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The Virtual Courtroom: COVID-19’s Effect on Jury and Bench Trials

April 26, 2021

Christopher H. Corkern

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Over the last year, the COVID-19 pandemic has swept across this nation.  It has impacted most areas of our daily lives, including the courtroom.  From court closures and trial continuances to Zoom depositions and hearings, COVID-19 has certainly influenced our judicial system.  In response thereto, federal district courts are more frequently permitting virtual or remote testimony for trials and evidentiary hearings.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(a) provides that “[f]or good cause in compelling circumstances and with appropriate safeguards, the court may permit testimony in open court by contemporaneous transmission from a different location.”1 The advisory committee notes indicate a strong preference for live testimony.2  However, the advisory committee notes also recognize that “[t]he most persuasive showings of good cause and compelling circumstances are likely to arise when a witness is unable to attend trial for unexpected reasons, such as accident or illness, but remains able to testify from a different place.”3 “The Court’s discretion on this question is supplemented by its ‘wide latitude in determining the manner in which evidence is to be presented’ under the Federal Rules of Evidence.” 4

Further, many recent cases acknowledge that “[t]he near-instantaneous transmission of video testimony through current technology permits ‘the jury [or, in a bench trial, the Court] to see the live witness along with his hesitation, his doubts, his variations of language, his confidence or precipitancy, [and] his calmness or consideration[.].’”5  Thus, “testimony by videoconference can satisfy the functional goals that Rule 43(a) was designed to achieve.”6

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, several federal courts across the United States have held bench trials by taking witness testimony via “contemporaneous transmission,” as permitted under Rule 43(a).7  Additionally, on February 11, 2021, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi granted a Rule 43(a) motion for leave to allow testimony by remote transmission of an expert who had health-related concerns in traveling across the country to testify at an evidentiary hearing.8  Said motion was successfully argued by Deutsch Kerrigan attorneys on behalf of a client in that matter.


[1] Id.

[2] See F.R.C.P. 43(a) Advisory Committee’s Note to 1996 Amendment (“The importance of presenting live testimony in court cannot be forgotten.”).

[3] Id.

[4] In re RFC & ResCap Liquidating Trust Action, 444 F. Supp. 3d 967, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44607, 2020 WL 1280931, at *2 (D. Minn. Mar. 13, 2020) (quoting Parkhurst v. Belt, 567 F.3d 995, 1002 (8th Cir. 2009)).

[5] In re RFC & ResCap Liquidating Trust Action, 444 F. Supp. 3d 967, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44607, 2020 WL 1280931, at *2 (D. Minn. Mar. 13, 2020) (quoting In re Vioxx Prods. Litig., 439 F. Supp. 2d 640, 644 (E.D. La. 2006); see also Aoki v. Gilbert, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44155, 2019 WL 1243719, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2019) (“Because a witness testifying by video is observed directly with little, if any delay in transmission … courts have found that video testimony can sufficiently enable cross-examination and credibility determinations, as well as preserve the overall integrity of the proceedings.”).

[6] Gould Elecs. Inc., v. Livingston Cty. Rd. Comm’n, 470 F. Supp. 3d 735, 739 (E.D. Mich. June 30, 2020).

[7] See Gould Elecs. Inc., v. Livingston Cty. Rd. Comm’n, 470 F. Supp. 3d 735, 744 (E.D. Mich. June 30, 2020) (proceeding with a bench trial via virtual testimony); In re RFC & ResCap Liquidating Trust Action, 444 F. Supp. 3d 967, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44607, 2020 WL 1280931, at *3-4 (D. Minn. Mar. 13, 2020) (holding that the COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on the parties’ and witnesses’ ability to appear in-person in court constituted “good cause and compelling circumstances” under Rule 43(a) to permit defense witnesses to testify at a bench trial via video-conference.); Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Manetta Enters., Inc., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103625, at *10, 2020 WL 3104033, at *2-3 (E.D.N.Y. Jun. 11, 2020) (exercising the court’s discretion, over one party’s objections, to order the entire 3-day bench trial be conducted via videoconference).

[8] See Allen v. Lyons & Farrar, P.A., et al., U.S. Dist. 2:19-Cv-0030-TBM-MTP (S.D. Miss. Feb. 11, 2021).

Firm Highlights

  • Insight

    No Mercy for Employers in Louisiana Supreme Court’s Recent Magill Decision

    In its recent per curiam opinion, Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska[1], the Louisiana Supreme Court has foreclosed a routine defense strategy to shield employers from direct negligence claims. The high court has extended their 2022 decision in Martin v. Thomas[2], and now allows plaintiffs to pursue direct negligence claims against an employer despite the employer’s stipulation that its employee was in the course-and-scope of employment and caused the accident. Essentially, employers who fail to implement better employment practices will permit plaintiffs to ramp up potential exposure with evidence, if such exists, that heretofore they were routinely barred from introducing at trial. The Supreme Court’s Magill holding should encourage employers to update where needed their policies and procedures pertaining to hiring, training, supervising, and entrusting duties and property to employees, not only for the safety of their employees and customers in this state, but also eliminate employer’s exposure to direct negligence claims. Prior to Martin, a litigation strategy had taken shape where employers stipulated to 1) an employee being in course-and-scope of employment at the time of the accident, 2) that the employee was at fault for the accident being caused, or 3) both. By stipulating these facts, employers were largely able to exclude evidence of any direct negligence on part of the employer and/or narrow the scope of trial to only a contest of the plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court in Martin held that despite an employer admitting their employee was in course and scope when the accident occurred, plaintiffs could pursue direct negligence claims against the employer—as the issue of liability had not been admitted. Accordingly, employers found success by admitting both course and scope and liability—as seen in the Western District of Louisiana’s holding in Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona[3]. In Ferguson, the defendants stipulated that their employee was acting in course-and-scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. Due to the employer’s stipulation of fault, Judge Wicks of the Western District of Louisiana held that Martin did not apply and that plaintiffs could not pursue direct negligence claims. In Magill, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided scarce reasoning for their decision. The high court simply affirmed the District Court’s expansion of the holding in Martin and that the employer’s reliance on the Western District’s Ferguson holding was a misapplication of Louisiana law. The Supreme Court also cited the decision in Tardo v. Farrell.[4] where the Fifth Circuit held that even if an employer and employee stipulate to course and scope and fault, those admissions do not eliminate direct-negligence claims because those claims remain separate issues for the trier of fact. The Fifth Circuit notably stated, “the societal decisions as to who actually pays does not change the manner of assessing fault to all parties as required by law.” This statement raises concern, as plaintiffs may now attempt to challenge employer stipulations that historically narrowed trials. The Supreme Court did not explain its reliance on Tardo, so future litigation will likely clarify the decision’s full impact. Under Magill, plaintiffs are permitted to pursue direct negligence claims against the employer despite the employer admitting that their employee was acting in course and scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. The full effect of the Supreme Court’s decision remains to be seen. In praxis, Magill will permit plaintiffs to put on evidence of direct negligence by an employer in front of a jury who cannot assign fault—as fault has already been stipulated to by the defendants. Employers now face the practical risk that plaintiffs will encourage juries to increase damages as a form of punishment against an employer that admits fault but contests the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries. Employers should use this moment to rigorously review and strengthen policies and procedures related to hiring and training in order to limit exposure when plaintiffs assert direct-negligence claims.  [1] Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska, 2025-00892 (La. 11/12/25) [2] Martin v. Thomas, 21-01490 (La. 6/29/22), 346 So.3d 238 [3] Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, 17-1570, 2023 WL 173413 (W.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) [4] Tardo v. Ferrell, 25-123 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/25), 2025 WL 1516837 (unpublished).
  • Experience

    Burnell Joseph v. Atalco Gramercy, LLC et al., No. 3:23-cv-505, United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

    Bob Kerrigan and Jose Ruiz successfully secured summary judgment dismissal for their client, Velan, Inc., in a complex intentional tort and products liability act involving catastrophic injury. The plaintiff, a precipitation batch tank operator working at the Atalco alumina refinery in Gramercy, Louisiana, suffered severe and debilitating chemical burn injuries to his face, eyes, and body when he was sprayed with caustic liquor while working underneath a tank at the refinery. He claimed that the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank was leaking, which allowed the tank to become filled with liquor after it had been previously verified as empty. He filed suit against Velan, Inc., the manufacturer of the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank, alleging that the valve was unreasonable dangerous in accordance with the Louisiana Products Liability Act. He also filed an intentional tort claim against his employer, Atalco Gramercy, LLC, alleging that Atalco knew the valve was leaking and continued to force employees to work underneath the tank. He claimed that under these conditions, an incident such as his was substantially certain to occur. Following the close of discovery, Velan moved for summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims was appropriate because: (1) the plaintiff’s injuries were a result of Atalco’s misuse of the valve; (2) the plaintiff lacked the expert testimony needed to prove his theory of liability under the Louisiana Product’s Liability Act; (3) the Velan valve at issue was not unreasonably dangerous as defined by the Louisiana Products Liability Act; and (4) the plaintiff was unable to prove proximate causation needed to establish his case of liability against Velan. The Hon. Brian Jackson found that under the undisputed facts presented by Velan, summary judgment was appropriate and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against it, with prejudice.