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Expert Reports: Read Carefully Before You Produce Them!

July 24, 2025

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Expert Reports: Read Carefully Before You Produce Them!

Expert reports are common in scientifically complex cases. Every practitioner, regardless of experience level, must read an expert’s report carefully before production. A recent opinion from the Fifth Circuit serves as a cautionary tale against using sloppy expert reports that are fatal to a party’s claim or defense, in this case, the plaintiff.

In Williams v. BP Exploration & Production, Inc., et al,[1] the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently affirmed a district court’s exclusion of expert testimony and the subsequent grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. The plaintiff, Matthew Williams, sued for bodily injuries sustained when he performed oil spill clean-up work in the Gulf of Mexico after the British Petroleum Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010.  A decade later, in 2020, Williams was diagnosed with chronic pansinusitis, a long-term inflammation of the nasal sinuses and linings of the nasal passages. Williams alleged that his chronic condition resulted from exposure to oil, dispersants, and other chemicals during the cleanup work and filed suit against defendants-appellees, BP Exploration & Production, Inc. and BP America Production Co. (collectively, “BP”) under the Back-End Litigation Option (BELO) provisions of the class action settlement relating to the oil spill.

To establish causation, Williams offered the testimony of two expert witnesses to link his chronic pansinusitis diagnosis to his exposure as an oil-spill cleanup worker: Dr. Michael Freeman[2] and Dr. James Clark. BP moved to exclude both expert reports under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert, followed by a motion for summary judgment based on the lack of admissible expert testimony needed to establish specific causation. The district court granted all of BP’s motions, and the Fifth Circuit seeking affirmed.

The Fifth Circuit found Dr. Clark’s testimony unreliable. Dr. Clark’s report repeatedly referred to a different plaintiff, a “Mr. Vincent” instead of “Mr. Williams, six different times, suggesting the report had been repurposed from another case. This prompted the Fifth Circuit to question how carefully Dr. Clark had prepared and reviewed his report, and whether other information in his report was likewise inaccurate. Importantly, Dr. Clark’s report contained a significant factual error—he overestimated Williams’ benzene exposure by twice the actual amount, according to data published by the Environmental Protection Agency. These errors seriously undermined the reliability and factual accuracy supporting Dr. Clark’s conclusions concerning the specific causation of Williams’ injuries. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, noting that Williams had failed to rebut the reasons for exclusion or to demonstrate that the district court had abused its discretion in granting BP’s Daubert motion to exclude Dr. Clark.

The Williams v. BP case is important for several legal and practical reasons. First, this case underscores the critical role of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and the Daubert standard. The Fifth Circuit reaffirmed that expert testimony must be based on reliable methods and applied properly to case facts. Merely asserting a causal link, without rigorous analysis, is not enough—especially in scientifically complex cases. This decision reinforces the judiciary’s “gatekeeping” function, and courts will closely scrutinize expert methodologies and factual accuracy.

Second, and most importantly, the exclusion of Dr. Clark’s testimony, partly due to clerical errors, serves as a cautionary tale to all practitioners. Even seemingly minor cut-and-paste mistakes can undermine the credibility of expert opinions, which can result in exclusion and case dismissal. Expert reports should be specifically tailored for the case at hand and reviewed carefully for factual accuracy.  This case emphasizes the need for rigor and precision in preparing expert reports in litigation

 

[1] Williams v. BP Exploration & Production, Inc., et al, --- F. 4th --- (5th Cir. 2025), 2025 WL 1904153.

[2] For the purpose of this article, we will only be discussing the expert report of Dr. James Clark.

Firm Highlights

  • Insight

    No Mercy for Employers in Louisiana Supreme Court’s Recent Magill Decision

    In its recent per curiam opinion, Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska[1], the Louisiana Supreme Court has foreclosed a routine defense strategy to shield employers from direct negligence claims. The high court has extended their 2022 decision in Martin v. Thomas[2], and now allows plaintiffs to pursue direct negligence claims against an employer despite the employer’s stipulation that its employee was in the course-and-scope of employment and caused the accident. Essentially, employers who fail to implement better employment practices will permit plaintiffs to ramp up potential exposure with evidence, if such exists, that heretofore they were routinely barred from introducing at trial. The Supreme Court’s Magill holding should encourage employers to update where needed their policies and procedures pertaining to hiring, training, supervising, and entrusting duties and property to employees, not only for the safety of their employees and customers in this state, but also eliminate employer’s exposure to direct negligence claims. Prior to Martin, a litigation strategy had taken shape where employers stipulated to 1) an employee being in course-and-scope of employment at the time of the accident, 2) that the employee was at fault for the accident being caused, or 3) both. By stipulating these facts, employers were largely able to exclude evidence of any direct negligence on part of the employer and/or narrow the scope of trial to only a contest of the plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court in Martin held that despite an employer admitting their employee was in course and scope when the accident occurred, plaintiffs could pursue direct negligence claims against the employer—as the issue of liability had not been admitted. Accordingly, employers found success by admitting both course and scope and liability—as seen in the Western District of Louisiana’s holding in Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona[3]. In Ferguson, the defendants stipulated that their employee was acting in course-and-scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. Due to the employer’s stipulation of fault, Judge Wicks of the Western District of Louisiana held that Martin did not apply and that plaintiffs could not pursue direct negligence claims. In Magill, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided scarce reasoning for their decision. The high court simply affirmed the District Court’s expansion of the holding in Martin and that the employer’s reliance on the Western District’s Ferguson holding was a misapplication of Louisiana law. The Supreme Court also cited the decision in Tardo v. Farrell.[4] where the Fifth Circuit held that even if an employer and employee stipulate to course and scope and fault, those admissions do not eliminate direct-negligence claims because those claims remain separate issues for the trier of fact. The Fifth Circuit notably stated, “the societal decisions as to who actually pays does not change the manner of assessing fault to all parties as required by law.” This statement raises concern, as plaintiffs may now attempt to challenge employer stipulations that historically narrowed trials. The Supreme Court did not explain its reliance on Tardo, so future litigation will likely clarify the decision’s full impact. Under Magill, plaintiffs are permitted to pursue direct negligence claims against the employer despite the employer admitting that their employee was acting in course and scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. The full effect of the Supreme Court’s decision remains to be seen. In praxis, Magill will permit plaintiffs to put on evidence of direct negligence by an employer in front of a jury who cannot assign fault—as fault has already been stipulated to by the defendants. Employers now face the practical risk that plaintiffs will encourage juries to increase damages as a form of punishment against an employer that admits fault but contests the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries. Employers should use this moment to rigorously review and strengthen policies and procedures related to hiring and training in order to limit exposure when plaintiffs assert direct-negligence claims.  [1] Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska, 2025-00892 (La. 11/12/25) [2] Martin v. Thomas, 21-01490 (La. 6/29/22), 346 So.3d 238 [3] Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, 17-1570, 2023 WL 173413 (W.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) [4] Tardo v. Ferrell, 25-123 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/25), 2025 WL 1516837 (unpublished).
  • Experience

    Burnell Joseph v. Atalco Gramercy, LLC et al., No. 3:23-cv-505, United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

    Bob Kerrigan and Jose Ruiz successfully secured summary judgment dismissal for their client, Velan, Inc., in a complex intentional tort and products liability act involving catastrophic injury. The plaintiff, a precipitation batch tank operator working at the Atalco alumina refinery in Gramercy, Louisiana, suffered severe and debilitating chemical burn injuries to his face, eyes, and body when he was sprayed with caustic liquor while working underneath a tank at the refinery. He claimed that the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank was leaking, which allowed the tank to become filled with liquor after it had been previously verified as empty. He filed suit against Velan, Inc., the manufacturer of the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank, alleging that the valve was unreasonable dangerous in accordance with the Louisiana Products Liability Act. He also filed an intentional tort claim against his employer, Atalco Gramercy, LLC, alleging that Atalco knew the valve was leaking and continued to force employees to work underneath the tank. He claimed that under these conditions, an incident such as his was substantially certain to occur. Following the close of discovery, Velan moved for summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims was appropriate because: (1) the plaintiff’s injuries were a result of Atalco’s misuse of the valve; (2) the plaintiff lacked the expert testimony needed to prove his theory of liability under the Louisiana Product’s Liability Act; (3) the Velan valve at issue was not unreasonably dangerous as defined by the Louisiana Products Liability Act; and (4) the plaintiff was unable to prove proximate causation needed to establish his case of liability against Velan. The Hon. Brian Jackson found that under the undisputed facts presented by Velan, summary judgment was appropriate and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against it, with prejudice.