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Understanding the Process When a Litigant Passes Away During a Lawsuit in Mississippi

October 12, 2023

Zachary Wessler, Sr.

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Understanding the Process When a Litigant Passes Away During a Lawsuit in Mississippi

Among the events that can significantly impact the course of a lawsuit is the unexpected passing of a litigant while a case is pending. Numerous questions and concerns arise for all involved, parties and non-parties alike (such as non-party stakeholders like insurance claims professionals and insurance companies). Fortunately, for Mississippi litigants and their attorneys, Mississippi has enacted a clear process to address this situation. This article explains the implications and essential steps that should be taken..

Filing a Suggestion of Death

Upon a litigant’s death, the first responsible course of action is to file a "Suggestion of Death" under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 251. This seemingly straightforward step is crucial as it initiates a formal process, providing notice to the court of the deceased litigant's demise. Furthermore, it sets a prescriptive clock in motion that all parties must adhere to.

The Prescriptive Clock

Once a Suggestion of Death has been properly filed, a pivotal countdown begins. The deceased litigant's successors or legal representatives2 are given a ninety (90) day window within which to file a motion to substitute themselves as the proper party(ies) in the lawsuit. This process is designed to ensure that the litigation can continue smoothly, with the appropriate parties representing the interests of the deceased litigant.

Failure to File a Motion to Substitute

Rule 25 of the Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure describes the consequences that result when a motion to substitute is not filed within the prescribed ninety (90) days. The rule states that, if the deceased litigant's successors or legal representatives do not take action within the allotted time frame, "[t]he action shall be dismissed without prejudice as to the deceased party3."

What does this mean? A dismissal “without prejudice” signifies that the lawsuit is not terminated permanently, but it is, in essence, put on hold4. The door remains open for potential future proceedings, but the immediate case is no longer active. However, if the statute of limitations (or prescriptive period) has run on the claim, then the dismissal “without prejudice” will, in effect, become a dismissal “with prejudice,” and the plaintiff will not be allowed to refile. So, one must be mindful of the limitations period applicable to the underlying claim.

Implications for All Parties

Understanding the legal implications of a litigant's passing is essential for making informed decisions and navigating the new legal landscape effectively. For insured individuals this information is vital to protect their interests and ensure a smooth resolution of the lawsuit against them. For non-party stakeholders (e.g., insurance claims professionals and insurance companies)  knowing these procedures is beneficial   for making  informed adjusting decisions following the unexpected death of a litigant.


[1] Miss. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1).

[2] E.g., an estate administrator(trix) or executor(trix).

[3] Miss. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1).(Emphasis added).

[4] In other words, if a case is dismissed “without prejudice,” it can be refiled at a later time. However, if the statute of limitations (or prescriptive period) has run out before the case is refiled, then the plaintiff has missed their deadline to bring the case again. In such a situation, the effect can be similar to a dismissal “with prejudice,” which means the case cannot be filed again. So, even though the initial dismissal of a case was “without prejudice,” the expiration of the statute of limitations (or prescriptive period) can convert it into a dismissal “with prejudice” because the legal opportunity to refile the case has been lost.


Firm Highlights

  • Insight

    No Mercy for Employers in Louisiana Supreme Court’s Recent Magill Decision

    In its recent per curiam opinion, Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska[1], the Louisiana Supreme Court has foreclosed a routine defense strategy to shield employers from direct negligence claims. The high court has extended their 2022 decision in Martin v. Thomas[2], and now allows plaintiffs to pursue direct negligence claims against an employer despite the employer’s stipulation that its employee was in the course-and-scope of employment and caused the accident. Essentially, employers who fail to implement better employment practices will permit plaintiffs to ramp up potential exposure with evidence, if such exists, that heretofore they were routinely barred from introducing at trial. The Supreme Court’s Magill holding should encourage employers to update where needed their policies and procedures pertaining to hiring, training, supervising, and entrusting duties and property to employees, not only for the safety of their employees and customers in this state, but also eliminate employer’s exposure to direct negligence claims. Prior to Martin, a litigation strategy had taken shape where employers stipulated to 1) an employee being in course-and-scope of employment at the time of the accident, 2) that the employee was at fault for the accident being caused, or 3) both. By stipulating these facts, employers were largely able to exclude evidence of any direct negligence on part of the employer and/or narrow the scope of trial to only a contest of the plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court in Martin held that despite an employer admitting their employee was in course and scope when the accident occurred, plaintiffs could pursue direct negligence claims against the employer—as the issue of liability had not been admitted. Accordingly, employers found success by admitting both course and scope and liability—as seen in the Western District of Louisiana’s holding in Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona[3]. In Ferguson, the defendants stipulated that their employee was acting in course-and-scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. Due to the employer’s stipulation of fault, Judge Wicks of the Western District of Louisiana held that Martin did not apply and that plaintiffs could not pursue direct negligence claims. In Magill, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided scarce reasoning for their decision. The high court simply affirmed the District Court’s expansion of the holding in Martin and that the employer’s reliance on the Western District’s Ferguson holding was a misapplication of Louisiana law. The Supreme Court also cited the decision in Tardo v. Farrell.[4] where the Fifth Circuit held that even if an employer and employee stipulate to course and scope and fault, those admissions do not eliminate direct-negligence claims because those claims remain separate issues for the trier of fact. The Fifth Circuit notably stated, “the societal decisions as to who actually pays does not change the manner of assessing fault to all parties as required by law.” This statement raises concern, as plaintiffs may now attempt to challenge employer stipulations that historically narrowed trials. The Supreme Court did not explain its reliance on Tardo, so future litigation will likely clarify the decision’s full impact. Under Magill, plaintiffs are permitted to pursue direct negligence claims against the employer despite the employer admitting that their employee was acting in course and scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. The full effect of the Supreme Court’s decision remains to be seen. In praxis, Magill will permit plaintiffs to put on evidence of direct negligence by an employer in front of a jury who cannot assign fault—as fault has already been stipulated to by the defendants. Employers now face the practical risk that plaintiffs will encourage juries to increase damages as a form of punishment against an employer that admits fault but contests the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries. Employers should use this moment to rigorously review and strengthen policies and procedures related to hiring and training in order to limit exposure when plaintiffs assert direct-negligence claims.  [1] Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska, 2025-00892 (La. 11/12/25) [2] Martin v. Thomas, 21-01490 (La. 6/29/22), 346 So.3d 238 [3] Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, 17-1570, 2023 WL 173413 (W.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) [4] Tardo v. Ferrell, 25-123 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/25), 2025 WL 1516837 (unpublished).
  • Experience

    Burnell Joseph v. Atalco Gramercy, LLC et al., No. 3:23-cv-505, United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

    Bob Kerrigan and Jose Ruiz successfully secured summary judgment dismissal for their client, Velan, Inc., in a complex intentional tort and products liability act involving catastrophic injury. The plaintiff, a precipitation batch tank operator working at the Atalco alumina refinery in Gramercy, Louisiana, suffered severe and debilitating chemical burn injuries to his face, eyes, and body when he was sprayed with caustic liquor while working underneath a tank at the refinery. He claimed that the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank was leaking, which allowed the tank to become filled with liquor after it had been previously verified as empty. He filed suit against Velan, Inc., the manufacturer of the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank, alleging that the valve was unreasonable dangerous in accordance with the Louisiana Products Liability Act. He also filed an intentional tort claim against his employer, Atalco Gramercy, LLC, alleging that Atalco knew the valve was leaking and continued to force employees to work underneath the tank. He claimed that under these conditions, an incident such as his was substantially certain to occur. Following the close of discovery, Velan moved for summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims was appropriate because: (1) the plaintiff’s injuries were a result of Atalco’s misuse of the valve; (2) the plaintiff lacked the expert testimony needed to prove his theory of liability under the Louisiana Product’s Liability Act; (3) the Velan valve at issue was not unreasonably dangerous as defined by the Louisiana Products Liability Act; and (4) the plaintiff was unable to prove proximate causation needed to establish his case of liability against Velan. The Hon. Brian Jackson found that under the undisputed facts presented by Velan, summary judgment was appropriate and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against it, with prejudice.