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Timely Notice Required: U.S. Fifth Circuit Affirms District Court’s Denial of Coverage Due to Prejudicial Delay by Insured to Inform Carrier of Claim

February 21, 2025

Written by Karina Shareen

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Timely Notice Required: U.S. Fifth Circuit Affirms District Court’s Denial of Coverage Due to Prejudicial Delay by Insured to Inform Carrier of Claim

In the case of Champagne v. A & T Maritime Logistics, Inc., et al., the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's decision to deny insurance coverage due to the insured's delayed notification of a claim, which prejudiced the insurer. The case involved a vessel's allision[1] with an embankment on Bayou Black and the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway in Houma, Louisiana. RLI Insurance Company (“RLI”) had issued a protection and indemnity policy to A & T Maritime.

A & T Maritime had been hired by a company to move barges between the lower Mississippi River and Houston. Since A & T Maritime did not own a vessel, it entered into a bareboat charter agreement with Alexis Marine in 2020 for the M/V Uncle Blue. The agreement required A & T Maritime to add Alexis Marine as an additional insured on its insurance policies, including the one issued by RLI.

At one point during the project, the M/V Uncle Blue suffered a blown engine, leading A & T Maritime to switch to a different vessel, the M/V Uncle John. Both A & T Maritime and Alexis Marine agreed that the bareboat charter terms would apply to this replacement vessel.

On March 10, 2020, while operating the M/V Uncle John for Russell Marine, A & T Maritime caused the vessel to strike an embankment. Although A & T Maritime photographed the damage, it did not deem the incident significant. The company failed to notify RLI about the allision or the resulting damage. Instead, A & T Maritime offered $3,500 to Mildred Dampeer, the embankment's owner, to cover the damage. Dampeer rejected the offer.

Five months later, on August 30, 2020, Dampeer informed A & T Maritime that the damage was worsening. With no settlement reached, Dampeer sold her portion of the embankment to Robert and Elizabeth Champagne (the “Champagnes”), who included an assignment of rights in the sale. The Champagnes then sued A & T Maritime and Alexis Marine. In response, Alexis Marine filed a crossclaim against A & T Maritime and a third-party claim against RLI. A & T Maritime filed a similar crossclaim against RLI, seeking defense, indemnity, and reimbursement for defense costs. RLI was not notified about the allision until the Champagnes filed their lawsuit. Once RLI was informed, it filed counterclaims against A & T Maritime, Alexis Marine, and the M/V Uncle John.

A & T Maritime and Alexis Marine both sought partial summary judgment, requesting reimbursement for their defense costs. The district court denied these motions, ruling that A & T Maritime’s coverage was disputed and that the policy did not impose a duty to defend. As a result, RLI was not required to reimburse defense costs. The district court held that the duty to reimburse defense costs merged with RLI's duty to indemnify.

In August 2022, RLI moved for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the claims against them. The district court granted RLI’s motion, finding that A & T Maritime had violated the policy's notice requirements and that this breach had prejudiced RLI.

On appeal, A & T Maritime argued that: (1) its notice to RLI was not unduly delayed; (2) exclusion of all coverage was not the appropriate remedy; and (3) the policy required RLI to pay defense costs as they were incurred.

The RLI policy contained three separate "prompt notice" provisions. The Fifth Circuit emphasized that, under Louisiana law, an insurer must demonstrate actual prejudice from a late notice to deny coverage. A & T Maritime argued that because RLI had the opportunity to participate in the defense of the lawsuit from the beginning, the delay in notification did not prejudice the insurer. However, the Fifth Circuit rejected this argument, asserting that actual prejudice needed to be demonstrated.

The Court concluded that RLI had been prejudiced because A & T Maritime failed to take necessary action after the allision. Despite being notified that the damage was worsening, A & T Maritime took no steps to mitigate the damage or protect RLI's interests, such as evaluating the costs or damages. As a result, RLI lost the chance to settle the claim for $3,500, and the damage ultimately led to a $200,000 settlement. The Court ruled that RLI had shown sufficient prejudice, making denial of coverage the appropriate decision.

This case shows the importance of timely notifying a carrier of a potential claim, regardless of how significant or insignificant, an insured thinks the damage may be. Failure to timely provide notice of a claim may cause actual prejudice to a carrier, which could preclude of liability coverage under a policy.


[1] An ‘allision’ is defined as the ‘running of one ship upon another that is stationery.’ Distinct from ‘collision,’ an allision occurs when a ship strikes a stationary object while a collision involves two moving vessels or objects. Trico Marine Assets Inc. v. Diamond B Marine Servs. Inc., 332 F.3d 779, 786 (5th Cir. 2003).

Firm Highlights

  • Experience

    Burnell Joseph v. Atalco Gramercy, LLC et al., No. 3:23-cv-505, United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

    Bob Kerrigan and Jose Ruiz successfully secured summary judgment dismissal for their client, Velan, Inc., in a complex intentional tort and products liability act involving catastrophic injury. The plaintiff, a precipitation batch tank operator working at the Atalco alumina refinery in Gramercy, Louisiana, suffered severe and debilitating chemical burn injuries to his face, eyes, and body when he was sprayed with caustic liquor while working underneath a tank at the refinery. He claimed that the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank was leaking, which allowed the tank to become filled with liquor after it had been previously verified as empty. He filed suit against Velan, Inc., the manufacturer of the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank, alleging that the valve was unreasonable dangerous in accordance with the Louisiana Products Liability Act. He also filed an intentional tort claim against his employer, Atalco Gramercy, LLC, alleging that Atalco knew the valve was leaking and continued to force employees to work underneath the tank. He claimed that under these conditions, an incident such as his was substantially certain to occur. Following the close of discovery, Velan moved for summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims was appropriate because: (1) the plaintiff’s injuries were a result of Atalco’s misuse of the valve; (2) the plaintiff lacked the expert testimony needed to prove his theory of liability under the Louisiana Product’s Liability Act; (3) the Velan valve at issue was not unreasonably dangerous as defined by the Louisiana Products Liability Act; and (4) the plaintiff was unable to prove proximate causation needed to establish his case of liability against Velan. The Hon. Brian Jackson found that under the undisputed facts presented by Velan, summary judgment was appropriate and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against it, with prejudice.
  • Insight

    No Mercy for Employers in Louisiana Supreme Court’s Recent Magill Decision

    In its recent per curiam opinion, Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska[1], the Louisiana Supreme Court has foreclosed a routine defense strategy to shield employers from direct negligence claims. The high court has extended their 2022 decision in Martin v. Thomas[2], and now allows plaintiffs to pursue direct negligence claims against an employer despite the employer’s stipulation that its employee was in the course-and-scope of employment and caused the accident. Essentially, employers who fail to implement better employment practices will permit plaintiffs to ramp up potential exposure with evidence, if such exists, that heretofore they were routinely barred from introducing at trial. The Supreme Court’s Magill holding should encourage employers to update where needed their policies and procedures pertaining to hiring, training, supervising, and entrusting duties and property to employees, not only for the safety of their employees and customers in this state, but also eliminate employer’s exposure to direct negligence claims. Prior to Martin, a litigation strategy had taken shape where employers stipulated to 1) an employee being in course-and-scope of employment at the time of the accident, 2) that the employee was at fault for the accident being caused, or 3) both. By stipulating these facts, employers were largely able to exclude evidence of any direct negligence on part of the employer and/or narrow the scope of trial to only a contest of the plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court in Martin held that despite an employer admitting their employee was in course and scope when the accident occurred, plaintiffs could pursue direct negligence claims against the employer—as the issue of liability had not been admitted. Accordingly, employers found success by admitting both course and scope and liability—as seen in the Western District of Louisiana’s holding in Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona[3]. In Ferguson, the defendants stipulated that their employee was acting in course-and-scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. Due to the employer’s stipulation of fault, Judge Wicks of the Western District of Louisiana held that Martin did not apply and that plaintiffs could not pursue direct negligence claims. In Magill, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided scarce reasoning for their decision. The high court simply affirmed the District Court’s expansion of the holding in Martin and that the employer’s reliance on the Western District’s Ferguson holding was a misapplication of Louisiana law. The Supreme Court also cited the decision in Tardo v. Farrell.[4] where the Fifth Circuit held that even if an employer and employee stipulate to course and scope and fault, those admissions do not eliminate direct-negligence claims because those claims remain separate issues for the trier of fact. The Fifth Circuit notably stated, “the societal decisions as to who actually pays does not change the manner of assessing fault to all parties as required by law.” This statement raises concern, as plaintiffs may now attempt to challenge employer stipulations that historically narrowed trials. The Supreme Court did not explain its reliance on Tardo, so future litigation will likely clarify the decision’s full impact. Under Magill, plaintiffs are permitted to pursue direct negligence claims against the employer despite the employer admitting that their employee was acting in course and scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. The full effect of the Supreme Court’s decision remains to be seen. In praxis, Magill will permit plaintiffs to put on evidence of direct negligence by an employer in front of a jury who cannot assign fault—as fault has already been stipulated to by the defendants. Employers now face the practical risk that plaintiffs will encourage juries to increase damages as a form of punishment against an employer that admits fault but contests the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries. Employers should use this moment to rigorously review and strengthen policies and procedures related to hiring and training in order to limit exposure when plaintiffs assert direct-negligence claims.  [1] Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska, 2025-00892 (La. 11/12/25) [2] Martin v. Thomas, 21-01490 (La. 6/29/22), 346 So.3d 238 [3] Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, 17-1570, 2023 WL 173413 (W.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) [4] Tardo v. Ferrell, 25-123 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/25), 2025 WL 1516837 (unpublished).