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Unequivocal Intended Benefit: Protecting Subcontractors and Design Professionals Under the AIA’s Subrogation Waiver

March 21, 2024

Zachary D. Howser

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Unequivocal Intended Benefit: Protecting Subcontractors and Design Professionals Under the AIA’s Subrogation Waiver

Subrogation is a legal principle which allows one person, called the subrogee, to be substituted to the rights of another, called the subrogor. One of the most common occurrences of subrogation is when a property insurance company, upon paying a damage claim, is substituted for the claims of the insured, typically the property owner, entitling the insurance company to pursue recovery against the entity or person who caused the loss.

In construction cases, where the owner purchases Builder’s Risk coverage for the project, subrogated insurance companies could cause significant interruptions in the progress of the work by seeking recovery against the contractor or other negligent party through litigation.  To avoid such litigation, many construction contracts contain provisions in which the owner and contractor waive all rights against each other to the extent the damages are covered by property insurance, typically the owner’s. Such provisions have the added salutary benefit of denying the property insurer of any subrogation to the owner’s (or contractor’s) claims for damages.

These “subrogation waivers,” as they have come to be called, can be a lifesaver for the contractor. Such clauses allow contractors, who would normally shoulder all risk of loss before project completion, to completely avoid that risk to the extent that insurance covers the loss. The intent is to eliminate litigation that would otherwise disrupt construction by having contracting parties look only to the owner's insurance for protection in the event of loss.

A particularly common subrogation waiver is contained in the American Institute of Architects (“AIA”) A201 General Conditions form. This clause, A201-2017, § 11.3.1 (“Section 11.3.1”)[1] provides that:

The Owner and Contractor waive all rights against (1) each other and any of their subcontractors, sub-subcontractors, agents and employees, each of the other, and (2) the Architect, Architect's consultants, separate contractors described in Article 6, if any, and any of their subcontractors, sub-subcontractors, agents and employees, for damages caused by fire or other causes of loss to the extent covered by property insurance obtained pursuant to this Section 11.3 or other property insurance applicable to the Work.[2]

While the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that Section 11.3.1 has generated “more than its fair share of litigation,”[3] Louisiana appellate courts have rarely considered the application and enforceability of Section 11.3.1. [4]

In 2700 Bohn Motor, LLC v. F.H. Myers Constr. Corp., 2021-0671, (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/20/22) 338 So.3d 500, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal provided welcome guidance, holding both that Section 11.3.1 was enforceable and, also protected non-signatory subcontractors and that the clause did not violate Louisiana’s anti-indemnity statute, La. R.S. 9:2780.1

In Bohn Motor, a fire occurred during the renovation of an automobile dealership in New Orleans. The owner and its insurer paid the costs for repairs and then sued the general contractor and multiple subcontractors for negligence. The trial dismissed by summary judgment all claims against the contractor and several of the subcontractors.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed. First, the court held that Section 11.3.1 did not violate Louisiana’s anti-indemnification statute because a waiver of subrogation clause did not shift liability between the parties, in the absence of an indemnity provision which the contract did not contain. In the absence of an indemnity clause, the subrogation waiver merely allocated the risk of loss to the extent of insurance coverage.

Second, the Fourth Circuit found Section 11.3.1 to be enforceable even as to non-signatory subcontractors. Louisiana’s Civil Code Article 1978 permits contracting parties to stipulate a benefit for a third person, commonly referred to as a “stipulation pour autrui.” Three factors are used to determine whether contracting parties provided a benefit for a third party: 1) the stipulation is manifestly clear; 2) there is certainty as to the benefit provided; and 3) the benefit is not a mere incident of the contract. The Fourth Circuit found the plain language of Section 11.3.1 was manifestly clear, the benefit certain and not incident, thereby establishing the subcontractors as third-party beneficiaries of the A201 contract under Louisiana law.

In Board of Trustees of Oakton, Community College District #535 v. Legat Architects, Inc., 2022 Ill. App. 210155-U, 2022WL1201821 the Board of Trustees of an Illinois community college, entered into a contract with various contractors and subcontractor defendants, including the architect for construction of a new building on their campus. This contract expressly incorporated, by reference, the A201-2007 General Conditions of the Contract for Construction, including Section 11.3.1. The College filed suit after the concrete slab for a new campus building settled unevenly and had to be demolished and replaced.

The architect filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing plaintiff's claims were barred pursuant to Section 11.3.1 and specifically that the architect was an intended third-party beneficiary to the contract based on Section 11.3.1. The trial court granted the architect’s motion and plaintiff appealed. The Illinois Appellate Court found that the architect was 'undoubtedly' an intended third-party beneficiary, as the architect is one of the parties explicitly identified in Section 11.3.1, and that Section 11.3.1 constituted an 'unequivocal intended benefit' to the architect.

Additionally, the Court pointed to Section 1.1.2 of the A201 Agreement, stating:

“Additionally, Section 1.1.2 of the CM agreement expressly states: “The Architect shall, however, be entitled to performance and enforcement of obligations under the Contract intended to facilitate performance of the Architect's duties.” The only way to interpret that language is as an explicit intention to benefit Legat with rights under the CM agreement.”

The Appellate Court ultimately held that the architect was an intended third-party beneficiary to the contract and affirmed summary judgment in the architect’s favor.

The Bohn Motor case established that a subrogation waiver such as Section 11.3.1 can apply to the signatories’ subcontractors if the clause satisfies the elements establishing the subcontractors as third-party beneficiaries. The Oakton decision demonstrates that application of Section 11.3.1 to architects and design professionals flows naturally from the reasoning in Bohn Motor for those seeking application of the AIA subrogation waiver to design professionals and other subcontractors.

 

[1] The AIA 201 Subrogation Waiver was previously designated as § 11.3.7. The 2017 revision changed the section number to § 11.3.1. All references in this article have been changed to § 11.3.1.

[2] See Gray Ins. Co. v. Old Tyme Builders, Inc., 03-1136 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2004), 878 So. 2d 603, writ denied, 04-1067 (La. 6/18/04), 876 So.2d 814 (General contractor's liability insurer sought reimbursement from subcontractor for damages paid due to the subcontractor's alleged faulty workmanship. The court held that the waiver of subrogation provision of the construction contract precluded the insurer's claim.); See also Starr Surplus Lines Insurance Company v. Bernhard MCC, L.L.C., 20-78 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2020), 308 So. 3d 372, writ denied, 21-00031(La. 3/2/21), 311 So. 3d 1060 (where builder's risk insurer reimbursed contractor for water damage caused by subcontractor, the insurer's subrogation action against the subcontractor was barred by the AIA's waiver of subrogation provision and additionally, the builder's risk policy precluded subrogation against any person or entity with which the insured had waived its rights of subrogation).

[3] Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Fowlkes Plumbing, L.L.C., 934 F.3d 424, 426 (5th Cir. 2019)

[4] See Gray Ins. Co. v. Old Tyme Builders, Inc., 03-1136 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/2/04), 878 So.2d 603, 604, writ denied, 04-1067 (La. 6/18/04), 876 So.2d 814.

Firm Highlights

  • Insight

    No Mercy for Employers in Louisiana Supreme Court’s Recent Magill Decision

    In its recent per curiam opinion, Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska[1], the Louisiana Supreme Court has foreclosed a routine defense strategy to shield employers from direct negligence claims. The high court has extended their 2022 decision in Martin v. Thomas[2], and now allows plaintiffs to pursue direct negligence claims against an employer despite the employer’s stipulation that its employee was in the course-and-scope of employment and caused the accident. Essentially, employers who fail to implement better employment practices will permit plaintiffs to ramp up potential exposure with evidence, if such exists, that heretofore they were routinely barred from introducing at trial. The Supreme Court’s Magill holding should encourage employers to update where needed their policies and procedures pertaining to hiring, training, supervising, and entrusting duties and property to employees, not only for the safety of their employees and customers in this state, but also eliminate employer’s exposure to direct negligence claims. Prior to Martin, a litigation strategy had taken shape where employers stipulated to 1) an employee being in course-and-scope of employment at the time of the accident, 2) that the employee was at fault for the accident being caused, or 3) both. By stipulating these facts, employers were largely able to exclude evidence of any direct negligence on part of the employer and/or narrow the scope of trial to only a contest of the plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court in Martin held that despite an employer admitting their employee was in course and scope when the accident occurred, plaintiffs could pursue direct negligence claims against the employer—as the issue of liability had not been admitted. Accordingly, employers found success by admitting both course and scope and liability—as seen in the Western District of Louisiana’s holding in Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona[3]. In Ferguson, the defendants stipulated that their employee was acting in course-and-scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. Due to the employer’s stipulation of fault, Judge Wicks of the Western District of Louisiana held that Martin did not apply and that plaintiffs could not pursue direct negligence claims. In Magill, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided scarce reasoning for their decision. The high court simply affirmed the District Court’s expansion of the holding in Martin and that the employer’s reliance on the Western District’s Ferguson holding was a misapplication of Louisiana law. The Supreme Court also cited the decision in Tardo v. Farrell.[4] where the Fifth Circuit held that even if an employer and employee stipulate to course and scope and fault, those admissions do not eliminate direct-negligence claims because those claims remain separate issues for the trier of fact. The Fifth Circuit notably stated, “the societal decisions as to who actually pays does not change the manner of assessing fault to all parties as required by law.” This statement raises concern, as plaintiffs may now attempt to challenge employer stipulations that historically narrowed trials. The Supreme Court did not explain its reliance on Tardo, so future litigation will likely clarify the decision’s full impact. Under Magill, plaintiffs are permitted to pursue direct negligence claims against the employer despite the employer admitting that their employee was acting in course and scope at the time of the accident and their employee was 100% at fault for the accident being caused. The full effect of the Supreme Court’s decision remains to be seen. In praxis, Magill will permit plaintiffs to put on evidence of direct negligence by an employer in front of a jury who cannot assign fault—as fault has already been stipulated to by the defendants. Employers now face the practical risk that plaintiffs will encourage juries to increase damages as a form of punishment against an employer that admits fault but contests the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries. Employers should use this moment to rigorously review and strengthen policies and procedures related to hiring and training in order to limit exposure when plaintiffs assert direct-negligence claims.  [1] Magill v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. of Nebraska, 2025-00892 (La. 11/12/25) [2] Martin v. Thomas, 21-01490 (La. 6/29/22), 346 So.3d 238 [3] Ferguson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, 17-1570, 2023 WL 173413 (W.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) [4] Tardo v. Ferrell, 25-123 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/25), 2025 WL 1516837 (unpublished).
  • Experience

    Burnell Joseph v. Atalco Gramercy, LLC et al., No. 3:23-cv-505, United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

    Bob Kerrigan and Jose Ruiz successfully secured summary judgment dismissal for their client, Velan, Inc., in a complex intentional tort and products liability act involving catastrophic injury. The plaintiff, a precipitation batch tank operator working at the Atalco alumina refinery in Gramercy, Louisiana, suffered severe and debilitating chemical burn injuries to his face, eyes, and body when he was sprayed with caustic liquor while working underneath a tank at the refinery. He claimed that the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank was leaking, which allowed the tank to become filled with liquor after it had been previously verified as empty. He filed suit against Velan, Inc., the manufacturer of the valve that controlled the flow of liquor into the tank, alleging that the valve was unreasonable dangerous in accordance with the Louisiana Products Liability Act. He also filed an intentional tort claim against his employer, Atalco Gramercy, LLC, alleging that Atalco knew the valve was leaking and continued to force employees to work underneath the tank. He claimed that under these conditions, an incident such as his was substantially certain to occur. Following the close of discovery, Velan moved for summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims was appropriate because: (1) the plaintiff’s injuries were a result of Atalco’s misuse of the valve; (2) the plaintiff lacked the expert testimony needed to prove his theory of liability under the Louisiana Product’s Liability Act; (3) the Velan valve at issue was not unreasonably dangerous as defined by the Louisiana Products Liability Act; and (4) the plaintiff was unable to prove proximate causation needed to establish his case of liability against Velan. The Hon. Brian Jackson found that under the undisputed facts presented by Velan, summary judgment was appropriate and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against it, with prejudice.