal activity in the general vicinity of a business’s premises to demonstrate that a pattern or “atmosphere of violence” existed on the business’s premises. Rogers v. Sunbelt Mgmt. Co., 52 F. Supp. 3d 816 (S.D. Miss. 2014). If an “atmosphere of violence” was established, then the business had “cause to anticipate” third-party criminal or tortious conduct. Id.at 823. As a result, third-party acts of violence were considered foreseeable to the business under the law, and a plaintiff who suffered injuries at the hands of a third party on the defendant business’s premises could prevail and recover damages from the defendant business in a premises liability lawsuit because the defendant business breached its duty to warn or protect its patrons from a known danger. Id.

THE LANDOWNERS PROTECTION ACT LIMITS A LANDOWNER’S LIABILITY FOR THIRD-PARTY CRIMINAL OR TORTIOUS ACTIONS AND NARROWS THE PARAMETERS FOR WHAT CONSTITUTES AN “ATMOSPHERE OF VIOLENCE”.

When the LPA went into effect on July 1, 2019, the premises liability law analysis in Mississippi significantly changed. Under the LPA, anyone who owns, leases, operates, or maintains a commercial property in Mississippi is immune from civil liability for injuries caused by a third party’s intentional criminal or tortious conduct (assault, battery, etc.), so long as the landowner or occupier did not “actively and affirmatively, with a degree of conscious decision-making, impel [set in motion] the conduct of said third-party.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-66.1(1)(b).

Furthermore, under the LPA, the scenario in which a landowner will be deemed to have had constructive notice of the potential for a third-party’s criminal or tortious actions is considerably reduced due to the narrowed definition of an “atmosphere of violence”. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-66.1(3). Now, instead of looking at the general vicinity of the business’s premises to determine whether an “atmosphere of violence” existed at the time a third-party’s violent actions caused injuries to a business’s patron, the law looks to the business premises itself. Id.Under the LPA, an “atmosphere of violence” will only be deemed to have existed at a landowner’s property if, within three (3) years of the subject injury, there were three (3) or more separate events or incidents on a business’s premises which resulted in three (3) or more arraignments of an individual for a felony involving an act of violence. Id. This codified version of what constitutes an “atmosphere of violence” greatly decreases the chance that a plaintiff will be able to prove that a landowner could foresee the possibility of a third-party’s tortious or criminal actions.

Mississippi landowners who are considering granting access to their land for commercial purposes would be wise to first consult with an attorney to review the provisions of the Landowner Protection Act in detail.

If you have any questions or would like to learn more, please reach out to one of the attorneys in our Gulfport, MS office.

Disclaimer: This article is meant for reference only, and is not intended to be legal advice. For legal counsel regarding your specific situation, please consult an attorney licensed in your state.

Firm Highlights

  • Experience

    Burnell Joseph v. Atalco Gramercy, LLC et al., No. 3:23-cv-505, United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

    Bob Kerrigan and Jose Ruiz successfully secured summary judgment dismissal for their client, Velan, Inc., in a complex intentional tort and products liability act involving catastrophic injury. The plaintiff, a precipitation batch tank operator working at the Atalco alumina refinery in Gramercy, Louisiana, suffered severe and debilitating chemical burn injuries to his face, eyes, and body when he was sprayed with caustic liquor while working underneath a tank at the refinery. He claimed that the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank was leaking, which allowed the tank to become filled with liquor after it had been previously verified as empty. He filed suit against Velan, Inc., the manufacturer of the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank, alleging that the valve was unreasonable dangerous in accordance with the Louisiana Products Liability Act. He also filed an intentional tort claim against his employer, Atalco Gramercy, LLC, alleging that Atalco knew the valve was leaking and continued to force employees to work underneath the tank. He claimed that under these conditions, an incident such as his was substantially certain to occur. Following the close of discovery, Velan moved for summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims was appropriate because: (1) the plaintiff’s injuries were a result of Atalco’s misuse of the valve; (2) the plaintiff lacked the expert testimony needed to prove his theory of liability under the Louisiana Product’s Liability Act; (3) the Velan valve at issue was not unreasonably dangerous as defined by the Louisiana Products Liability Act; and (4) the plaintiff was unable to prove proximate causation needed to establish his case of liability against Velan. The Hon. Brian Jackson found that under the undisputed facts presented by Velan, summary judgment was appropriate and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against it, with prejudice.
  • Insight

    No Mercy for Employers in Louisiana Supreme Court’s Recent Magill Decision

    In its recent per curiam opinion, Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska[1], the Louisiana Supreme Court has foreclosed a routine defense strategy to shield employers from direct negligence claims. The high court has extended their 2022 decision in Martin v. Thomas[2], and now allows plaintiffs to pursue direct negligence claims against an employer despite the employer’s stipulation that its employee was in the course-and-scope of employment and caused the accident. Essentially, employers who fail to implement better employment practices will permit plaintiffs to ramp up potential exposure with evidence, if such exists, that heretofore they were routinely barred from introducing at trial. The Supreme Court’s Magill holding should encourage employers to update where needed their policies and procedures pertaining to hiring, training, supervising, and entrusting duties and property to employees, not only for the safety of their employees and customers in this state, but also eliminate employer’s exposure to direct negligence claims. Prior to Martin, a litigation strategy had taken shape where employers stipulated to 1) an employee being in course-and-scope of employment at the time of the accident, 2) that the employee was at fault for the accident being caused, or 3) both. By stipulating these facts, employers were largely able to exclude evidence of any direct negligence on part of the employer and/or narrow the scope of trial to only a contest of the plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court in Martin held that despite an employer admitting their employee was in course and scope when the accident occurred, plaintiffs could pursue direct negligence claims against the employer—as the issue of liability had not been admitted. Accordingly, employers found success by admitting both course and scope and liability—as seen in the Western District of Louisiana’s holding in Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona[3]. In Ferguson, the defendants stipulated that their employee was acting in course-and-scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. Due to the employer’s stipulation of fault, Judge Wicks of the Western District of Louisiana held that Martin did not apply and that plaintiffs could not pursue direct negligence claims. In Magill, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided scarce reasoning for their decision. The high court simply affirmed the District Court’s expansion of the holding in Martin and that the employer’s reliance on the Western District’s Ferguson holding was a misapplication of Louisiana law. The Supreme Court also cited the decision in Tardo v. Farrell.[4] where the Fifth Circuit held that even if an employer and employee stipulate to course and scope and fault, those admissions do not eliminate direct-negligence claims because those claims remain separate issues for the trier of fact. The Fifth Circuit notably stated, “the societal decisions as to who actually pays does not change the manner of assessing fault to all parties as required by law.” This statement raises concern, as plaintiffs may now attempt to challenge employer stipulations that historically narrowed trials. The Supreme Court did not explain its reliance on Tardo, so future litigation will likely clarify the decision’s full impact. Under Magill, plaintiffs are permitted to pursue direct negligence claims against the employer despite the employer admitting that their employee was acting in course and scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. The full effect of the Supreme Court’s decision remains to be seen. In praxis, Magill will permit plaintiffs to put on evidence of direct negligence by an employer in front of a jury who cannot assign fault—as fault has already been stipulated to by the defendants. Employers now face the practical risk that plaintiffs will encourage juries to increase damages as a form of punishment against an employer that admits fault but contests the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries. Employers should use this moment to rigorously review and strengthen policies and procedures related to hiring and training in order to limit exposure when plaintiffs assert direct-negligence claims.  [1] Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska, 2025-00892 (La. 11/12/25) [2] Martin v. Thomas, 21-01490 (La. 6/29/22), 346 So.3d 238 [3] Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, 17-1570, 2023 WL 173413 (W.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) [4] Tardo v. Ferrell, 25-123 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/25), 2025 WL 1516837 (unpublished).