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U.S. Supreme Court Answers Questions, Raises Others, Regarding How Employers Are to Best Accommodate Employees on the Basis of Religion

August 8, 2023

Brendan J. Besh

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U.S. Supreme Court Answers Questions, Raises Others, Regarding How Employers Are to Best Accommodate Employees on the Basis of Religion

Employers seeking clarity on how to best accommodate its employees’ religious beliefs may find some answers and even more questions in the United States Supreme Court decision Groff v. DeJoy1. The decision focused on the Title VII requirement for employers to reasonably accommodate the religious observance or practice of their employees unless doing so would constitute undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business2.

Without announcing any new standard, or even articulating precisely what costs an employer must incur as an “undue hardship” before being relieved of accommodation, the decision simply rejected the Court’s prior ruling in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977),1 that the employer need only “’ to bear more than a de minimis cost,’” a standard that had been used for decades to interpret undue hardship. While the standard has been clarified so that undue hardship is to instead mean “substantially increased costs in relation to the conduct of an employer’s particular business,” employers are left in the difficult position of having to discern how this new standard will be applied and what impacts this new standard could have on managing religious accommodations going forward.

In Groff, an employee of the United States Postal Service (“USPS”) brought a claim under Title VII for religious discrimination. The employee was unwilling to work on Sundays, and USPS, while not forcing the employee to work on Sunday, reassigned the employee’s scheduled Sunday shifts to other employees. USPS also instituted “progressive discipline” for failing to work on Sundays3. Eventually, the employee resigned and sued USPS for violating Title VII, “asserting that USPS could have accommodated his Sunday Sabbath practice without undue hardship on the conduct of [USPS’s] business.4" The District Court granted summary judgment to USPS, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision based on their reliance on the Supreme Court’s former ruling in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977)5. Because Hardison construed Title VII’s undue hardship standard to mean “that requiring an employer ‘to bear more than a de minimis cost’ to provide a religious accommodation is an undue hardship,” the Third Circuit concluded that the de minimis cost standard was met as “exempting Groff from Sunday work... had imposed on his coworkers, disrupted the workplace and workflow, and diminished employee morale6." The Supreme Court granted the employee’s writ of certiorari and unanimously reversed the decision of the Third Circuit.

In Justice Alito’s opinion for the Court, the Court reasoned that the Hardison precedent did not set out the proper standard for evaluating whether a reasonable accommodation constitutes an undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business. The Court ultimately held that showing “more than a de minimis cost” does not suffice to establish “undue hardship” as applied under Title VII’s accommodation requirement. “Undue hardship,” properly understood, is shown when the burden of granting an accommodation would result in substantially increased costs in relation to the conduct of an employer's particular business7. The Court’s reasoning relied upon the language in Hardison regarding the fact that an accommodation is not required when substantial costs would be incurred to the employer’s business and the meaning of “undue hardship” in ordinary speech. However, the Court declined to apply the undue hardship analysis to any set of particular facts, leaving questions regarding the application of the undue hardship standard to be determined on a case-by-case basis.

The question then remains of how employers, including the defendant in Groff, will be able to practically establish an undue hardship as illuminated in Groff. Justice Sotomayor, in her concurrence, reasoned that an employer will be able to meet the undue hardship burden perhaps with a showing of undue hardship on the business’s employees8. But whether imposing on one’s coworkers, disrupting the workplace and workflow, and diminishing employee morale will constitute undue hardship, as substantially increased costs in relation to the conduct of an employer’s particular business, appears unlikely given that the substantial increased costs requirement would constitute more than inconvenience and disruption. In light of Groff’s undue hardship analysis, the importance of seeking to provide reasonable accommodations, not only as a legal requirement under Title VII but also as a practical way to prevent avoidable litigation, has never been clearer.


[1]  Groff, 600 U.S. at *3 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).

[1]  Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. ____ (2023).

[2]  42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a); 42 U.S.C. §2000e(j).

[3]  Groff, 600 U.S. at *2-3.

[4]  Id. at *3.

[5] Id.

[6] Id.

[7] Id. at *18 (emphasis added).

[8] Groff, 600 U.S. at *3 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).

Firm Highlights

  • Experience

    Burnell Joseph v. Atalco Gramercy, LLC et al., No. 3:23-cv-505, United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

    Bob Kerrigan and Jose Ruiz successfully secured summary judgment dismissal for their client, Velan, Inc., in a complex intentional tort and products liability act involving catastrophic injury. The plaintiff, a precipitation batch tank operator working at the Atalco alumina refinery in Gramercy, Louisiana, suffered severe and debilitating chemical burn injuries to his face, eyes, and body when he was sprayed with caustic liquor while working underneath a tank at the refinery. He claimed that the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank was leaking, which allowed the tank to become filled with liquor after it had been previously verified as empty. He filed suit against Velan, Inc., the manufacturer of the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank, alleging that the valve was unreasonable dangerous in accordance with the Louisiana Products Liability Act. He also filed an intentional tort claim against his employer, Atalco Gramercy, LLC, alleging that Atalco knew the valve was leaking and continued to force employees to work underneath the tank. He claimed that under these conditions, an incident such as his was substantially certain to occur. Following the close of discovery, Velan moved for summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims was appropriate because: (1) the plaintiff’s injuries were a result of Atalco’s misuse of the valve; (2) the plaintiff lacked the expert testimony needed to prove his theory of liability under the Louisiana Product’s Liability Act; (3) the Velan valve at issue was not unreasonably dangerous as defined by the Louisiana Products Liability Act; and (4) the plaintiff was unable to prove proximate causation needed to establish his case of liability against Velan. The Hon. Brian Jackson found that under the undisputed facts presented by Velan, summary judgment was appropriate and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against it, with prejudice.
  • Insight

    No Mercy for Employers in Louisiana Supreme Court’s Recent Magill Decision

    In its recent per curiam opinion, Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska[1], the Louisiana Supreme Court has foreclosed a routine defense strategy to shield employers from direct negligence claims. The high court has extended their 2022 decision in Martin v. Thomas[2], and now allows plaintiffs to pursue direct negligence claims against an employer despite the employer’s stipulation that its employee was in the course-and-scope of employment and caused the accident. Essentially, employers who fail to implement better employment practices will permit plaintiffs to ramp up potential exposure with evidence, if such exists, that heretofore they were routinely barred from introducing at trial. The Supreme Court’s Magill holding should encourage employers to update where needed their policies and procedures pertaining to hiring, training, supervising, and entrusting duties and property to employees, not only for the safety of their employees and customers in this state, but also eliminate employer’s exposure to direct negligence claims. Prior to Martin, a litigation strategy had taken shape where employers stipulated to 1) an employee being in course-and-scope of employment at the time of the accident, 2) that the employee was at fault for the accident being caused, or 3) both. By stipulating these facts, employers were largely able to exclude evidence of any direct negligence on part of the employer and/or narrow the scope of trial to only a contest of the plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court in Martin held that despite an employer admitting their employee was in course and scope when the accident occurred, plaintiffs could pursue direct negligence claims against the employer—as the issue of liability had not been admitted. Accordingly, employers found success by admitting both course and scope and liability—as seen in the Western District of Louisiana’s holding in Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona[3]. In Ferguson, the defendants stipulated that their employee was acting in course-and-scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. Due to the employer’s stipulation of fault, Judge Wicks of the Western District of Louisiana held that Martin did not apply and that plaintiffs could not pursue direct negligence claims. In Magill, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided scarce reasoning for their decision. The high court simply affirmed the District Court’s expansion of the holding in Martin and that the employer’s reliance on the Western District’s Ferguson holding was a misapplication of Louisiana law. The Supreme Court also cited the decision in Tardo v. Farrell.[4] where the Fifth Circuit held that even if an employer and employee stipulate to course and scope and fault, those admissions do not eliminate direct-negligence claims because those claims remain separate issues for the trier of fact. The Fifth Circuit notably stated, “the societal decisions as to who actually pays does not change the manner of assessing fault to all parties as required by law.” This statement raises concern, as plaintiffs may now attempt to challenge employer stipulations that historically narrowed trials. The Supreme Court did not explain its reliance on Tardo, so future litigation will likely clarify the decision’s full impact. Under Magill, plaintiffs are permitted to pursue direct negligence claims against the employer despite the employer admitting that their employee was acting in course and scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. The full effect of the Supreme Court’s decision remains to be seen. In praxis, Magill will permit plaintiffs to put on evidence of direct negligence by an employer in front of a jury who cannot assign fault—as fault has already been stipulated to by the defendants. Employers now face the practical risk that plaintiffs will encourage juries to increase damages as a form of punishment against an employer that admits fault but contests the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries. Employers should use this moment to rigorously review and strengthen policies and procedures related to hiring and training in order to limit exposure when plaintiffs assert direct-negligence claims.  [1] Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska, 2025-00892 (La. 11/12/25) [2] Martin v. Thomas, 21-01490 (La. 6/29/22), 346 So.3d 238 [3] Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, 17-1570, 2023 WL 173413 (W.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) [4] Tardo v. Ferrell, 25-123 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/25), 2025 WL 1516837 (unpublished).