Insights

Deutsch Kerrigan Article /

Use Your Shield: AIA A201 Protections Against Contractor and Subcontractor Claims

May 2, 2023

Juan J. Miranda

share this page

Use Your Shield: AIA A201 Protections Against Contractor and Subcontractor Claims

Construction Administration service (“CA”) can be a daunting task for Design Professional particularly on large projects where significant nonconforming work is discovered. The complexity of the CA services often depends on the scale and scope of the project, expected versus actual site conditions, the use the proper means and methods to construct a project as designed, the effectiveness of communication and cooperation between the Design Professional and the general contractor (“GC”), and the ability of the parties to quickly identify and remediate non-conforming work. But disagreements do occur, and Design Professionals can find themselves at odds with positions taken by a GC and its subcontractors regarding conformity of work.   As a practical matter, in order to minimize their own role in delays and increased costs on a project, GCs and/or subcontractors may try to shift responsibility to the Design Professional based their role during CA services.

On most projects, the Design Professional and the GC will not have contractual privity with one another and will instead contract directly with the Owner of the project. As such, any claims brought by the GC against the Design Professional will generally sound in tort and negligence arising from acts and omissions taking place during the construction of the project and pursuant to the Design Professional’s CA obligations owed to the Owner. Although no contractual privity exists between the Design Professional and GC, contractual provisions contained in the construction contract between the Owner and the GC may nevertheless provide defenses against claims brought by the GC against the Design Professional, particularly claims arising from CA.

For example, §4.2 of A201-2017, General Conditions of the Contract for Construction, and its predecessors, contains provisions that may shield a Design Professional against claims arising from their CA decisions:

§ 4.2.6 The Architect will have the authority to reject Work that does not conform to the Contract Documents. Whenever the Architect considers it necessary or advisable, the Architect will have authority to require inspection or testing of the Work in accordance with Section 13.4.2 and 13.4.3, whether or not such Work is fabricated, installed or completed. However, neither this authority of the architect nor a decision made in good faith either to exercise or not to exercise such authority shall give rise to a duty or responsibility of the architect to the contractor, subcontractors, suppliers, their agents or employees, or other persons or entities performing portions of the work. 

Arguably, §4.2.6 is an exculpatory provision in favor of Design Professionals shielding them from liability arising from CA decisions made in good faith during the project. The theme of shielding the Design Professional from liability arising from decisions made in good faith is further reflected in § 4.2.12, which states in pertinent part:

§ 4.2.12 . . . When making such interpretations and decisions, the Architect will . . . not be liable for results of interpretations or decisions rendered in good faith.

At least two courts in Louisiana have applied these provisions as shields against tort claims brought by contractors against Design Professionals. In Farrell Constr. Co. v. Jefferson Par.,1a Design Professional filed a motion for summary judgment and motion in limine seeking, inter alia, to dismiss a general contractor’s claims against the Design Professional arising from CA services. Interpreting §4.2.6, the court held that the provision precluded tort liability on behalf of the Design Professional for acts and omissions which took place during the course of construction but did not bar claims related to the preparation of plans and specifications prior to construction.2

Likewise, in Patriot Contracting, LLC v. Star Ins. Co.3, an architect moved for partial summary judgment seeking to dismiss a contractor’s claims for professional negligence in administering a construction contract on the basis that a § 4.2.6  and § 4.2.12 in the contract precluded any liability. The court found that the AIA provisions were valid and served to relieve the architect of any duty towards the contractor and limit claims for negligent contract administration.4 The court further found that because the clauses refer to duty and liability generally, the clause limits both contractual and delictual duties.5The court granted summary judgment to the extent that the contractor could not recover for acts of contract administration that the architect made in good faith.6

The Farrell and Patriot cases apply § 4.2.6  and § 4.2.12 as they were intended, which is to shield the Design Professional from liability arising from their good faith decisions made pursuant to their CA obligations on the project. In the event of a dispute, Design Professionals should make themselves and the general contractor aware of such provisions in the construction contract to discourage costly litigation. The Design Professional should also maintain thorough records of their decisions making process when administering CA services to further shield against allegations of bad faith decisions. In sum, knowing the ins and outs of the construction contract between the owner and the general contractor can help avoid costly litigation and encourage amicable resolution of disputes arising during construction.


[1] 693 F. Supp. 490, 494 (E.D. La. 1988).

[2] Id

[3] No. 15-6634, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33427, at *7 (E.D. La. Mar. 1, 2018).

[4] Id. at 8-9.

[5] Id. at 9.

[6] Id.

Firm Highlights

  • Experience

    Burnell Joseph v. Atalco Gramercy, LLC et al., No. 3:23-cv-505, United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

    Bob Kerrigan and Jose Ruiz successfully secured summary judgment dismissal for their client, Velan, Inc., in a complex intentional tort and products liability act involving catastrophic injury. The plaintiff, a precipitation batch tank operator working at the Atalco alumina refinery in Gramercy, Louisiana, suffered severe and debilitating chemical burn injuries to his face, eyes, and body when he was sprayed with caustic liquor while working underneath a tank at the refinery. He claimed that the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank was leaking, which allowed the tank to become filled with liquor after it had been previously verified as empty. He filed suit against Velan, Inc., the manufacturer of the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank, alleging that the valve was unreasonable dangerous in accordance with the Louisiana Products Liability Act. He also filed an intentional tort claim against his employer, Atalco Gramercy, LLC, alleging that Atalco knew the valve was leaking and continued to force employees to work underneath the tank. He claimed that under these conditions, an incident such as his was substantially certain to occur. Following the close of discovery, Velan moved for summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims was appropriate because: (1) the plaintiff’s injuries were a result of Atalco’s misuse of the valve; (2) the plaintiff lacked the expert testimony needed to prove his theory of liability under the Louisiana Product’s Liability Act; (3) the Velan valve at issue was not unreasonably dangerous as defined by the Louisiana Products Liability Act; and (4) the plaintiff was unable to prove proximate causation needed to establish his case of liability against Velan. The Hon. Brian Jackson found that under the undisputed facts presented by Velan, summary judgment was appropriate and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against it, with prejudice.
  • Insight

    No Mercy for Employers in Louisiana Supreme Court’s Recent Magill Decision

    In its recent per curiam opinion, Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska[1], the Louisiana Supreme Court has foreclosed a routine defense strategy to shield employers from direct negligence claims. The high court has extended their 2022 decision in Martin v. Thomas[2], and now allows plaintiffs to pursue direct negligence claims against an employer despite the employer’s stipulation that its employee was in the course-and-scope of employment and caused the accident. Essentially, employers who fail to implement better employment practices will permit plaintiffs to ramp up potential exposure with evidence, if such exists, that heretofore they were routinely barred from introducing at trial. The Supreme Court’s Magill holding should encourage employers to update where needed their policies and procedures pertaining to hiring, training, supervising, and entrusting duties and property to employees, not only for the safety of their employees and customers in this state, but also eliminate employer’s exposure to direct negligence claims. Prior to Martin, a litigation strategy had taken shape where employers stipulated to 1) an employee being in course-and-scope of employment at the time of the accident, 2) that the employee was at fault for the accident being caused, or 3) both. By stipulating these facts, employers were largely able to exclude evidence of any direct negligence on part of the employer and/or narrow the scope of trial to only a contest of the plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court in Martin held that despite an employer admitting their employee was in course and scope when the accident occurred, plaintiffs could pursue direct negligence claims against the employer—as the issue of liability had not been admitted. Accordingly, employers found success by admitting both course and scope and liability—as seen in the Western District of Louisiana’s holding in Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona[3]. In Ferguson, the defendants stipulated that their employee was acting in course-and-scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. Due to the employer’s stipulation of fault, Judge Wicks of the Western District of Louisiana held that Martin did not apply and that plaintiffs could not pursue direct negligence claims. In Magill, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided scarce reasoning for their decision. The high court simply affirmed the District Court’s expansion of the holding in Martin and that the employer’s reliance on the Western District’s Ferguson holding was a misapplication of Louisiana law. The Supreme Court also cited the decision in Tardo v. Farrell.[4] where the Fifth Circuit held that even if an employer and employee stipulate to course and scope and fault, those admissions do not eliminate direct-negligence claims because those claims remain separate issues for the trier of fact. The Fifth Circuit notably stated, “the societal decisions as to who actually pays does not change the manner of assessing fault to all parties as required by law.” This statement raises concern, as plaintiffs may now attempt to challenge employer stipulations that historically narrowed trials. The Supreme Court did not explain its reliance on Tardo, so future litigation will likely clarify the decision’s full impact. Under Magill, plaintiffs are permitted to pursue direct negligence claims against the employer despite the employer admitting that their employee was acting in course and scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. The full effect of the Supreme Court’s decision remains to be seen. In praxis, Magill will permit plaintiffs to put on evidence of direct negligence by an employer in front of a jury who cannot assign fault—as fault has already been stipulated to by the defendants. Employers now face the practical risk that plaintiffs will encourage juries to increase damages as a form of punishment against an employer that admits fault but contests the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries. Employers should use this moment to rigorously review and strengthen policies and procedures related to hiring and training in order to limit exposure when plaintiffs assert direct-negligence claims.  [1] Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska, 2025-00892 (La. 11/12/25) [2] Martin v. Thomas, 21-01490 (La. 6/29/22), 346 So.3d 238 [3] Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, 17-1570, 2023 WL 173413 (W.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) [4] Tardo v. Ferrell, 25-123 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/25), 2025 WL 1516837 (unpublished).