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Governor Edwards Extends the Louisiana State of Emergency For COVID-19 and the duration of the “Stay at Home” Order

April 7, 2020

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On April 2, 2020, Governor Edwards issued Proclamation 41 JBE 2020. This 13-page Proclamation extends Governor Edwards’ prior Proclamations, the first of which was issued on March 11, 2020, and extends the “Stay at Home” Order as a result of the continuing statewide public health emergency presented by COVID-19. It also acts, in part, as a summary document, essentially containing the text of all of his prior Proclamations in one convenient place, though does contain some, new fairly significant language.

The general Stay at Home Order applies to all individuals within the State of Louisiana.  It operates to suspend all gatherings of 10 or more people indefinitely.  Further, it requires all Louisiana citizens to continue to stay at home since the original Stay Home Order was put into place last month, unless they are “performing an essential activity.” Essential activities are defined to mean only those activities that have the following purposes:

  1. Obtaining food, medicine, and other similar goods necessary for the individual or a family member of the individual.
  2. Obtaining non-elective medical care and treatment and other similar vital services for an individual or a family member of the individual.
  3. Going to and from an individual's workplace to perform a job function necessary to provide goods or services being sought in Subsections (A) and (B) of this Section, or as otherwise deemed essential worker functions. Guidance provided by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) on what workers are essential is outlined at https://www.cisa.gov/identifying-critical-infrastructure-during-covid-19.
  4. Going to and from an individual’s place of employment remaining open under Section 2C of the Proclamation, provided that the employee has been designated as essential. Section 2C provides that any business not specifically ordered to be closed (Non-Essential Businesses) and not covered by the CISA guidance may continued operations only with essential employees and minimal contact with the public, maintaining social distancing and limiting their staffing relating to business operations to 10 people or less.
  5. Going to and from the home of a family member.
  6. Going to and from an individual's place of worship.
  7. Engaging in outdoor activity, provided individuals maintain a distance of six feet from one another and abide by the 10-person limitation on gathering size established in this proclamation.

With respect to "essential worker functions" that would be exempt from the order, the Governor's order cites to the list established by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, referred to above as the CISA guidance. The Department states that this list is advisory in nature and should not be viewed as a federal directive or standard in and of itself. The list includes 14 broad categories of essential employment sectors: Healthcare / Public Health; Law Enforcement, Public Safety, First Responders; Food And Agriculture; Energy (Electric, Petroleum,  Natural and Propane Gas); Water and Wastewater; Transportation and Logistics; Public Works; Communications And Information Technology; Other Community-Based Government Operations And Essential Functions; Critical Manufacturing; Hazardous Materials; Financial Services; Chemical; and Defense Industrial Base.

It appears that Governor Edwards' office utilized this list so that interstate commerce would have a uniform, albeit broad, set of rules. However, how local businesses and intrastate commerce should interpret and abide by these broad rules is less clear. If you have questions about the order's applicability to your operations, please contact our office and we will work to get you an answer.

Non-Essential Businesses are to remain closed indefinitely. These businesses include: all places of public amusement, whether indoors or outdoors (bowling alleys, bars, casinos, racetracks, music and concert halls, theaters, movie theaters, museums, arcades, aquariums, zoos, amusement parks, children’s play centers, playgrounds, etc.); all personal care and grooming businesses; fitness centers, gyms and similar businesses; and all malls, except for stores in a mall that have a direct outdoor entrance and exit that provide essential services and products as defined by CISA guidance (e.g. big box retailers that sell human food, pet food or supplies, or pharmacy/health supplies).  Non-Essential Businesses are not prohibited from conducting activities such as payroll, maintenance or upkeep as necessary.

Further, the Governor’s April 2, 2020 Proclamation continues the restrictions on the sale of on-premises food and beverages by all restaurants, cafes, and coffee shops, but does specifically allow such entities to continue to provide their services in a delivery/take-out fashion.

Notably the Governor’s April 2, 2020 Proclamation contains new language authorizing the chief law enforcement office of any political subdivision to promulgate any orders (unspecifying the amount or any restrictions on the same) to “protect life and property and to bring the emergency situation under control.”  The example given is the institution of a local curfew from 10 p.m. to 5 a.m., however, the language in the Proclamation can be seen to give fairly unfettered freedom to the local governments. See,41 JBE 2020 at Section 2E.

Additionally, the Governor’s Order also extends all legal deadlines, including those that relate to liberative prescription and peremption.

Firm Highlights

  • Experience

    Burnell Joseph v. Atalco Gramercy, LLC et al., No. 3:23-cv-505, United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

    Bob Kerrigan and Jose Ruiz successfully secured summary judgment dismissal for their client, Velan, Inc., in a complex intentional tort and products liability act involving catastrophic injury. The plaintiff, a precipitation batch tank operator working at the Atalco alumina refinery in Gramercy, Louisiana, suffered severe and debilitating chemical burn injuries to his face, eyes, and body when he was sprayed with caustic liquor while working underneath a tank at the refinery. He claimed that the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank was leaking, which allowed the tank to become filled with liquor after it had been previously verified as empty. He filed suit against Velan, Inc., the manufacturer of the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank, alleging that the valve was unreasonable dangerous in accordance with the Louisiana Products Liability Act. He also filed an intentional tort claim against his employer, Atalco Gramercy, LLC, alleging that Atalco knew the valve was leaking and continued to force employees to work underneath the tank. He claimed that under these conditions, an incident such as his was substantially certain to occur. Following the close of discovery, Velan moved for summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims was appropriate because: (1) the plaintiff’s injuries were a result of Atalco’s misuse of the valve; (2) the plaintiff lacked the expert testimony needed to prove his theory of liability under the Louisiana Product’s Liability Act; (3) the Velan valve at issue was not unreasonably dangerous as defined by the Louisiana Products Liability Act; and (4) the plaintiff was unable to prove proximate causation needed to establish his case of liability against Velan. The Hon. Brian Jackson found that under the undisputed facts presented by Velan, summary judgment was appropriate and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against it, with prejudice.
  • Insight

    No Mercy for Employers in Louisiana Supreme Court’s Recent Magill Decision

    In its recent per curiam opinion, Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska[1], the Louisiana Supreme Court has foreclosed a routine defense strategy to shield employers from direct negligence claims. The high court has extended their 2022 decision in Martin v. Thomas[2], and now allows plaintiffs to pursue direct negligence claims against an employer despite the employer’s stipulation that its employee was in the course-and-scope of employment and caused the accident. Essentially, employers who fail to implement better employment practices will permit plaintiffs to ramp up potential exposure with evidence, if such exists, that heretofore they were routinely barred from introducing at trial. The Supreme Court’s Magill holding should encourage employers to update where needed their policies and procedures pertaining to hiring, training, supervising, and entrusting duties and property to employees, not only for the safety of their employees and customers in this state, but also eliminate employer’s exposure to direct negligence claims. Prior to Martin, a litigation strategy had taken shape where employers stipulated to 1) an employee being in course-and-scope of employment at the time of the accident, 2) that the employee was at fault for the accident being caused, or 3) both. By stipulating these facts, employers were largely able to exclude evidence of any direct negligence on part of the employer and/or narrow the scope of trial to only a contest of the plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court in Martin held that despite an employer admitting their employee was in course and scope when the accident occurred, plaintiffs could pursue direct negligence claims against the employer—as the issue of liability had not been admitted. Accordingly, employers found success by admitting both course and scope and liability—as seen in the Western District of Louisiana’s holding in Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona[3]. In Ferguson, the defendants stipulated that their employee was acting in course-and-scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. Due to the employer’s stipulation of fault, Judge Wicks of the Western District of Louisiana held that Martin did not apply and that plaintiffs could not pursue direct negligence claims. In Magill, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided scarce reasoning for their decision. The high court simply affirmed the District Court’s expansion of the holding in Martin and that the employer’s reliance on the Western District’s Ferguson holding was a misapplication of Louisiana law. The Supreme Court also cited the decision in Tardo v. Farrell.[4] where the Fifth Circuit held that even if an employer and employee stipulate to course and scope and fault, those admissions do not eliminate direct-negligence claims because those claims remain separate issues for the trier of fact. The Fifth Circuit notably stated, “the societal decisions as to who actually pays does not change the manner of assessing fault to all parties as required by law.” This statement raises concern, as plaintiffs may now attempt to challenge employer stipulations that historically narrowed trials. The Supreme Court did not explain its reliance on Tardo, so future litigation will likely clarify the decision’s full impact. Under Magill, plaintiffs are permitted to pursue direct negligence claims against the employer despite the employer admitting that their employee was acting in course and scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. The full effect of the Supreme Court’s decision remains to be seen. In praxis, Magill will permit plaintiffs to put on evidence of direct negligence by an employer in front of a jury who cannot assign fault—as fault has already been stipulated to by the defendants. Employers now face the practical risk that plaintiffs will encourage juries to increase damages as a form of punishment against an employer that admits fault but contests the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries. Employers should use this moment to rigorously review and strengthen policies and procedures related to hiring and training in order to limit exposure when plaintiffs assert direct-negligence claims.  [1] Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska, 2025-00892 (La. 11/12/25) [2] Martin v. Thomas, 21-01490 (La. 6/29/22), 346 So.3d 238 [3] Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, 17-1570, 2023 WL 173413 (W.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) [4] Tardo v. Ferrell, 25-123 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/25), 2025 WL 1516837 (unpublished).