Insights

Deutsch Kerrigan Article /

First COVID-19 Lawsuit Filed in Louisiana

March 24, 2020

Kelly E. Theard, Sean P. Mount, Melissa M. Lessell and Raymond C. Lewis

share this page

The first lawsuit pertaining to business interruption claims and interpretation under insurance policies for same has been filed in the Civil District for the Parish of Orleans.  Cajun Conti, LLC, Cajun Cuisine 1 LLC, Cajun Cuisine LLC d/b/a Oceana Grille filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment against Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London (“Lloyd’s”), Governor John B. Edwards in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Louisiana, and the State of Louisiana as it pertains Oceana - Petition for Dec J (executed) insurance coverage under a policy issued by Lloyd’s to the plaintiffs, which operate a restaurant in the French Quarter area in the City of New Orleans.  The suit was filed by John Houghtaling of the Gauthier, Murphy and Houghtaling firm, which was heavily involved in both the Hurricane Katrina and tobacco litigation. It is alleged that the Lloyd’s policy at issue provides coverage for property, business personal property, business income, and extra expense for the relevant policy period at issue.  Plaintiffs further allege that the policy premiums paid to Lloyd’s were to specifically provide all risk coverage, and in particular, the extension of coverage in the event of business closure by order of Civil Authority.  
 
The crux of the plaintiff’s argument centers around the policy not having any exclusion due to losses, business, or property, from a virus or global pandemic. Instead, the policy allegedly only excludes losses due to “biological materials such as pathogens in connection with terrorism or malicious use, therefore, providing coverage to other viruses or global pandemic.” The plaintiffs’ argument further is premised on what they claim is recognition by the scientific community and those personally affected by the virus that the Coronavirus is a cause of real physical loss and damage. Plaintiffs are further asserting that the “deadly virus physically infects and stays on the surface of objects or materials, ‘formites’, for up to twenty-eight days, particularly in humid areas below eighty-four degrees” and thus, the contamination of the premises would be a direct physical loss needing remediation to clean the surfaces of the establishment. They cite Widder v. Louisiana Citizens Proper. Ins. Corp., 2011-0196 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/10/11); 82 So.3d 294, 296, writ denied, 2011-2336 (La. 12/2/11), which was in regard to the intrusion of lead or gaseous fumes, to support that proposition that the contamination caused by the pandemic would constitute a direct physical loss that would need to be remediated. 
 
The Petition goes on further to reference the Orders issued by both the Governor of the State of Louisiana and the Mayor of New Orleans pertaining to the restriction placed on businesses and in particular, restaurants. Please keep in mind that this suit was filed prior to the subsequent orders issued by both the Governor and the Mayor, and thus you can expect the plaintiffs to supplement this Petition to address what is contained in any subsequent orders.

The plaintiffs are seeking a Declaratory Judgment, in pertinent part, on (1) whether the Governor’s March 13, 2020 Civil Authority Order applies to restaurants whose capacity exceeds 250 people; (2) whether the Governor’s March 13, 2020 Civil Authority Order and the Mayor’s March 15, 2020 restrictions trigger the civil authority provisions of the policy issued to plaintiffs; and (3)  an affirmation by the Court that because the policy issued by Lloyd’s does not contain an exclusion for a viral pandemic, the policy provides coverage to plaintiffs for any future civil authority shutdowns of restaurants in the New Orleans area due to direct physical loss from the coronavirus contamination and that the policy provides business income coverage in the event that the coronavirus has contaminated the insured premises.
 
This is an ever evolving set of issues for which we expect to see a litany of suits begin to be filed state and nationwide.  We will certainly keep you updated in regard to new suits, new arguments and how the courts are dealing with these issues.


COVID-19 Response Resource Team:

KELLY E. THEARD

504 593 0667
ktheard@deutschkerrigan.com

SEAN P. MOUNT

504 593 0653
smount@deutschkerrigan.com


MELISSA M. LESSELL

504 593 0689
mlessell@deutschkerrigan.com


RAYMOND C. LEWIS

504 593 0697
rlewis@deutschkerrigan.com

Firm Highlights

  • Experience

    Burnell Joseph v. Atalco Gramercy, LLC et al., No. 3:23-cv-505, United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

    Bob Kerrigan and Jose Ruiz successfully secured summary judgment dismissal for their client, Velan, Inc., in a complex intentional tort and products liability act involving catastrophic injury. The plaintiff, a precipitation batch tank operator working at the Atalco alumina refinery in Gramercy, Louisiana, suffered severe and debilitating chemical burn injuries to his face, eyes, and body when he was sprayed with caustic liquor while working underneath a tank at the refinery. He claimed that the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank was leaking, which allowed the tank to become filled with liquor after it had been previously verified as empty. He filed suit against Velan, Inc., the manufacturer of the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank, alleging that the valve was unreasonable dangerous in accordance with the Louisiana Products Liability Act. He also filed an intentional tort claim against his employer, Atalco Gramercy, LLC, alleging that Atalco knew the valve was leaking and continued to force employees to work underneath the tank. He claimed that under these conditions, an incident such as his was substantially certain to occur. Following the close of discovery, Velan moved for summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims was appropriate because: (1) the plaintiff’s injuries were a result of Atalco’s misuse of the valve; (2) the plaintiff lacked the expert testimony needed to prove his theory of liability under the Louisiana Product’s Liability Act; (3) the Velan valve at issue was not unreasonably dangerous as defined by the Louisiana Products Liability Act; and (4) the plaintiff was unable to prove proximate causation needed to establish his case of liability against Velan. The Hon. Brian Jackson found that under the undisputed facts presented by Velan, summary judgment was appropriate and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against it, with prejudice.
  • Insight

    No Mercy for Employers in Louisiana Supreme Court’s Recent Magill Decision

    In its recent per curiam opinion, Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska[1], the Louisiana Supreme Court has foreclosed a routine defense strategy to shield employers from direct negligence claims. The high court has extended their 2022 decision in Martin v. Thomas[2], and now allows plaintiffs to pursue direct negligence claims against an employer despite the employer’s stipulation that its employee was in the course-and-scope of employment and caused the accident. Essentially, employers who fail to implement better employment practices will permit plaintiffs to ramp up potential exposure with evidence, if such exists, that heretofore they were routinely barred from introducing at trial. The Supreme Court’s Magill holding should encourage employers to update where needed their policies and procedures pertaining to hiring, training, supervising, and entrusting duties and property to employees, not only for the safety of their employees and customers in this state, but also eliminate employer’s exposure to direct negligence claims. Prior to Martin, a litigation strategy had taken shape where employers stipulated to 1) an employee being in course-and-scope of employment at the time of the accident, 2) that the employee was at fault for the accident being caused, or 3) both. By stipulating these facts, employers were largely able to exclude evidence of any direct negligence on part of the employer and/or narrow the scope of trial to only a contest of the plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court in Martin held that despite an employer admitting their employee was in course and scope when the accident occurred, plaintiffs could pursue direct negligence claims against the employer—as the issue of liability had not been admitted. Accordingly, employers found success by admitting both course and scope and liability—as seen in the Western District of Louisiana’s holding in Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona[3]. In Ferguson, the defendants stipulated that their employee was acting in course-and-scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. Due to the employer’s stipulation of fault, Judge Wicks of the Western District of Louisiana held that Martin did not apply and that plaintiffs could not pursue direct negligence claims. In Magill, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided scarce reasoning for their decision. The high court simply affirmed the District Court’s expansion of the holding in Martin and that the employer’s reliance on the Western District’s Ferguson holding was a misapplication of Louisiana law. The Supreme Court also cited the decision in Tardo v. Farrell.[4] where the Fifth Circuit held that even if an employer and employee stipulate to course and scope and fault, those admissions do not eliminate direct-negligence claims because those claims remain separate issues for the trier of fact. The Fifth Circuit notably stated, “the societal decisions as to who actually pays does not change the manner of assessing fault to all parties as required by law.” This statement raises concern, as plaintiffs may now attempt to challenge employer stipulations that historically narrowed trials. The Supreme Court did not explain its reliance on Tardo, so future litigation will likely clarify the decision’s full impact. Under Magill, plaintiffs are permitted to pursue direct negligence claims against the employer despite the employer admitting that their employee was acting in course and scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. The full effect of the Supreme Court’s decision remains to be seen. In praxis, Magill will permit plaintiffs to put on evidence of direct negligence by an employer in front of a jury who cannot assign fault—as fault has already been stipulated to by the defendants. Employers now face the practical risk that plaintiffs will encourage juries to increase damages as a form of punishment against an employer that admits fault but contests the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries. Employers should use this moment to rigorously review and strengthen policies and procedures related to hiring and training in order to limit exposure when plaintiffs assert direct-negligence claims.  [1] Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska, 2025-00892 (La. 11/12/25) [2] Martin v. Thomas, 21-01490 (La. 6/29/22), 346 So.3d 238 [3] Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, 17-1570, 2023 WL 173413 (W.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) [4] Tardo v. Ferrell, 25-123 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/25), 2025 WL 1516837 (unpublished).